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This study attempts to illustrate the explanatory,
taxonomic and practical potential of the linguistic ap¬
proach to architecture. The structural paradigm which
the study introduces follows the philosophy of semantic
syntax, is orientated to the solution of particular
problems and can be applied to particular institutional
and building categories.
The study consists of two parts. In the first part,
the main concepts of the linguistic paradigm are
introduced and are, also, formulated through the analysis
of the problem of alienation. In the second part, the
general theory is filtered through the study of
universities and of the planning methods which deal with
them (namely, the 'activity models' and the 'pattern —
language'). The examples of alienation and universities
are adopted as being typical and at the same time
particular enough to show the value of the concepts and
methods introduced by the theory.
The author hopes that, in the end, some main
conclusions will become clear to the reader of this
study. Such conclusions are:
a. that it is possible to understand the architectural
realities in a comprehensive way, by using a model which
contains a limited number of basic concepts,
b. that such a model, through its taxonomic capacity,
recovers areas of problems and proposals for their
solutions which, until now, have remained either obscure
or underestimated,
c. that the manipulation of the linguistic paradigm in
architecture illustrates the superiority and realistic
character of the concepts and the assumptions on which
the paradigm is based, such as: the necessity of a
semantic and not autonomous approach to the built space;
the inevitability of an explanation based on problems
and, therefore, automatically orientated to the solution
of them; finally, the importance of a multi—level
understanding of the artificial environment as well as
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NOTE
Some quotations from E.A.R.(Edinburgh Architecture
Research -3 and-4)are written as normal text because
of their close connection with the meaning developed
in the original text of the thesis.
This is clearly indicated before and after the
quotation; e.g.:
...The following part is taken from E.A.R./3:
Consider two theories
the built space (part taken from
E.A.R./3,pp.45-46).
My emphasis within quoted text is in spaced out lettering,
while author's emphasis is indicated by underlining.





Although the history of architectural thinking has
been marked by numerous attempts to structure a scientific
corpus of the description and planning of artificial
space, it is generally accepted that architecture is not
established as what might be called a 'normal science".
A natural consequence of this is that theoretical
thinking in this domain has an interdisciplinary
character and makes extensive use of models and paradigms
from other domains of inquiry. So, architecture seems to
be continuously at the crossroads, where the need for a
way of thinking more general and more philosophical than
in other sciences is always present.
The recent history of theories concerned with
explanation of and. action on the built environment has
shown this interdisciplinary and unstable process.
We can accept that, in general, architecture has passed
from a purely aesthetical era to an era of 'borrowing'
from sciences or technologies which dispose methodological
apparatuses that architectural theorists have considered
as suitable for the organization and applicability of
their own methods.
One aspect of this borrowing refers to methods of
a limited significance for architectural theory as a
whole, but of high practical importance for the solution
of particular problems. University planning is an
example, where such techniques have been largely applied
with more or less successful results as regards their own
prescriptions.
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The other aspect of 'scientific borrowing1 of which
architecture is making use, refers to paradigms which are
far more ambitious than the techniques mentioned previous¬
ly and which are intended to structure or re-structure
the scientific corpus of architectural thinking. The
attempts to consider the production of artificial
space as incorporated in a more general mode of production
and,consequently, to consider buildings as products and
architecture as a social science are examples of this
second aspect and signify what might be called the
"social era' in architectural thinking. However, it is
now realised that such, perfectly justifiable, efforts
have driven architecture to methodological deadlocks,
where the social criticism of architectural production
functions as a barrier for the solution of its practical
problems.
Such deadlocks signify, in my view, a turning point
in the theories of built space. The basic characte¬
ristic of this turning point is the internalization by
theorists of the need for a new and mcrt comprehensive
integration of both methodological and social thinking as
regards the artificial environment and its production.
It is certain that such a desirable integration can¬
not automatically signify the beginning of architecture as
a normal science and that the theorists who attempt such
an integration are obliged to make extensive use of the
refuge of scientific borrowing. It is for this reason
that the present study as well as the team work presented
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in EAR/3 and EAR/4 are well aware of their almost crude
simplifications and of their limitations. What they
propose, however, can be classified as an attempt
towards such a direction, that is to the direction of
combining methodological and social thinking in
architecture.
This particular attempt is based upon a metaphor
from the area of structural linguistics. There is nothing
new in this, since architectural practice has been seen
quite frequently in the past as a phenomenon analogous
to that of language. Recently, however, these views
have taken a more concrete and systematic form probably
influenced by the development of structuralism as a
more general philosophy and by the development of semiotics
as the general science of signs where linguistics is
incorporated. Where the present study hopes to contribute
is a review of such efforts and a criticism of some
problematic points^mainly those which function as an
implicit barrier against the social integration of the
linguistic views in architecture. It considers, therefore,
these linguistic views from an aspect which opposes the
construction of autonomous syntaxes of the built space
and advocates a more socially meaningful manipulation
of 'architectural language'.
2.
A theory of architectural practice, borrowed or not
imposes in my view an important question concerned with.
16
the unity of architecture. It is part of our common sense
that, although building-types correspond to institutional
categories which have shown remarkable particularities
in historical terms, the practice on them is viewed as
belonging to a more or less unified category of human
action. The question is concerned with the extent to
which a general mode of thinking, in the form of a
descriptive theory equipped with practical 'beyonds',
is capable of dealing with all the particularities that
such institutional categories imply as regards their
environmental representation. An important consequence
of the above yet unanswered question is that the linguistic
approach to architecture, as any approach, has to be
tested through its application to particular institutional
categories and not be discussed in merely general terms.
While such a test seems to correspond to a clear
necessity, the issues which it implies are not few.
A first area of such issues refers to the demands from a
general theory and a second one to the problems that the
institutional categories and their building—types
incorporate:
The main corpus of a descriptive theory of the built
space based on the linguistic metaphor has to be clearly
articulated by using a limited number of concepts of
general value. This means that such a general theory
inevitably acquires a taxonomic character; that is, it
introduces a series of concepts which dispose the
capacity of attributing a clear identity to an institutio—
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nal and building category, of classifying it and, finally,
of explaining it in depth. Moreover, such concepts should
recover areas of problems which have remained until now
obscure, underestimated or only empirically internalized.
It is interesting that some of these problems are
of such general social origin that they can be hardly con¬
nected with any institutional category or building-type
in particular. Yet, they are clear enough to indicate
the capacity of a general theory to describe them as
regards the artificial space. The problem of alienation
is one characteristic example. This example is used here
to illustrate the potential formalization of the concepts
introduced by the linguistic paradigm and, also, to il¬
lustrate aspects of the problem of alienation which until
now have not been taken seriously into account in the
study of the built environment.
Finally, one of the most important demands from a
general theory is that it should be able to classify and
explain not only the institutional category and the
building-type with which it deals, but also, the
explanatory or planning apparatuses which have been
developed around such categories and building-types.
It is obvious that a proposed explanatory theory is in a
state of feedback with such already established apparatuses;
it attempts to clarify them and, at the same time, to
clarify its own corpus.
The second area of issues concerned with the ap¬
plication of the linguistic paradigm refers to a series of
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conceptual problems directly introduced by the building-
types themselves. There are many assumptions included in
the acceptance of what I have already called 'institutio¬
nal categories' and 'bulding-types which correspond to
such categories'.
This acceptance, first, presupposes that there is a
kind of clear correspondance between the institutional
and the environmental image of such categories ;second,
it is to some extent contradictory with the taxonomic
character of the general paradigm the aim of which is
exactly to identify such categories.
The solution of such problems and contradictions
belongs to a more philosophical level. However, some
critical points have to be emphasized in simpler terms:
It is in fact impossible to abandon a generalized and
useless manipulation of spatial problems without ap¬
plying any theory to current practice and reality.
The question is, what this reality is and, mainly, how
it is classified. The artificial environment as well as
the theories of it are commonly known as belonging to
different kinds of classifications according to a variety
of criteria. I have already referred to classifications
of theories of architecture previously, when I dealt with
scientific borrowings, with the development of contemporary
architectural thinking as well as with the identity of the
linguistic metaphor. The built environment, however, is
itself commonly understood as classified according to two
main sets of criteria. The first set refers to the scale
-19
and has produced conceptual categories like urbanism,
architecture, interior design etc.
The second set of criteria refers to the institutio¬
nal character of buildings and has promoted conceptual
categories which concern the dominant activity which
takes place in the buildings, the institutional state
which defines the boundaries and the structure of this
activity as well as the historical development of this
institutional state and its embodiment in a more general
mode of production. Making criticism of the real or
illusionary substance of such categories seems to be a
useless logical circle. What seems useful for any clas—
sificatory paradigm is to take such categories into ac¬
count. Otherwise, it would be in the danger of re¬
defining in a idiosyncratic and socially useless manner
the subject of the science of the built environment and
of the action on it. In any case, however, I believe
that in the search for a path, through such problems,
it is much more essential to start from the institutional
and building categories than from the categories which
have been established according to the notion of scale.
Among these institutional categories and their
environmental representation, universities seem to keep
a unique position for a series of reasons which are
mentioned in detail in the introduction of the second part
of the present study. My involvement in the study of
universities covers the past decade and concerns the
planning of universities as well as the study of their
20
character and classification at a building scale.
This involvement definately constitutes a first, but hiqhy
subjective reason for dealing with universities in the
present study.
However, I hope that more objective reasons justify
the significance of applying a general theory of the
built space to universities and to the theories which
deal with them. A first one is that universities have
a clear institutional identity the development of which
through history is equally clear. At the same time,
universities have played and continue to play a role of
'societal guidance' which few other institutional
categories have played.
A second reason is that the built environment of
universities can be seen at different scales, from the
urban to the building-scale, keeping a remarkable unity
as regards the characteristics that the institutional
identity of university implies.
A third reason is that, while universities represent
a typical building category through their similarities
to other environmental forms of the same size, at the same
time their institutional identity implies particularities
and 'exaggerations' which are useful for testing the value
of a general theory of the built space.
Finally, a fourth reason is that universities as
institutions as well as built forms have been the subject
of many explanatory and planning theories, either at the
level of large scale decisions or at the level of building
deagn and construction.
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Universities as such could constitute an obvious
subject of the present study. In such a way, the study
could redefine the corpus of its theory and, also, clas¬
sify universities through its taxonomic apparatus.
The purpose of such a task would be to recover areas of
problems which have remained more or less obscure and to
introduce a logic for their solution. It has been
decided, however, that such purposes can be better pro¬
moted by studying the explanatory and planning theories
of universities rather than by analysing and classifying
independent examples of university complexes and buildings.
The main advantage of such an attitude is that,without
minimizing the information from the institutional and
building category with which the study is concerned, it is
easier to test the taxonomic value as well as the cohere¬
nce of the general theory, since such a theory is directly
compared with similar, more or less comprehensive approa¬
ches to the built space in general and universities in
particular.
There are three main kinds of approach , as
regards the explanation and/or planning of universities.
The first is the historical approach. Our interest in
the history of universities is orientated to a particular
period, namely the period of the first 'student universi¬
ties' when certain critical transformations took place.
Our interest is also in the way in which historians
understand such transformations and incorporate this
understanding in more general theories of institutions
22
and of their environmental representation.
The second kind of approach' concerns what has been
called the 'activity models' of university planning. These
models are criticized in the present study as regards their
efficacy in their own terms and,also, as regards the concepts
proposed by the linguistic paradigm of this study.
Finally,the third kind of approaches consists of more
general explanatory models of universities which,in parallel,
prescribe particular methods of planning. Such explanatory
and planning models clearly represent comprehensive models
of understanding the artificial environment. This is
clear in the case of the 'Oregon Experiment'which,in the
present study,is subject of an extensive analysis and
discussion.
3.
I hope that it will become finally clear to the reader
of this study that the analysis of the above cases promotes
some general conclusions concerned with the nature of this
study and with the effectiveness of the theory it proposes.
First of all, I think that it will be clear that it is
possible to understand architectural realities in a
comprehensive way,by using a model which contains a limited
number of basic concepts and has a simple structure.
A second conclusion which, I hope, will become clear is
that the linguistic paradigm in architecture is capable of
explaining a large spectrum of building categories and of
theories concerned with them. Such an explanation ,first,
23
has a taxonomic character and,second, recovers areas of
hidden problems the significance of which has been more
or less underestimated.
Finally, a third conclusion is that the manipulation
of the linguistic paradigm in architecture illustrates the
superiority and realistic character of the concepts of the
paradigm and of the assumptions on which it has been based,
such as: the necessity of a semantic rat^C "than. o(l arvrtonoroouS
approach to built space; the inevitability of an expla¬
nation based on problems and, therefore, automatically
orientated to the solution of them; finally, the importance
of a multi—level understanding of the artificial environment
as well as the importance of a contradictional understanding
of its dynamics.
I have to admit that the present work was fortunate
in selecting the case studies. Especially, the 'pattern-
language' of the 'Oregon Experiment',despite the social
philosophy of design on which it is based and despite its
Utopian and eventually one—sided understanding of partici¬
patory processes, is probably the only worked example of
a linguistic metaphor to architecture in general and to
university planning in particular.
I would like to apologize to the reader for the
large number of concepts used in the present study in an
idiosyncratic and not generally established manner.I would
like also to note that the study is divided into two parts;
the first concerns the development of the linguistic
paradigm in its general form and the second the case
2^
studies on universities. There is an introductory note to
the first part which explains the contents of it.There is,
also, an introduction to the second part which functions
as a link between the two parts; it contains the main
conclusions of the first part and explains the way in
which these conclusions are dealt with as regards the
case studies :
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO PART if
PART I
INTRODUCTI. _ IE CASE STUDIES
THROUGH SOME MAIN CONCLUSIONS
FROM PART I |
PART II













The following first part of this thesis is concerned with
a linguistic approach to architectural explanation and is
divided into two sub-parts: Part 1,1 and Part 1,2.
Part 1,1 introduces the general philosophy and
the main concepts of the linguistic metaphor in architecture
and contains four chapters:
Ch.1,1.1 (1 The Dynamic Nature of Description')is a
general introductory chapter on the broader notion of
description, not particularly concerned with the linguistic
approach. This approach is dealt with in the next three
chapters starting from some general concepts (Ch.1,1.2,'The
Linguistic Paradigm and the Environmental Structures') and
leading towards an extensive discussion on the 'syntagmatic'
character of description in architecture.The basic arguments
are that,first,environmental'syntax1 cannot acquire a
character analogous to that of 'autonomous syntax1 in language
but a character which resembles to that of'semantic syntax',
and second that the notion of meaning is broader and of
different nature in the built space than in language.Tbese
arguments are developed in Ch.I,1.3('The Broader Notion of
Meaning') and Ch.I,1.4('Syntagms and Prototypes').
Part 1,2 is an attempt to develop the linguistic para¬
digm in architecture and to formulate it by using a limited
number of basic concepts. The main purpose of this develop-
28
ment,however, is to make this paradigm capable of dealing
with the complex problems of the artificial space in opera¬
tional terms and by following the philosophy of 'semantic'
and not 'autonomous' syntax. The main component of this
sub-part is an example of how the general paradigm can
take a specific form in the case of one particular family
of problems, that is the problems concerned with the
phenomenon of alienation. Part 1,2 contains five chapters:
Ch.I,2.1 ('Differentiations in Descriptive Theories
of the Artificial Space')is a brief review of some well
known theories in architecture .This review illustrates
the fact that the nature of the problems in which each
theory is interested influences its own corpus. The next
two chapters (Ch.I,2.2,'Operational Modifications of the
Linguistic Paradigm:a Formal Basis' and Ch.I,2.3,'Operatio¬
nal Modifications of the Linguistic Paradigm: Catalysts or
Problem-Solving Modifiers') describe the way in which
the linguistic paradigm can take a particular form of
describing the built space in such a manner that the so¬
lution of a particular problem can be promoted.Ch.I,2.2
outlines the conceptual apparatus of such a modification
(a 'formal basis') and Ch.I,2.3 is a brief but necessary
introduction to the detailed analysis of such a modification
which follows in Ch.I,2.4 (concerning the problem of alienation).
The discussion of alienation as a problem which occurs
in the use and production of artificial space is not
simply an example of developing and giving a formal expression
29
to the linguistic paradigm. As it happens in the case of
universities,which constitute not only a representative
institution and building-type but also a unique example
of clear transformations,societal guidanceexaggerations'
and highly specialised planning techniques(see General
Introduction) in a similar way alienation is generally
accepted as one of the most important problems in contempo¬
rary society^a problem,that is, which influences any aspect
of human life and practice and,therefore,architectural
practice as well. The selection of the examples of alienation
and universities is, consequently,harmonized with the general
'semantic' attitude adopted in the present study.
Alienation is discussed in Ch.I,2.4 as a general problem
(I,2.4.1),in connection with the notion of 'barrier' which
functions as a useful concept to understand the nature of
alienatory processes as regards artificial space(I,2.4.2),
in connection with participation as a strategy towards the
gradual abolition of alienation(I,2.4.3) and is analysed
(together with participation)through the linguistic paradigm,
in detail(1,2 . 4 . 4) .
Finally,Ch.I,2.5 is an attempt to examine some
aspects of the dynamics of environmental structures,always
through the logic of our paradigm.This chapter is more a
terminological discussion than a real involvement in
the analysis of spatial dynamics. However,some of the
concepts developed here( especially the concepts of trans¬
formation and its versions as regards built space,and,
30
mainly,the concepts of 1 contradictions' and normal1 anomalies')
are closely related to the discussion of universities,in






THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF DESCRIPTION
' Description1 and 'descriptive models:l are terms which
have been used mostly to refer to a static and not
particularly penetrating statement about what is described.
In this sense, the difference between descriptive models
on the one hand, and dynamic, predictive, prescriptive or
normative models on the other, has been always clear*.
In architecture, considered as planning and design action,
description has been placed in a less important position
with the exception of architectural history. Yet,
1. A further discussion i these terms is included in: R. CHORLEY
and P. HAGGEH?,Models in Geography, Methuen © 1967
(especially, p. 25).
33
architectural history, as a domain of knowledge, has not
contributed very much to a broadening of description in
architecture. Architectural history still constitutes a
tool merely for classifying the main products of environ¬
mental practice or for explaining them in an empirical and
largely idiosyncratic manner. Apparently, there is seme rocm
for an understanding of these products which iS more comprehensive
than that offered by the conventional history of architecture.
In recent years there have been many attempts to
enlarge the significance of description in the domain of the
artificial environment. Two of the most important ones are
probably Hillier and Leaman's 'architectural morphology '2
and Alexander's 'synthesis of form' and, later, 'pattern
language'. Although there is a profound difference in the
philosophy of these two attempts - the former being purely
explanatory and 'syntactic' and the latter design
orientated - both represent theories of description of the
built space, where 'description' is far more ambitious
and comprehensive than the traditional interpretation of
the term would imply.
2. B. HILLIER and A, LEAMAN, Space Syntax, 1974, and
The Architecture of Architecture, 1974.
3. Ch. ALEXANDER, Notes on the Synthesis of Form, Harvard
University Press 1979 ( © 1964); Ch. ALEXANDER, I. FIKSDAHL—
KING, S. ISHIKAWA, M. JACOBSON, M. SILVERSTEIN, A Pattern
Language, Oxford University Press, 1975.
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It is in this broader sense of 'explanation' that the
term 'description' is to be used in this study. To what
extent explanation denotes both a 'beyond' - concerned with
the normative consequences of explanation for practice -
as well as a 'behind' - concerned with the historical
origin of the explanatory action - is a matter open to a
general epistemological discussion about the nature of
'architectural description'. This study adopts the view,
however, that 'behinds' and 'beyonds' are incorporated
inevitably in the explanatory approaches which the social
sciences use, especially when they deal with the products
of human practice .
Explanatory description, therefore, is broader than
description in conventional terms. The latter might be
interested in a particular aspect of a given structure
while the former requires a comprehensive and multi-level
approach to it. It is this comprehensiveness of explana¬
tion that implies 'beyonds' and 'behinds' and introduces
the rather paradoxical concept of 'descriptive theory'.
The concept of descriptive theory in the social
sciences has been elaborated by Louis Althusser. He seems
to be convinced that,
"great scientific discoveries cannot help but pass
through the phase of ... descriptive theory."4
(author's emphasis)
4. L. ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1971)
in: B. R. COSIN (ed.), Education: Structure and Society,
Penguin © 1972, p. 249.
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What is new and interesting in the above argument is
the way Althusser understands the connection between
description and practice. He writes:
"(Descriptive theory) is the first phase of every
theory, at least in the domain which concerns us
(that of the science of social formations). As
such, one might - and my opinion is one must -
envisage this phase as a transitional one, necess¬
ary to the development of the theory. That it is
transitional is inscribed in my expression
'descriptive theory', which reveals in its con¬
junction of terms the equivalent of a kind of
'contradiction'. In fact, the term theory
'clashes' to some extent with the adjective
'descriptive' which I have attached to it. This
means quite precisely:
1. -that the 'descriptive theory' really is, with¬
out a shadow of a doubt, the irreversible begin¬
ning of the theory; but
2. that the 'descriptive' form in which the theory
is presented requires, precisely as an effect of
this contradiction a development of the theory
which goes beyond the form of description."5
Althusser's explanation of how the descriptive form
of a theory is automatically equipped with a potential for
praxis is based upon a logic of contradictions. This
logic is quite common to a large spectrum of contemporary
philosophy from Marx to Kuhn, though within a variety of
contexts . The way this logic is understood as explaining
the transformations of structures as well as the connec¬
tion between description and practice is to be developed
later in this study (Ch. 1,2.5). Here, I shall be looking
at some more general aspects of descriptive theories.
5. Ibid. , p. 249.
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Descriptors may be considered as the components of
descriptive theories. They represent the bases according
to which description can be implemented. It is clear that
a descriptive theory may either represent the particular
importance which has been attributed to one basis - that
is, it may consist of one predominant descriptor - or it
may consist of a whole set of descriptors which supplement
each other in a structural way. In the latter case it is
obvious that, since different bases have been used to
structure a unified apparatus for understanding a reality,
this apparatus should be sufficiently comprehensive to
incorporate all these bases.
The need for comprehensiveness is, consciously or
not, understood in the development of scientific thinking
and constitutes one fundamental reason for what might be
called 'scientific borrowing' or 'metaphor' in the original
meaning of the term . This means that pre-structured and
comprehensive scientific paradigms^ are transferred from
one scientific domain to another in order to incorporate
and integrate a new field of knowledge based upon empirical
6. From the greek "|_i£TCGcp£poo" : move from one place to another,
transfer.
7. For a classificatory analysis of the notion of "paradigm"
see R. CHORLEY and P. HAGGETT,op. cit,, p. 26, This notion
is also discussed by T. S. Kuhn in: T. S. KUHN, The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago, ©
1970, p. 43 , and criticized especially by M. Masterman in:
M. MASTERMAN, The Nature of a Paradigm, in: I, LAKATOS and A,
MUSGRAVE (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,
Cambridge University Press 1974 ( © 1970), pp. 59-90.
37
research. Architecture, both as historical research as
well as a practice, has been using - though mostly in an
unconscious manner - comprehensive models suitable for its
state at a given historical moment: from the aesthetical
attitude of the 19th century to the technological-
aesthetical paradigm that the Bauhaus introduced, and from
the quasi-scientific approaches of the design methods of
the '60s to the quasi-sociological activism of planning
pluralism and to the semiological understanding of space
adopted by what Jencks accepts as 'post-modern'
architecture^. Very roughly, this game of predominant
ideas in architectural thinking is shown in the following







This model explains to some extent what has happened
in modern architectural thinking. It represents also in
a very generalized form the structure of a comprehensive
8. C. JENCKS, The Language of Post-Modern Architecture,
Academy 1978 ( 0 1977).
9. n. TZQNOE, *EE;£AiE;r| xflg Oecopiag xfjg auyxpovris 'Apyixe-
xxovixfie xau * Apyixexxovixri ' ExxouSeuari, Teyvixa Xpo-
vtxd, Aex. 1972^ a. 1105 (P. TZONOS, Development of the theory
of contemporary design and design education, Bulletin of the
Technical Chamber of Greece, Dec. 1972, p. 1105).
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descriptive model which corresponds to the attributes
stated previously in this chapter. That is, it contains
some basic descriptive tools and shows the transformations
which have taken place as far as the importance of these
tools is concerned. It gives, therefore, some information
about the structural pattern which dominates the
descriptors of the built environment and of its production.
Although it deals with paradigms, it is itself a paradigm.
It is, however, too general to go beyond description and,
in any case, does not intend to do so.
A fundamental assumption - which could either evolve
from the above example or be taken as a direct consequence
of the arguments stated here about descriptive theories -
is that sciences are historical products. Even if such an
assumption seems to be inaccurate for the whole spectrum
of knowledge, it is not particularly untrue for the social
sciences and especially for those which deal with the products
of human practice,i.e. the so-called sciences of the
artificial. The point is that in these sciences, not only
their stock of knowledge but also their very subject-
matter is historically affected. The major explanation of
this assumption is that these sciences describe human
practice which itself is strongly influenced by ideology.
The additional reason why paradigms in these sciences
are interested in 'behinds' and automatically introduce
'beyonds' is simply that, as Wiener has pointed out, it Is
3?
extremely difficult for the observer to consider himself
excluded from the reality he investigates10.
There is no doubt that a major epistemological
argument like this cannot be discussed and developed here
in its general form. What I shall consider as an axiom
in this study is an assumption from the above general
thesis. This assumption has been stated in EAR/3, as
follows:
"Descriptors in architectural descriptive theories
are generated as products of historically created
problems with which the practice of architecture
is concerned. Thus, descriptors represent in a
way the ideological struggle of the historical
moment in which they appear.
The history of descriptive theories in architecture
is too short to give sufficient evidence for this assump¬
tion. To some degree, the absence of explanatory
approaches is due to the fact that the predominant
attitude towards architecture until the twentieth century
was that architecture was a form of art. The same also
happened in other fields of human activity such as
language, music, and the visual arts in general. In all
these fields the attempt of investigating an 'art' in a
scientific way is a recent development.
10. N. WIENER, Cybernetics, Greek Edition 1974 ( © 1961, M.I.T.
Press), p. 172. See also C. Levi-Strauss's objections in: C.
LEVI-STRAUSS, Structural Anthropology, Penguin 1972
C © 1958), p. 56.
11. A. AWADALLA, T. K0TSI0P0UL0S, T. MARAVELIAS, Description and
Descriptors on Architecture, E.A.R. (Edinburgh Architecture
Research)/3 1976, p. 39.
If we present, in a diagrammatic way, both the above
assumption as well as the process of scientific borrowing,













1. DIRECT ORIGIN: From historically created prob¬
lems and from the social realization and formulation of
these problems.
2. INDIRECT ORIGIN: From various scientific fields,
where descriptors have been effective within
analogous context.*2
This model summarizes to some extent an attitude
towards science which is much nearer to the Althusserian
view than to those of Kuhn and Lakatos^. Although both
Lakatos and Kuhn have produced sophisticated and convincing
models of the involvement of historical time in scientific
inquiry, they have not developed what Chalmers calls 'a
formal theoretical framework for science' which can be
sufficiently interrelated with a general theory of
history. As Chalmers wrote:
12. Ibid. , p. H-0.
13. According to a classification by A. F, Chalmers in: A. F.
CHALMERS, What Is this Thing Called Science?, Open
University 1978 ( 0 1976).
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"(LaXatos) (i) assumes without argument, and in
a theoretical framework that leaves no room for
the assumption to be challenged, that there is a
timeless scientific method, and (ii) he assumes
the existence of a history against which his theory
of science can be tested without offering an
adequate theory of that history. The Althusserian
position ... at least provides a formal theoretical
framework that does not share the same faults.
Firstly, it offers a general theory of history
(historical materialism), one feature of which is
that a particular society is understood in terms
of a number of interrelated practices. Secondly,
it offers a theory of science, according to which
a science is a particular kind of practice that is
relatively autonomous with respect to other
practices ... If a scientific practice is to be
eliminated, then this will result, primarily, not
from arguments but from changes in the social
structure. To think otherwise is, from the mater¬
ialist point of view, to act like King Canute, who
addressed the incoming tide and unsuccessfully
urged it to stop."-*4
To accept, however, Althusser's view by rejecting at
the same time all the productive ideas developed by
Lakatos and especially Kuhn (concerning the formal
structure of scientific paradigms and their transforma¬
tions ) is not only unnecessary but also false. In the
end, the formalization of Althusser's thinking is not
clear to the degree which is necessary for domains like
architecture, for which the definition of 'non-science'
seems to be more accurate than the 'normal-science' one-*5.
In order to structure theories in such domains, we have to
14. Ibid., pp. 143-144.
15. The concept of "normal science" is developed by Kuhn in: T. S.
KUHN, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , op.
cit., pp. 23-34.
take into account the revolutionary character of paradigms
and the characteristics of scientific communities as they were
developed by Kuhn. Paradigms and their transformation
and movement from one domain to another do not in any




THE LINGUISTIC PARADIGM AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL
STRUCTURES
1.2.1 THE METAPHOR
The field of structural linguistics, developed mainly
after the publication of De Saussure's Cours de
Linguistique G£n<§rale-{ has been very attractive for
contemporary thinking in various scientific domains
including architecture. Structural linguistics - connected
with the development of structuralism as a more general
philosophy as well as with the development of semiotics
1. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, Course in General Linguistics,
Fontana 1974 ( © 1959, Philosophical Library, New York).
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and the science of communication - has given the impression
that it would provide the methodological apparatus for a
better understanding of built space.
What we can find at the heart of such hopes is the
consideration of architecture as a language or as a system
of signs (if the term 'language' is not large enough to
cover the totality of architectural phenomena ).
The metaphor can sometimes take a more complex form
as in Hillier and Leaman's work where
"the generative syntax models of linguistics and
the new epigenetic development languages of
theoretical biology might ... be held to provide
appropriate prototypes for such a model (for the
study of the morphology of artificial space)."2
The dominant questions are of course,first,why a
metaphor is necessary and, second, why this particular
kind of metaphor is appropriate. To deal with these, we
have to look at some general methodological problems which
do not belong as such to the domain of architectural
thinking but are present in various attempts to produce
systematic approaches to design2, especially when design
is concerned with large-scale forms^. A good example of
the nature of these problems at a level of maximum
2. B. HILLIER and A. LEAMAN, Space Syntax, op. cit. pp. 2-3.
3. See also P. TZONOS, op. cit., p. 1109.
4. Such models are mentioned in the second part of this study.
abstraction is offered by A. Angyal who wrote in 1941,
that,
"Our scientific thinking consists prevalently in
the logical manipulation of relationships. That
the structure of wholes cannot be described in
terms of relationships has, however, been
repeatedly pointed out by many writers. While
accepting the premise that holistic connections
cannot be resolved into relationships, some
authors have implied that the pattern of structure
of wholes does not lend itself at all to logical
manipulation. We suggest, however, that the
structure of wholes is perhaps amenable to
logical treatment after all, that, though it may
not be described in terms of relations, it may be
described in terms of some more adequate logical
unit, representing an entirely different logical
genus."5
What Angyal referred to as 'the thinking which
consists prevalently in the logical manipulation of
relationships' has influenced the beginning of the scient¬
ific era in architectural description and has been proven
inadequate to produce comprehensive methodological tools.
The obvious connection between the built environment and
the activities which take place in it seems to be one of
the main reasons why this logic of relationships is present
in the theoretical background of architectural thinking.
Human groups are, in fact, particularly relevant for a
description based on relationships for the simple reason
that their units are generally understood as independent
individuals. There is no confusion ctfjo whether a human
individual is an independent measurable unit. Consequently,
5. A. ANGYAL, A Logic of Systems in: F. EMERY (ed.),
Systems Thinking , Penguin 1972 ( © 1969) p. 20; see
also T. KOTSIOPOULOS, Barriers and Participation, E. A. R./5,
p. 53.
Bertalanffy's understanding of a system as consisting of
elements and relations® may be, and in fact is, repeatedly
applied to human groups and their activities.
There is at least one basic argument against the
simplification of transferring to the artificial environ¬
ment the systemic logic which is used to describe human
groups and their activities. Hillier and Leaman have
stressed this argument writing that:
"the failure of general system theory to progress
beyond an elementary level in characterizing how
such systems work is because this elementary
principle of the dynamics of artificial systems
(that the internal autonomic structure of the
'simplest structures' of the morphology already
contains the rules which govern aggregation into
higher logical forms) cannot be formulated within
a definition of a system as 'elements and their
relations'. There simply are no elements."7
This position answers to some extent the question of
the necessity of the metaphor. The above argument might
equally refer to structural linguistics or to space. This,
however, would be an arbitrary answer if it remained at
a purely syntactic level, for the main reason that the
very nature of the artefact is what gives to such systems
the common characteristics which make metaphors possible.
6. L. v. BERTALANFFY, General System Theory, Penguin 1973
( © 1968), p. 52,
7. B. HILLIER and A. LEAMAN, How is Design Possible?, in:
J.A.R. (Journal of Architectural Research) 3/1, January 1974,
p. 6.
47
There are, however, some other problems concerning
the 'systemic' views at a syntactic level. These problems
refer mainly to the way of dealing with artificial systems
and are connected with the notion of 'comprehensiveness'.
The problem with the so-called systemic manipulation of a
complex system is that comprehensiveness in description
is inevitably accompanied by increasing complexity.
This complexity places limits to the degree of wholeness
which might be achieved by the description and eliminates
the explanatory power of it.
The approach to wholeness and comprehensiveness - a
kind of methodological dream of our times - is one of
the promises offered by the linguistic paradigm. And it
does so by attempting at the same time to reduce complexity.
The use of elementary operations together with transform¬
ational rules which lead from elementary to higher
structures is the key to attain comprehensiveness with
simplicity. Christopher Alexander, one of the most
influential personalities of the design method era,
constitutes a characteristic example of the realization of
the problem of complexity. In the preface of the last
edition of his famous 'Notes on the Synthesis of Form'
(1974), he wrote:
"I discovered that it is quite unnecessary to use
such a complicated and formal way of getting at
the independent diagrams."®
8. Ch. ALEXANDER, Notes on the Synthesis of Form, op. cit.,
(edition of 1974, preface).
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'and from the diagrams to higher forms' one could add,
following Alexander's logic for the 'synthesisThe fact that
Alexander has moved from formal systemic thinking towards
the quasi-linguistic approach of the 'pattern language'
keeping at the same time the most linguistic of his
ideas, that is, that of ' diagram' >is an indication of the
contemporary route towards the introduction of the
linguistic paradigm in architecture.
The problem of wholeness and comprehensiveness is
central in structuralism as a more general and inter¬
disciplinary philosophy. According to Piaget, wholeness
can be attained genetically by 'reflective abstraction'.
This means that^ while in the systemic mode of thought a
property can be derived by being drawn out of things by
reflective abstraction, properties are derived from the way
we act on things.® Piaget's route to
comprehensiveness is important especially because it shews
a different way of achieving comprehensiveness, a way
which is neither purely syntactic nor abstract. The deep
character of what he calls reflective abstraction is that
description becomes anthropocentric and historically
originated. D. Harvey in estimating Piaget's position in
modern thinking seems to be quite familiar with this
9. J. PIAGET, Structuralism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971
( @ 1968), p. 19.
«9
anthropocentrism, writing about Piaget's 'operational
structuralism':
"Fortunately too, living scholarship leads to the
rediscovery of the method by those who might not
otherwise regard themselves as 'Marxists'.
Perhaps the most outstanding example in recent
times is Piaget. ... Marx might be surprised to
find himself described as 'an operational
structuralist'."
Piaget's structuralism is a general method of inquiry
based on the concept of totality (wholeness) as well as on
the concepts of self-regulation and transformation.
These concepts could dominate,apart from linguistics and
anthropology where they have been developed primarily,
domains like mathematics, physics, biology, the social
sciences, as well as philosophy and epistemology as Kuhn's
and Althusser's work has shown to a certain extent
The global character of these concepts combined with the
nature of elementary artefact structures seems to
constitute the logical mechanism which favoured the use
of the structural linguistic paradigm in the field of
architecture.
A practical consequence of such a metaphor, however,
which does not seem to be always understood, is that this
metaphor implies clear guidelines which the elementary
structures in the sciences of the artificial should
10. D." HARVEY, Social Justice and the City , Edward Arnold
1975 ( 0 1973), pp. 287-288.
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follow. Such structures have to be identified at an
operational level of abstraction, still capable of solving
particular problems within the social context within
which these structures have been formed. Less abstraction
makes the solution of problems idiosyncratic and more
abstraction makes it simply impossible.
In modern architectural thinking the linguistic
paradigm has been seen in a slightly different way than
that which might be directly introduced by genetic
structuralism. The source of linguistic views in
architecture is the newly developed and often misunderstood
field of semiotics-*-* . There is no apparent connection
between structuralist thinking and semiotics though what
is called 'Semiotic (or Semiological) Structuralism' is
an underlying attitude in both domains.
Linguistic structuralism, which originated from
Saussurian linguistics, inevitably interprets Saussure's
view that language has to be considered as a particular
system of signs. On the other hand, semiotics, closely
connected with social anthropology and its structuralistic
versions, interprets human culture as a broader system of
signs but within the context of structural analysis*2 .
It is interesting that Piaget's more general structuralist
11. An interesting discussion on the role of Semiotics, in
Architectural Science is included in ; A.AWADALLA,Space
Design and the Description of Built Environment;
a theoretical enquiry into some structural aspects,
Ph. D. Thesis , Edinburgh 1979.
12. For this subject see also: D.ROBEY(ed.),Structuralism,
an Introduction, Clarendon Press 1973.
*
Uj
philosophy cannot work in the domain of the social sciences
without accepting the notion of sign. It is also
interesting that, when semiotics abandons a genetic view
of human culture , it becomes a mere collection of
poor comparisons of images and of ambiguous paths from
the signifier to the signified. This is not too far from
a modern version of astrology
Semiotic structuralism, though not clearly established
as a philosophy, would be a starting point for the kind
of metaphor we need in architecture. There are two main
reasons for such a more general understanding of the
linguistic paradigm in the domain of the artificial
environment. The first is the predominance of the concept
of 'meaning' in architecture although the traditional
meaning of 'meaning' in language is not enough to
incorporate the social importance of the weight, cost, and
permanence of buildings. Because of this, in EAR/3 we
tried to replace the concept of meaning with what we
called 'social evaluation' or 'socially evaluated
meaning'. The second reason is more methodological
and is concerned with the desirable level at which both
the genetic and semiotic approaches may be resolved. In
EAR/3 we called this level 'syntagmatic'. The syntagmatic
attitude-*4 is very near to what in linguistics is called
13. E.A.R. /3, op. cit., p. 57.
14. For the use of the terms "syntagm" and "syntagmatic" in
De Saussure's work, see: F. de SAUSSURE, op. cit., p. 123.
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'generative semantics' (or in Seuren's view simply
'semantic syntax'15 ) and is certainly incorporated in domains
more general than linguistics as,for instance, in
Bernstein's sociolinguistics. The basic characteristic
of the syntagmatic approach is that the most elementary
and deep structures are considered as socially meaningful.
So, the concept of 'syntagm' becomes almost equivalent to
the concept of 'prototype' in architecture. And it will
be a fundamental principle in this study that a prototypic
analysis of built forms,orientated towards problem-solving,
is a successful way of dealing with both description and
its planning 'beyonds' in architecture.
1.2.2 TOWARDS A SYNTAGMATIC SYNTAX ; AN EXAMPLE
The contribution of the linguistic paradigm to the
explanatory theories of architecture was not directly
identified until recently when Hillier and Leaman's proposals
were formulated. This does not mean,however, that the
general philosophy of this paradigm or the basic components
of it( syntactic and semantic)were not mentioned or
indirectly implied by other theorists of architecture.What
is important is that such ideas had remained hidden under
other explanatory models and in some cases were 'discovered'
15. P.A.M. SEUREN, 'Introduction 'Autonomous Versus
Semantic Syntax^ in: P.A.M. SEUREN (ed.), Semantic
Syntax, Oxford University Press 1978 ( © 1974), pp. 1-28
and 96-122.
16. B. BERNSTEIN, Class, Codes and Control, Three Volumes
(1. Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language,
2. Applied Studies Towards a Sociology of Language,
3. Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions),
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971 to 1975,
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by the authors themselves at a later stage of their work.The
general path that such a development usually followed is from
more or less systemic views concerned with design methods to
structural approaches concerned with the understanding of the
language of architecture. Two examples of such a development
are,in my view, Ch.Alexander's path to the'pattern language'
17
and D.A.Fatouros'recent 'syntactic structure of architecture'.
Syntax may be considered as the level at which the
generation of structures is investigated in an achronic
and abstract way. This investigation deals with the chain
from elementary to complex structures. In linguistics,
the involvement of meaning has been mapped on syntax and
has produced a different understanding of it; that is,
the chain from deep to surface structures. There has
been a long discussion between linguists on how semantics
are involved in the chain from deep to surface structures,
and references to this discussion concerning its
importance for architecture will be made in various
parts of this study-^ . I shall prefer, however, to use
both the concepts 'complexity chain' and 'deepness chain'
regardless of the view adopted in this study about the
connection between them.
The structural view of the path from the elementary
to the complex in architecture means that we assume
17. See especially: A.A.MTOYPOE,"OpYOCVooan xou Xcopou xax retouexpixfi
'(^Yocvaxjr)/ h Euvxccxxixfi hopf) xns 'Apxixexxovucns, BeaoaAovLxri 1979,
(D. A. FATOUROS, Organization of Space and Geometrical Organization;
The Syntactic Structure of Architecture,Thessaloniki 1979).
18. A good sample of such a discussion is included in: P.A.M.
SEUREN (ed.), op. cit.
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that the complex structures we observe have been generated
by successive transformations of elementary structures.
This assumption stresses the importance of a methodo¬
logical apparatus to understand complex structures and
does not mean necessarily that such structures have been
consciously produced by applying a set of transformational
rules to some elementary structures. Hillier and Leaman,
being interested in the evolution of deep structures of
space, have developed a terminology and a methodological
apparatus concerned with what they call 'space syntax'.
They adopt the view that elementary structures in
'architectural morphology' are developed towards higher
structures in a way which may be described by functional
variables - such as contiguity, differentiation,
boundaries, and permeability - as well as by operational
rules - such as what they call T, D, M, RJ0 which are
logically interconnected by means of a 'universal formula'
borrowed from categorical algebra. This universal formula,
which may be expressed into the form of a commutative
square20, is,according to them,the key to understand the
'simplest structure' of architectural form as well as the
key to understand the involvement of meaning in this
simplest structure which may be called 'minimum meaning
unit'. They understand, however, this meaning as product
of a 'mapping'procedure. They wrote in 'How is Design
Possible':
"The pattern of dissimilar domains of entities,
with mapping structures between them, one domain
19. B. HILLIER and A. LEAMAN, Space Syntax, op. cit., p. 5,
20. B. HILLIER and A. LEAMAN, How is Design Possible, op. cit.,
p. 6.
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of which constitutes the normal 'manipulable set',
are very general indeed in human cultures. It
might not be fanciful to define man as a structure
who knows how to effect a large number of mappings
between dissimilar domains which may be expressed
as commutative squares. Languages have this form,
with mappings between an abstract domain of
'meaning' and a concrete domain of phonetic sounds.
The architecture of architecture is equally based
on such structures which include, for example, the
mapping between human behaviour and its spatial
containment, or between psycho-physiology and the
environmental filter. In design the mapping
structures are used as autonomic devices to solve
problems. In research these mapping devices are
studied in order to understand and improve them."^
(authors' emphasis)
Hillier and Leaman's attitude towards 'mapping' is
near to the Chomskian view in language, and emphasizes
the possibility of an independent syntax in architectural
morphology. Although their work takes the semantic
component into account from the beginning, their logic of
'space syntax' is mostly concerned with the mechanisms
from the simple to the complex. They are interested in
the development of a more or less structural geometry of
space. The use and interpretation of this geometry is to
be investigated separately in a way very similar to that
of sociolinguistics for language.
It is interesting to study to what extent both the
syntactically pure complexity chain and the ambiguous
deepness chain may be considered simultaneously in
architecture; that is, to what extent the semantic
element is involved in elementary architectural structures
not through mapping but as an organic component of them.,
The following example is taken from EAR/3:
21. Ibid. , pp. 6-7:
** Consider a building element; for instance a wall.
By creating a wall we modify the various climatic fields
such as wind, temperature, radiation, humidity, precipita¬
tion, etc. The result is that different boundaries are
produced attributing to the specific operation of
barrierization a multifunctional character. These
boundaries indicate the particular differentiations
which occur in each climatic field:
WIND FIELD RAIN FIELD SOLAR RADIATION FIELD
The physical properties which interconnect these
fields according to classical physics imply some funda¬
mental characteristics of the elementary deep structure
of wall. These characteristics are analogous, for
instance, to the rule of linearity in language and may

























Obviously, these are images which have been neces¬
sarily derived from the involvement of a semantic dimension
rather than from a pure physical actuality. Of course,
in a strictly physical sense, rain and solar radiation
boundaries are topologically identical to the wind
boundary. However, we have considered them in the way
shown in the diagram above - speaking about 'modification'
in terms of wind but, at the same time, about 'presence-
absence' in terms of rain and direct solar radiation -
because of the fact that in architectural thinking even
abstract elementary structures cannot be isolated from
a certain semantic context (taken from EAR/3) ^2
If we develop and generalize the above example, we
will conclude that the above elementary structures
correspond to a variety of surface structures. This
variety may be constructed by taking into account the
physical dynamics of the climatic fields such as value,
22. E.A.R./3, op. cit,, p, 46,
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orientation etc. By combining such factors we can form
different surface images of a wall in a climatic field.





























So, elementary structures of space include, even
at a deep topological level, the semantic component and
can produce a variety of surface structures by developing
the possible ways in which the semantic component may
occur in reality. However, the above example is over¬
simplified in the sense that the built space very rarely
corresponds to the elementary degree of complexity which
was shown in the example. The artificial space is mainly
23. Ibid. , p. 46.
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understood at a level of higher complexity at which
structures have already been transformed into
'enclosures'. This means that the deep structures from
which the everyday surface images are generated belong
to an order higher than the order of 'wall' and have
been formed after applying a transformational procedure
to the elementary structures. Consider the same example:
IN
Again,the physical properties that interconnect the
microclimatic fields imply fundamental characteristics
of higher complexity deep structure, such as:
60
Barrier - enclosure




are dominated by the
same rules as in the
elementary wall-structure 24
In all the cases stated in the above example there
is a kind of dialectics between 'barriers' and 'boundaries'.
The next diagram shows how these concepts are interrelated:
The diagram explains, in an abstract way, that a
barrier creates a boundary but not in only one way.
According to the physical property which is considered,
the boundary created by the barrier may be different:
FACTOR.
24. Ibid., p. 47.





This means, in simple words, that it is meaningless
to attempt to identify a deep structure independently
from meaning. There is not even one mapping, since the
wall itself does not constitute any structure without
being equipped with its dialectical supplement, i.e. the
boundary created by the wall. This duality is essential
because it shows an eventual route towards an apparatus
useful for understanding the structure of elementary
architectural operations.
In reality, architectural operations work in two
different directions: creation of boundaries and pene¬
tration of them, i.e. creation of channels. This is shown
in the following examples:
This can be expressed in a more abstract form, as'
shown in the following diagram:
FIFLP OF
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/5LI5MENTA RY O PERATIOi\'
OF CRIrATliNCj A CHANNEL 26
26. These elementary operations constitute a development of those
mentioned in E.A.R./3, p. 52.
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The reason why such operations work towards both
directions is strongly connected with the semantic
component of these operations. It is impossible for
architecture to deal with non-permeable enclosures or
with non-connected barriers. In a very abstract way,
we could refer to this as the 'dual barrier-channel
structure'. Such a structure deals with the continuity
and discontinuity of the semantic field to which it
















—ORP£R> 1 — 27
In a transformational form, the series of operations
stated above may be represented as follows, according to
the logical basis of the commutative square:






































































7 v^>INTERMEDIATÊ ABSTRACTIOSI: SEMANTIC CCMPONENT-* ->DEEPSTRUCIURE
or more generally, for each field of meaning:
Deepness
I rules -> rules --I
T = (TrT2 ) T = <tt T2 ' 29
Such a highly theoretical consideration would be in
danger if it did not consider the syntagmatic identity of
the structures and the broader understanding of meaning
as 'social evaluation'. Even in the previous diagrams,
there is an involvement of the syntagmatic consideration
when, for example, 'continuity' and 'discontinuity'
first refer to barriers and boundaries and secondly take
forms like 'boundary discontinuity through hierarchy'
(in order to reach the tree-network, useful for flow
regulation) or 'boundary continuity through permeability'
(in order to reach the permeable microclimatic barrier,
useful for microclimatic regulation). The involvement
of meaning and social evaluation is discussed in more
detail in the following chapter.
Before discussing the concept of 'social evaluation',
however, it is worth restating the two central points
which have been developed in these first two chapters:
29. Ibid.,p. 54.
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The first point is that, within the general attitude
towards the development of scientific thinking adopted
here, description cannot be considered achronically or
without being connected with practice.
The second point is that, within the historical
context of description, descriptors represent semantic
bases which can influence the descriptive theory and its
'beyonds' and, in any case, have to be sufficiently
structured to make description comprehensive.
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CHAPTER 1,1.3
THE BROADER NOTION OF MEANING
1.3.1 GENERATIVE VERSUS AUTONOMOUS SYNTAX
The exploration of how semantics is involved in
linguistics constitutes a large area of research and no
definite answers have been formulated yet. According to
the model developed by Chomsky , meaning is derived from
the syntactic deep structure through 'projection rules'.
Two versions of this model have appeared successively-' :
1. N. CHOMSKY, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax , M.I.T.
Press 1972 ( © 1965) and later N. CHOMSKY, Deep Structure,
Surface Structure and Semantic Interpretation in: R. JAKOBSON,
S. KAWANOTO (eds.), Studies in General and Oriental
Linguistics , Tokyo, T.E.C. Company, 1970.
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2
Both Chomski an versions constitute what has been
called the 'interpretive approach' to semantics and, thusy
have been distinguished from what has been called the
'generative approach'. According to the generative
approach semantic interpretation is no longer derived
from the purely syntactic deep structure, but the
structure is so deep3 that it is identical with semantic
interpretation. In this manner, projection rules







The above model represents the attitude which is
understood as 'generative semantics' or 'semantic syntax'5.
2. Diagrams after G. LEECH, Semantics , Penguin 1974,
pp. 328 and 329.
3. The "base" of the Chomskian version.
4. After G. LEECH, op. cit. , p. 330; phonology, however, is not
dealt with in this diagram.
5. After P.A.M. SEUREN (op. cit.).
6?
The generative approach is based mainly on a strong
opposition to Chomsky's ideas as he is
"by far, the most prominent defender of
autonomous syntax in its most
tenable form."6 (my emphasis)
The core of the generative approach may be summarized
by the following quotation from Seuren:
"In semantic syntax,two independent claims are
made with regard to lexical insertion. First,
it is claimed that the semantic analysis of
lexical items, i.e. the way in which they are
represented in SR's (Semantic Representations),
implies at least a tree structure or phrase-
marker of the type well known in syntax.
Secondly, the mapping rules relating lexical
items to their semantic analyses fulfil not only
the function of specifying possible
meanings but also the function of
relating surface structures
to their underlying syntact.ic
structures, and finally their SDS
(syntactic deep structure). It is the latter
claim which distinguishes semantic syntax from
autonomous syntax."7 (emphasis and parentheses mine).
The same argument in a more simple form is that
... semantic mappings coincide with those of
syntax..." 8,9
In the examples of the previous chapter, concerned with
the syntactic analyses of some space structures and the
6. P.A.M. SEUREN, Introduction, op. cit., p, 2.
7. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
8. Ibid.,p. 21.
9. The following diagram gives an idea of the difference
between autonomous and semantic syntax, as developed by
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involvement of meaning, it was clear that no syntax may
be identified independently of the semantic component.
However, to what extent the influence of meaning over
syntax takes place according to a more or less automatic
procedure is a question the answer of which differentiates
language from architecture. As we have seen in the
examples, we can identify different semantic syntaxes
according to the descriptor used. In language,it is
natural to expect a more or less unique procedure since
communication dominates it. In architecture, the involve¬
ment of additional semantic bases is necessary to
achieve comprehensiveness. In the end, the same could
Seuren (Ibid., pp. 109-110. Square boxes represent sets
of rules; round boxes represent sets of structures defined
by the rules).
Autonomous Syntax Semantic Syntax
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happen in language if it were considered as a socio-
linguistic phenomenon and the communicative value of it
were not the only starting point for understanding it.
1.3.2 SEMANTIC PLURALISM OF SPACE AND'SOCIAL EVALUATION'
It is a consequence of the above discussion that we
can introduce a concept like 'semantic pluralism' in
systems like architecture. It is also clear that, in
such systems, the initiatives incorporated in the
explanatory action represent the kind of 'beyonds'
which are expected from explanation. However, to
investigate this plurality it is necessary to discuss
further the notion of meaning and its extension to what
has been called 'social evaluation'.
Traditionally, semantics deals predominantly with the
concept of meaning in its communicative sense. C.K. Ogden
and I.A. Richard (19 23)-*® wrote on what they called
'the meaning of meaning' and recently G. Leech in
'Semantics' (1974) proposed the concept of
'communicative value' instead of 'meaning'** . 'Value'
10. C. K, OGDEN, I. A, RICHARD, The Meaning of Meaning,
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1946 C © 1923).
11. G, LEECH, op, cit,, p. 27,
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in semantics is the concept which explains the way in
which the meaning of a semantic unit develops from the
total set of semantic units. This interpretation has
nothing to do with the nature of these units since it
refers to their internal relationships. What Leech's
definition offers is the extension of this 'value'
beyond the esoteric situation of a linguistic structure.
In this way, 'value' introduces a domain according to
which it is measured, that is a 'system of evaluation'.
There is no doubt, of course, that the predominant
system according to which values are measured in language
is the system of communication. So, 'communicative
value' is a perfectly acceptable interpretation of
meaning in linguistics which shows, however, at the
same time the limitations of the linguistic paradigm and
the elaboration which is necessary in order to develop
this paradigm for architecture.
A first approach to such a development is the
extension of 'communicative value' towards a broader
semiotic framework. The route beyond the semiotic to a
socially valuable framework would be the second step,
but it is necessary to look first at the broader
explanation of communicative value. Piaget pointed out
that in all spheres of human behaviour there are systems
of meanings the essential parts of which are studied by
linguistics. However, he stressed the fact that,
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although language has played an important role in the
transmission of values and rules of every kind, it is
not the only system of signs or symbols by which these
values and rules have been originated. For instance, the
appearance of representation in individual development
is not due to language alone, but to a much wider
'semiotic function'. Piaget proceeds by suggesting
that language constitutes a system of meaning 'to the
power of one' and it is accompanied in collective life
by systems 'to the power of two', such as myths, which
are simultaneously symbols and semantic characters^.
Piaget's attitude represents a tendency which is
expressed by the involvement of semiotics in various
fields of human activities as an apparatus to explain
them. Yet, this tendency does not go beyond what has
been identified as 'communicative value'. The broadest
possible understanding of communicative value that
semiotics deals with is the communication of other values
to the investigator in the same context as language does,
by using codes which are different from language. Piaget
has translated this phenomenon by using the notion of
'convention'^ . According to Piaget convention indicates
that signs and meanings incorporate a social and
historical value and, thus, we can speak about the
'social evaluation' of signs at a given historical period.
12. J, PIAGET, Main Trends in Interdisciplinary Research,
G. Allen and Unvin, 1973 ( © 1970), pp. 20-24,
13. Ibid., p. 53 .
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The concept of 'evaluation' - as opposed to 'value' -
is highly operational since it reminds us of the way
operational structuralism looks at realities. Evaluation,
within this context, is open to a broadening of its
communicational context, since it includes conscious
preferenees for a potential planning action which go
beyond the pure understanding of a structure. So, the
simple concept of 'meaning' is replaced here by the more
complicated but certainly more suitable concept of
'historically created social evaluation'. This concept
is expected to allow, even starting from a purely
semiological base, the inclusion of the broader social
character of systems like architecture. An analogous
concept has also been used by Morris. He used 'pragmatic
meaning' in order to transfer the linguistic meaning -
which he refers to as 'syntactic meaning' - to the sphere
of examining the sign in relation to operations and
behaviours. In the next chapters both these concepts —
'social evaluation' and 'pragmatic meaning' - will be used
alternatively as having the same content. The concept
'system of social evaluation', however, is to be used
in a broader sense, indicating the social conditions
under which a pragmatic meaning is attributed to a
structure.
14. C. MORRIS, Signs, Language and Behaviour, Prentice-Hall
1946.
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1.3.3 BASES FOR SOCIAL EVALUATION IN SYSTEMS OF
ARTEFACTS; A COMPARISON
The argument which directly follows the previous
discussion - that communicative value is only one aspect
of a broader value of a system of artefacts - is that
each particular historical period is characterized by a
particular balance of systems of evaluation for a system
of products. The following example, giving a brief
account of what happened in different systems like
architecture, painting, music and language is taken from
EAR/3 15.
^ Systems like painting,music and language have been
always dominated by communicative values while architecture
shows a different history. For instance, it is quite
easy to understand that communicative value has dominated
the production of artefacts as far as official or relig¬
ious architecture is concerned, from the Pyramids to the
contemporary phenomenon of returning, at a morphological
level to the deep structure. This 'return' is supposed
to facilitate production, and produces another kind of
communicative value by the very acknowledgement of this
return. Banham emphasizes this point when he speaks
about functionalism, writing: "Under these circumstances
15. E.A.R./3, op. cit., p. 56.
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it was better to advocate or defend the new architecture
on logical and economic grounds than on grounds of
aesthetics or symbolisms that might stir nothing but
hostility. This may have been good tactics - the. point
remains arguable - but it was certainly misrepresenta¬
tion. Emotion had played a much larger part than logic
in the creation of the style; inexpensive buildings had
been clothed in it, but it was no more an inherently
economical style than any other. The true aim of the
style had clearly been, to quote Gropius's words about the
Bauhaus and its relation to the world of the Machine
Age, " to invent and create forms symbolizing that
world , and it is in respect of such symbolic forms that
its historical justification must lie."
What we have to add to this is that the deep struc¬
ture of this contemporary symbolism signifies - not in
terms of each architect's emotional reaction, but in
terms of social evaluation - the development of an
economic basis of symbolism and what is more important,
the beginning of an ' internalization' of this development.
Such an internalization already dominated other
fields of description of human practice and one of the
most important deep characteristics of contemporary
architectural thinking is that it does not only assume
———————————————— ^
16. R. BANHAM, Theory and Design in the First Machine
Age , Archit. Press 1972 C ® 1960), p, 321,
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the significance of an economic basis in the limited
symbolic context of architecture, but also acknowledges
the necessity of the interdisciplinary character of it.
Harvey is a good example of this. He points out
that: "in asserting the primacy of the economic basis
Marx was proposing two things. First, he is suggesting
that the relationships between structures are themselves
structured in some way within the totality. In a con¬
flict between the evolution of the economic basis of
society and elements in the superstructure, it is the
latter that has to give way, adapt, or be eliminated.
Some structures are therefore regarded as more basic than
others within a totality. Structures can therefore be
ranked in order of significance. Marx obviously decided
that the conditions concerning the production and re¬
production of material life were fundamental - he certainly
argued more strenuously for this view. And this led him
to his second main point. When we attempt to view
society as a totality, then, ultimately everything has to
be related to the structures in the economic basis of
society. " *7
One should expect that economic bases have been
constituting the fundamental system of social evaluation
of architecture because of the hardware operations
i
required to produce architectural artefacts and the
difficulty of reproducing them. This has been happening
17. D. HARVEY, op. cit,, p. 292,
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also in other systems - consider, for example, stone
writing or sculpture - but the additional property of
architecture is that it has mainly to do with land use
and economic resources. We shall try to make a rough
comparison of four systems of human practice: Architecture,
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* After L. Bernstein ^
Social evaluation appears at a final level which has
been already called 'super-surface structure' and which,
particularly in painting, music, and language, has been
considered as the aesthetic one. Specifically in
18. L.BERNSTEIN, The Unanswered Question, The Norton
Lectures at Harvard University, 1973 (also shown on B^B.C. 2,
1976).
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language, what has been accepted by Chomsky as surface
structure constitutes a level which does not exist in the
other systems as a self-sufficiently evaluated level, and
it is the result of the highly communicative power of
language.
Nevertheless, in ,architecture it is not only the
aesthetic evaluation which constitutes the system of
social evaluation, as opposed to music and painting in
which, because of the ease of reproduction, aesthetic
evaluation has historically become predominant. The
bipolar form-substance, for instance, may be used as a
basis which clarifies a comparison among these systems.
Although these systems are comparable in terms of form,
they are quite different as far as the substance of their
final product is concerned. Substance in painting is
completely preserved from the chosen elements to the
super-surface structure. Language and music belong to
another category in which there is always the opportunity
of conceiving both systems either in a written or in an
oral substance. Architecture belongs to another category
in which the super-surface structure is reached through
a mapping which is quite different from the substance of
the real product. The important difference between these
last two categories is concerned with the process of
producing the super-surface structure and not with the
process of resolving and understanding it.
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This deals directly with the economic bases of social
evaluation in architecture, which allows us to interpret
the nature of the production of architectural 'syntagms'
and what might be called pragmatic meaning in architec¬
ture. Indeed, the four systems of the artificial we
mentioned, in terms of the properties of the super-
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(taken from EAR/3 , pp. 58-6l).
19, Industrial design belongs to a particular category in terms of
the production of the super-surface structure, In this category ,
aesthetic value is greatly replaced by a set of operational
advantages concerned with the prototype. However, in industrial
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In fact, the economic basis for evaluating environ¬
mental artefacts has been developed towards a kind of
symbolism of the mode of production in which these
artefacts are incorporated. This shows an interesting
metaphor which takes place consciously and which is
represented. by a variety of buildings such as the
Pompidou cultural centre in Paris or the numerous mass
housing blocks of the era of industrial purism. Such
'second power' symbolisms, which consciously emphasize
through communication a system of social evaluation of
architectural forms, is also included in the kind of
architectural practice which is identified as 'post¬
modern architecture' . The critical point of view of
post-modern architecture and the symbolic loading of its
products constitute a return to communication as the
predominant basis to appreciate the value of the built forms.
Post-modern architecture is itself a strong criticism
of what post-modernists call 'purism' . It is obvious to
them that purism rejected the communicative values that
an architectural artefact can incorporate^.
design, especially because prototypes are designed in order to
be reproduced, the ability of being a commodity gets an aesthetic
value, reversing the traditional scheme. This new kind of
aesthetically evaluated functionalism can be very easily acknow¬
ledged in contemporary forms of architectural design (P.S.S.H.A.
K., infrastructural design for flexibility, etc.).
20. See C. JENCKS (1977), op. cit,, and R, VENTURI, Complexity
and Contradiction in Architecture , The Architectural
Press, 1977 ( 0 1967, 1977), particularly p. 16 (Nonstraight-




In the previous chapters I examined the dynamic
capacity which descriptive theories acquire by placing them
in a historical context. I discussed also some of the
fundamental concepts involved in the linguistic metaphor
of architecture; mostly the generative character of
environmental syntax and the broader notion of 'meaning'.
In this chapter this discussion will be completed by
introducing the concepts of 'syntagm' and 'prototype'.
These concepts formalize the whole idea of the linguistic
metaphor of architecture and make it suitable for further
elaboration.
According to De Saussure, a syntagm in linguistics
is a combination of consecutive units, supported by
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linearity*. Also, 'syntagmatic relations' are considered
as being opposed to'paradigmatic relations!^ Lyons explains
these points as follows:
"Syntagmatic relations which an element contracts
are those which derive from its combinations with
preceding and following elements of the same
level ... paradigmatic relations contracted by an
element are those which hold between the actually
occurring element and other elements of the same
level which might have occurred in its place.
The concept of 'syntagm' in the sense developed above
represents a logically powerful combination which has
appeared after a syntactic process and, at the same time,
is automatically equipped with a coherent meaning. The
logical understanding of a sentence in linguistics shows
this power of cohesion which is not merely a product of
autonomous syntax. Furthermore, a 'syntagm' implies a
degree of complexity beyond the level of an elementary
structure. So, the 'syntagmatic approach' includes the
necessities with which architectural explanation should
be equipped and is to be used in this study to summarize
my view of the linguistic metaphor for the built environ¬
ment .
In language, linearity is obviously a predominant
structural rule for 'syntagms'4. However, environ-
1. F. de SAUSSURE, op. cit., p. 123.
2. They are also called "associative relations"(by de Saussure).
3. In D. ROBEY (ed.), op. cit., p. 12; also see: J. LYONS,
Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics , Cambridge
University Press, 1974- ( © 1968), p, 70,
4. J. LYONS, (1968), op. cit,, p. 209.
8^f
mental artefacts considered as 'syntagms' do not follow
this rule. They are subject to a plurality of interpre¬
tations and get meanings according to rules which are
different from those of language®. Nevertheless,
'environmental syntagms' are certainly structured and are
also classified (or can be classified) into particular
categories following a paradigmatic procedure analogous to
that of language. Following again the linguistic logic,
we could establish the notion of 'prototype' to indicate the
deeper structure of a family of surface environmental
images which derive from the same deep structure; provided,
of course, that we understand this deeper structure as
totally meaningful, in the broader sense of 'meaning'.
A. Awadalla has developed a view of prototypes beyond
the form initially adopted in our collective work (EAR/3).
He investigated the analogies between linguistic and
architectural prototypes, especially concerning their
level of abstraction .
"Prototypes ... are to be viewed as highly syn¬
thetic structures obtainable at intermediate
levels of abstraction ... They are not surface
phenomena in themselves, yet not entirely isolated
from the rich level of observables, since they
realize their potential and material existence in
it ... They presuppose a structural organization
that is relatively persistent and amenable to some
form of analytic treatment, yet they retain a
property of fundamental incompleteness that makes
them flexible, dynamic and open to transformation
and hierarchic permutation. They continuously
negate their actuality only to reintroduce it
enriched with new possibilities that obtain within
various operational contexts."®
5, Compare with the concept of "ambiguity" in Venturi's "gentle
manifesto" (R. "VENTURI CL977), op, cit. , p. 16).
6. A. AWADALLA (1979), p. 168,
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Awadalla stressed that architectural syntagms repre¬
sent structures which are produced by restricted productive
freedom because of the material resources involved. These
material resources are involved in a process which corres¬
ponds to what Barthes has called logo-techniques which,
unlike natural language, have an essentially utilitarian
character and are not elaborated by a 'speaking mass' but
by a 'deciding group'7. Finally, Awadalla also indicated
that the timing rules involved in the production of
language do not exist as such in architecture:
"In architecture, syntagmatic relations do not in
principle presuppose (though they by r>o means exclude,
especially during the process of construction) a linear
ordering of units ... Architecture usually dis¬
plays and juxtaposes its elements all at once and
imposes on them a physical existence in volumetric
space."8
The history of architectural practice has been char¬
acterized by an extensive use of prototypes, either at
the level of 'language' or at the level of 'speech'. At
the level of language, prototypes have been grouped in
different styles and at the level of speech, they have
been grouped in the individual ways in which architec-,
tural surface-structures have been implemented.
Especially in architecture, prototypes appear as
pre-structured 'syntagms' carrying a particular meaning.
The changes in the system of social evaluation of these
7. Ibid., pp. 169-170.
8 , Ibid,, p. 171.
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syntagms, however, have continuously influenced the
development of the apparatus to understand them, that is,
the descriptive theories in architecture.
An important feature of such changes is that pro-
totypic images not only distinguish one style from another
but also distinguish a particular building-type from another.
Again, whole periods in the history of architectural
practice are characterized by the predominance of specific
building-types and by the social meaning carried by them.
Building-types, the institutions they represent, the style
they promote, and the social meaning they carry, all seem
to constitute coherent structural units which signify
each particular period and place.
It is interesting to discuss here the consequences of
this understanding of the role of prototypes on the
conception of architecture as an autonomous and coherent
discipline.
In the professional education of architects as well
as in the academic organization of architectural schools
two attitudes towards architecture are clear and distinct.
According to the first, the logic of architectural prac¬
tice - and consequently the logic of explaining it - is
unique independently of the institutional characteristics
as well as of the predominant activities taking place in
a specific building type. According to the second attitude,
such a unique logic does not exist or exists at a very
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deep abstract and, therefore, useless level. Thus, both
practice and description in architecture are decisively
influenced by the particularities and the institutional
origin of the building-types or, more generally, by a set
of taxonomic factors which are involved in the whole field
of the built space.
At least one of these taxonomic factors, the scale,is
commonly accepted as highly influential for the creation
of distinguishable disciplines. There is undoubtedly a
conceptual gap between urbanism and architecture and some
would claim that a similar gap exists between architec¬
ture and what belongs to the smaller scale of interior
design.
In general, the sciences of the artificial environ¬
ment in both disciplinary as well as in practical terms
seem to follow a simple taxonomic model, which is based on
taxonomic factors such as 'scale', 'building-type', and
'explanatory paradigm'.
88
All the above factors (which constitute the basic
dimensions of a model through which architectural educa¬
tion and practice can be classified) seem to function as
generators of prototypes in environmental thinking
through history. The argument is that one of these
factors, that is 'building-types', is more powerful than
the others in influencing the creation of autonomous
prototypic categories especially because of the insti¬
tutional origin of these building-types. Universities
constitute the main but not the only example in favour of this
argument. There are no clear boundaries between large-
scale university planning and the design of specific
buildings. The problems are the same; at least,those probl&ns
which come from the particular institutional identity of
universities as compared with other building-types such as
housing complexes or industrial areas.
The important epistemological question that the above
simple hypothesis imposes is whether environmental arte¬
facts can be studied separately according to their insti¬
tutional origin and their social evaluation rather than
according to scale disciplines. This study adopts the
view that, although it is meaningless to establish a
priori such barriers, building-types correspond to
structured prototypes or to model-structures which are
distinguishable at least to the same degree as model-structures
originated from scale, if such structures exist at
all. This is a basic consequence of a 'prototypic
analysis' of space. According to such an analysis,
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institutional prototypes and their environmental images
are more pragmatic than conceptual prototypes such as
'urban* or 'interior'. City, for example, is a model-
structure but it is as an institution that it has to be
looked at and not as a large-scale aggregate. The
interest of this study in the description and planning of







DIFFERENTIATIONS IN DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES OF THE
ARTIFICIAL SPACE
Some of the questions which arise from the linguistic
metaphor in architecture have been already discussed in
the previous chapters. Those questions referred to
two main areas. Firstly, to the historical origin of
description and its 'beyonds' and secondly to the
particular characteristics of the environmental 'syntagms';
that isy the generative character of these syntagms and
the broader significance of the meaning included in them.
According to the arguments developed in the previous
chapters, a linguistic product seen as a structure aims
predominantly at communication, although an a posteriori
analysis of it can raise some more general questions of
the kind investigated in sociolinguistics. On the
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contrary, an architectural product aims predominantly at
other purposes although the analysis of it can display
communicative values which have not been consciously
included in the process of its production.
A central concept which is based upon the previous
conclusions is the concept of 'syntagm' or 'prototype'.
The particular character of environmental prototypes, as
it has been developed by A. Awadalla,shows the limitations
of the linguistic metaphor in architecture and the
need for further consideration of what has been called
the prototypic analysis of the built space, or - in a
more linguistic terminology - the 'syntagmatic approach
to environmental structures'.
I have already noted that there are two main conse¬
quences of the 'syntagmatic approach'. The first refers
to the involvement of prototypes in the production of
different 'styles' in the course of architectural history.
The meaning of the concept of prototype emphasizes the
differentiations of architectural forms at the intermediate
deepness level of prototypes.
The second consequence refers to the role of proto¬
types in the eventual introduction of different
disciplinary areas within the context of architectural
explanation. This meaning of the concept of prototype
emphasizes the differences between architectural products
as far as their institutional origin is concerned. It is
interesting here to remember that in the history of
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architecture different 'styles' were developed mostly
when they were exercised on a particular building-
type. It seems, therefore, quite reasonable to conclude
that the notion of prototype might incorporate both the
above meanings at the same time. It is also reasonable to
conclude that the social evaluation of specific building-
types would not be possible if we excluded from them the
morphological features of the intermediate deepness level
to which prototypes belong.
I shall try in this chapter to extend the concept of
'syntagm' a little further, towards the descriptive
apparatus for explaining the production of the built space.The
argument is that syntagms have dominated not only the
historical evolution of architectural practice, but
descriptive theories of architecture as well. And the
core of the argument refers of course to the operational
character of description and the subjectiveness of it.
Since syntagms include socially evaluated meanings,the
way they are understood is also characterized by the
predominances of particular attitudes towards both the
description of space and the practice of its products.
In EAR/3, we tried to examine three well known
theories of artificial space, namely those developed
by Lynch, Alexander and Harvey. We wrote:
Consider, for instance, three theories in architec¬
ture concerned with the description of the built
9^
environment and its 'beyonds'. In these theories - by
people who have been basically trained in quite different
disciplines - we shall see how the general principles
reflect the emphases on specific systems of social
evaluation in the way we called syntagmatic, and also how
such syntagmatic approaches differentiate the syntactic
chains which might be derived from them.
Lynch in his 'Image of the City' is concerned with
'the look of cities and whether this look is of any
importance, and whether it can be changed'1. His work,
which is predominantly experimental, stresses the
syntactic aspects of a built form by analyzing its
'environmental image' into three components:'identity',
'structure' and 'meaning'. By definition, the whole of
this approach is based on the communicative value of -the
built forms. He points out that "so various are the
individual meanings of a city, even while its form may
be easily communicable, that it appears possible to
separate meaning from form, at least in the early stages
of analysis. This study will therefore concentrate on
the identity and structure of city images"^. Lynch
could not avoid the syntagmatic dimension in his work -
even working in a purely systemic way - since he had
himself pointed out that symbolic, aesthetic and other
values beyond the communicative one are also of equal,
1. K. LYNCH, The Image of the City, MIT Press 1973 ( 0 1969),
Preface.
2. Ibid., p. 9.
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if not more, importance. Furthermore, what is striking
is that city images, even in terms of communicative
value, are grouped according to social classes, age, sex,
education and profession.
Lynch has tried to investigate syntax chains
evaluated socially in terms of human perception,
cognition, and communication. The components of his
elementary structure 3 inevitably include this particular
kind of semantic interpretation, and consequently, the
whole structural chain does the same, belonging
to the syntagmatic approach.!
We have to look at his chapter concerned with
'metropolitan form' in order to imagine how this chain may
be descriptively identified and to show how flexible
the syntactic chain and social evaluation is according to the
system of meaning we use.
Apart from Lynch's first technique-which is less
structural and more systemic^ - to identify the way in
which higher order structures (such as metropolitan ones)
may be formulated, it is quite interesting how structurally
valuable is the second one in which the elementary
structures already contain the powerful attributes (always
within the communicative context) that allow them to pro-
3. "Paths", "edges", "districts", "modes" and "landmarks".
4. K. LYNCH (1960), op. cit., p. 112.
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duce higher order structures. He points out that: "The
i
second technique is the use of one or two very large
dominant elements, to which many smaller things may be
related: the siting of settlement along a sea-coast for
example; or the design of a linear town depending on a
basic communication spine ..."? The structural chain that
may be produced in such a way is syntactically different
compared, for instance, with what we might understand as
a hypothetical abstract topological syntax of a city, as it
might be suggested by the first technique.
Alexander represents the kind of investigator who
moved from the predominantly syntactic aspects of design
to the syntagmatic ones. In his first book 'Notes on the
Synthesis of Form' he tried to establish a general mathe¬
matical syntax according to which elementary structures
cam be equipped with some semantic interpretation®.
I
Alexander accepted later the already structured
prototypes (purely syntagmatic) and also the differentia¬
tion of their syntactic characteristics caused by
political, social - in a word cultural - demands. When
he established an institution like the 'Centre for Environ¬
mental Structure'7 he had already realized the social
5. Ibid. , p. 113.
6. Alexander uses the term "needs", later changed into "tendencies".
7. Proceedings of the Seminar held by the Center for Environmental
Structure in 1967.
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significance and changing character of architectural
prototypes and tried to find a technique to record them
and to produce his flexible 'environmental pattern
language '.
In Harvey's work 'Social Justice and the City's the
predominance of economic evaluation of environmental
structures at the urban scale is obvious. Equipped
with the apparatus of theoretical Marxism combined with
what Harvey calls the 'operational structuralism' of
Piaget, he does not try just to use economics as one
basis of an environmental descriptive theory, but as the
comprehensive basis for i\ . Harvey's purely syntagmatic
approach goes further, structuring the syntagms themselves
through the structure of social evaluation. He does not
speak anywhere about what this means in terms of syntag¬
matic syntax, but we may realize what that might be,
considering some of his basic concepts, such as 'real
income', 'use value', 'exchange value', etc. It is not
our intention here to proceed *vitk o( detailed discussion
oj" syntagmatic syntax as it may be formulated in
relation to Harvey's work. Nevertheless, it will become
more and more clear that Harvey's emphasis on the economic
basis is considered here as being strong enough to
stimulate further research on the syntagmatic nature of
architectural prototypes (taken from EAR/3 ,p.65).
8. D. HARVEY (1973), op. cit.
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What becomes apparent in the above examples is that,
of course, different descriptive approaches to architec¬
tural products are intended to solve problems which these
approaches consider as most important and are influenced
in their structure by the nature and historical origin of
these problems. They also adopt particular views concern¬
ing the social meaning of elementary space structures.
For Lynch a prototype has mostly a communicative value and
this is the way he deals with it in attempting to propose
ways of practice. For Alexander a prototype is a system
of fundamental needs either in the older form of 'diagrams'
or in the more recent form of the lexical items in his
pattern language. Especially in Alexander's work, it is
interesting to examine the enlargement of the social
meaning included in each pattern, which goes beyond the
formalistic attitude adopted in the 'Notes of the Synthesis
of Form'. Finally, for Harvey, a prototype reflects the
economic values embedded in it by the mode of production
in which the prototype is incorporated and has also a
fundamental institutional value for the one who investi¬
gates it.
According to a prototypic analysis of built space, any
attempts to produce the abstract autonomous syntax of
it fail to meet a problem-solving purpose. They have
to be elaborated through mapping procedures. However,
since mapping procedures do not belong "to the context of
a syntagmatic approach to the built space,abstract syntaxes
r
have a mere geometrical significance for this kind of
approach.
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The level of abstraction of the prototypes which are
used in different descriptive theories is by no
means clearly defined. Lynch's syntagms, for instance,
are nearer to the surface than Alexander's first
'diagrams'. Alexander himself moved later towards a
lower degree of abstraction by introducing the patterns.
Generally speaking, we have to admit that a high degree
of individuality characterizes different approaches as
they have been generated by different problem-solving
intentions and developed at different times. In a broader
sense, we can accept, however, that the strongly syntagmatic
character of architectural practice and the structural
complexity of environmental prototypes would imply, as a
rule, an intermediate level of abstraction for the descriptive
theories of the built space , as it is shown diagrammat-
ically below (first appeared in EAR/3).
Ideology, behinds and






















9. E.A.R./3, op. cit. 74.
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The major conclusion from the above discussion
is that, in practice, each explanatory apparatus for the
built space is historically generated and highly subjective.
The linguistic metaphor serves this explanatory task by
enlarging the notion of meaning towards 'social
evaluation' and by implying the structural philosophy
which is embedded in the linguistic paradigm. However,
it is precisely this enlargement - made necessary because
of the natural semantic pluralism of space - that shows
the limits of the linguistic metaphor. A modified paradigm




OPERATIONAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE LINGUISTIC PARADIGM:
A FORMAL BASIS
2.2.1 DESCRIPTIVE OR SUBSTANCE LEVELS
The development of the linguistic paradigm towards
the semantic pluralism of artificial space is,by defini¬
tion, subject to a kind of operational taxonomy. What we
really need to achieve by such a taxonomy is an average
formal basis which would be equally sufficient for a
plurality of explanatory approaches to the built space
regardless of the problem-origin and the structure of
these approaches. We may refer to this hypothetical
basis as the 'descriptive dimension' which should be
added to the linguistic paradigm. In general, this
descriptive dimension is the tool which makes the ling-
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uistic metaphor conscious and serves as a modifier from
the domain of language to the domain of the artificial
space. In this sense, such a hypothetical basis
is not a dimension at all, at least in the usual linear
sense of dimension. It signifies the structure of the
descriptive apparatus of the built space - or, in other
words, the structure of descriptors of it - and as such,
it indicates the ideological origin and the problem-
solving intentions of the actor who describes the
built environment. In strictly linguistic terms, the
descriptive dimension is predominantly concerned with an
operational modification of the semantic component of the
linguistic paradigm. It is also expected that, because
of its generative character, this operational modifica¬
tion of meaning cannot but affect the syntactic character¬
istics and the transformational rules of the explanatory
apparatus for understanding the artificial space.
The best way to identify this hypothetical formal
basis is, of course, by investigating and classifying the
existing theories of the artificial environment and their
historical development. I have been involved to some
extent in this task, in the previous chapters, in discuss¬
ing some aspects of different systems of human practice*
and some well known theories about the built environment^
1. See Ch.I,1.3, comparison systems like language, music, painting
and architecture.
2. See Ch.1,2.1, comparison of Alexander and Lynch's theories.
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and the production of it^ . This is still, however, far
from constituting a sufficient empirical inquiry on this
subject. Furthermore, it has been also repeatedly
claimed in this study that one basic consequence of the
semantic pluralism of the built space is the effect on the
coherence of architectural explanation, as far as the
institutional origin of environmental products is taken
into account. This means that different institutions
are not expected to correspond to environmental images
which could be explained in a unique and general manner,
although it is definitely possible to discover highly
abstract formal languages for this explanatory purpose.
In the following chapters, I shall be trying to
investigate some aspects of such a formal language but
my empirical research will be concentrated on a
particular institutionally defined structure: the
universities. The major inputs, however, for starting the
empirical research do not deal with university structures
in particular, but are based on more general assumptions .
The hypothetical formal basis according to which the
structure of descriptors can be understood is very
elastic and equally sufficient for a whole spectrum of
the sciences of the artificial. As such, this basis has
mostly a taxonomic character unless it is equippped
with some transformational rules which can illustrate
3. Especially Harvey's theory Csee Ch.1,2.1).
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the possible forms that this basis can take when it
refers to a particular domain of inquiry.
The linguistic paradigm, considered in a broader
sense as semiotic paradigm, provides us with a generally
accepted apparatus for such a formal basis. This appara¬
tus is the path from the 'signifier' to the 'signified'.
Lagopoulos has shown in a digrammatic form how
complex such a path may be (in the case of urbanism) : 4
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The central concept introduced by the signifier-
signified logic is the level of approach of a structure
and, furthermore, of a domain of inquiry. The
4. A.-©. AATOnOYAOS, Aoulh^I noAeoSopua, "EkSocth T.E.E., 1973.
(A.-Ph. LAGOPOULOS, Structural Urbanism , Technical Chamber
of Greece, 1973), p. 159.
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predominance of environmental considerations is, for
example, quite clear for the study of the built forms,but at
the same time the explanatory power of description is
definitely reinforced by the consideration of other
levels, such as the activity level or the level of the
institutional characteristics of the artificial environ¬
ment.
The levels of approaching a structure are also
related to the differentiations of substance which can
appear as the investigator moves from one level of ap¬
proach to another. The general form of this phenomenon was
developed previously as a basic characteristic of
different systems of human artefacts (Chapter 1.3.3).
Architecture was considered there as a system where
super-surface structures are static, which coco be evgtuor^ec)
in composite ways, and can be reproduced by changing
substance through mapping. Although the levels of
approach, which I mentioned previously as components of
a formal basis for description, do indeed describe
pragmatic aspects of space structures, it is also apparent
that these levels represent differentiations of substance
of these structures . The view which is adopted in this
study is that such levels (environmental,activity,
institutional) are not communicational artefacts merely
created to conceive better a spatial form, but existing
and interacting realities which are all included in what
we understand under the general title of 'environmental
structures'.
10(5
2.2.2 THE DOMINANCE OF THE ACTIVITY LEVEL
Among these levels of approaching an environmental
structure, the activity level is proven to be essential
for both theory and practice in architecture. As J.
Farbstein wrote,
"Activity studies are steadily gaining support and
popularity at various scales of environmental
studies, from the architectural to the urban,
metropolitan and even national ... Activity is
treated as an abstraction of human behaviour which
can be usefully related to certain aspects of the
environment."5
This support and popularity of activity studies has
driven architects to a behaviourist approach towards the
artificial environment. There is no doubt that activities
are what architects usually consider as the first
'signified' of the built space. The behaviourist attitude
towards the design of the artificial environment, however,
is due to the opposite: built space is considered
as the first 'signified' of the activities. Especially
in the planning of complex forms, like universities, the
production of activity models has been used as a kind of
panacea in order to face the complex problems which are
involved in large-scale planning. In the case of
universities, such activity models constitute the essential
5. J. FARBSTEIN, The definition and description of activity, in:
J.A.R.3/1 (January 1974) p. 18.
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part of the newly developed operational techniques which
are used to translate academic order into built space.®
The importance of the activity level for modern
architecture was first expressed in the Charte d'Athenes
as a hierarchical arrangement of categories such as
Dwelling,Recreation, Work, Transportation etc ^ . The
Charte d'Athenes has been considered by the new generation
of urban planners and architects as the source of many
problems incorporated in the so-called Modern Movement.
It is generally accepted that most of these problems
derive from the attempts to translate activity groups into a
strict environmental zoning.
Because of the popularity of activity studies
numerous attempts to describe activities in a formal way
have appeared. Farbstein's article (1974) is a good
review of such attempts. He wrote on the definition of
activity, that,
"activities are the observable actions of indi¬
viduals, alone or in groups ... this excludes
verbs describing interior states as opposed to
actions (to be in love, to be sad, to think etc.)."®
and on the classification of activities (stressing the
connection between activities and their locational
characteristics), that
6. See ch. 1.2.1 of part II of this study.
7. A brief summary in D. SHARP, A Visual History of
Twentieth - Century Architecture, Heinemann 1972, p. 155.
8. J. FARBSTEIN (1974), op. cit. , p. 18.
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"... activities are recognized as distinct in
themselves, but separate categories are included
for the same activity, carried out by different
locations. Eating, for example, would be given
a different code at home, at college and
'outside'."®
However, Farbstein's main contribution to the under¬
standing of activities is his discussion on 'activity
patterns' and the regulation of activities. First, he
stresses the links between activity patterns and the insti¬
tutional characteristics of an organization.
"The activity pattern of a particular organization
consists of the highly interdependent activity
routines of the people who compose that organiza¬
tion ... The activities performed tend to be
identified strongly with the person's role in the
organization ... The characteristic pattern of
activities for the organization ... contains a
description of the temporal structure imposed by
the organization . . .
Second, he stresses the possibility of controlling
activities and the role of this control in maintaining "the
social structure.
"These controls influence greatly the daily
activity patterns of society and thus the use of
space and facilities. Another type of control is
that which determines which activities can take
place in which spaces. It is impossible, however,
to state precisely when 'functional' requirements
govern the location of activities and when more
symbolic concerns are responsible. Probably they
are mutually reinforcing. As Mary Douglas2^ said
in discussing dirt,
'It is a relative idea. Shoes are not dirty in
themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the
dining table; food is not dirty in itself, but it
is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the bedroom,
or ... bathroom equipment in the drawing room, ...
outdoor things . indoors ;.. . and so on' . (pp . 35-36) "-1*
9. Ibid., p. 19.
10. Ibid., p. 22; reference to: T. HAGERSTRAND, What about people
in regional science? Papers and Proceedings of the
Regional Science Association, vol. 24, 1970, pp. 7-21.
11. Ibid., p. 23; reference to: M. DOUGLAS, Purity and Danger,
Preager, 1966.
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What seems to be important in the above remarks is
that activities may signify deeper orders of the kind
which characterizes an organization, the system of roles
in it and the social order which is promoted by the
organization.
There is no doubt, therefore, that although
activities represent one level of approaching the built
forms - and as such belong to a Sa-Se path - they,
themselves, may be also understood at different levels of
approach. In a previous work, concerned with participa¬
tion as a descriptor of the built environment, I attempted
such an analysis of the activity level. That analysis
identified successive levels of approaching the semantic
component of activities12 . These levels are mentioned
below.
The first and simplest level of approaching
activities is expressed by the combination of the
participants with the time sequence of an activity.
af
The typical element (Xji) of such a matrix corres¬
ponds to a variety of potential meanings, e.g. 'simple
12. A. M. KOTSIOnOYAOS, euuiietoxfi otlq ? Apxitehtovih££
^
ApdoE ig , GeaoaAovtxri 1975 (A. M, KOTSIOPOULOS, Participation
in Architectural Actions, Ph. D. Thesis, Thessaloniki,
1975) pp. 263-264 (english summary).
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presence of an individual or group during one stage of
the process' or 'degree of control that each individual
or group exercises on the process in a particular stage
of it',etc.
A second, more complex and comprehensive level of
approaching activities is expressed by combining the
above matrix with a set of bases, which describe the
nature of activities:













according to a set of descriptive
III
"bases: M= (m-^, nu, .... me) •
The main component of the above representation of
activities is the set of descriptive bases M = (m^,m2, ..
Such bases are: 1 communicationcoalition and conflict',
and finally 'dominance'. It is possible to represent
'coalition', 'conflict' and 'dominance' structures in
terms of matrices or graphs similar to sociograms. What
is important in such representations is the distribution
V
w
among the participants of the property which is described
by each descriptive basis. The total set of these dis¬
tributions constitutes a first step towards the under¬
standing of the roles of participants. Roles are, in
fact, the main components of a third, more comprehensive,
level of approaching activities.
'Role' is a concept introduced by sociologists and
social psychologists to explain human activities in a
schematic and coherent manner. There has been a long
discussion about what exactly 'role' is. As Goffman
wrote:
"In sociology there are few concepts more commonly
used than 'role', few that are accorded more
importance, and few that waver so much when looked
at closely."13
'Role' means literally 'actor's part in a play' or
'person's task or duty in an undertaking' but this con¬
cept is generally used here in order to signify the
typical connection of a unit or part with a whole or pro¬
cess. Berger and Luckman define role as follows:
"We can properly begin to speak of roles when this
kind of typification occurs in the context of an
objectified stock of knowledge common to a collect¬
ivity of actors. Roles are types of actors in such
a context. It can readily be seen that the con¬
struction of role typologies is a necessary
correlate of the institutionalization of conduct.
Institutions are embodied in individual experience
by means of roles. The roles, objectified
13. E. GOFFMAN, Encounters, Penguin University 1972 C 0 1961),
p. 75.
linguistically, are an essential ingredient of the
objectively available world of any society. By
playing roles, the individual participates in a
social world. By internalizing these roles, the
same becomes subjectively real to him."14
According to B. Berstein, roles are incorporated in
a semiotic understanding of human activities:
"A social role can then be considered as a complex
coding activity controlling both the creation and
organization of specific meanings and the
conditions for their transmission and reception."-^
Roles are better understood within the framework of
'role systems'. Role systems represent a formalization
and abstraction of activity sets and correspond to what
Berger and Luckman define as ' institutionalization of
conduct' . Role systems deal with activities in an
overall way and are particularly important for the study
of complex environmental structures as opposed to
isolated roles. The following tables show an example of
how rich the information which is included in role
systems can be.
14. P. L. BERGER and T. LUCKMANN, The Social Construction of
Reality, Penguin University 1973 (. © 1966), p, 91,
15. B. BERNSTEIN, Class, Codes and Control, Vol, I Cl973,







































































































































































































The example shown in the above table represents an
activity (1C, 21B, 22C, 31D, 32D, 4C) which can be
16. A. M. KOTSIOPOULOS, Participation in Architectural Actions
1975, op. cit., p. 266 (in english).
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approached as a system of roles and has the following
characteristics:
1C: participants belong to several groups and represent
their groups during the process of the activity,
2 IB)
22c) onlY one group possesses the communicational codes
and is capable of distributing notification to other groups,
32d} no cligues aPPear an<3 there are no fields of intense
conflict,
4C: a pluralistic situation exists as far as dominance
is concerned (i.e. during the activity, power is dis¬
tributed among groups which control each other).
Obviously, semantic bases like communication, con¬
flict Or dominance are very general to describe the
surface characteristics of everyday activities. Such
bases belong to a deeper level of analysis. The form of
the path from deepness to surface, as far as the semantic
component of activities is concerned, is shown in the
following simple example. The example is based on a


































An example of developing one of the semantic bases
of activities(flow of information).
18. Beyond these static descriptions, there have been numerous
attempts to relate activities to human "needs" or "strings",
As Abraham writes, activities may be related to the "needs"
described by B. Malinowski because they are different between
primitive and more civilized people only in degree (metabolism,
reproduction, bodily comfort, safety, movement, growth and
health; see J. H. ABRAHAM, Origins and Growth of Socio¬
logy, Penguin 1973, pp. 555-556). On the other hand, Leighton
identified ten "basic strings" in man, Maslow described an
hierarchical system of evolutionary needs, and Erikson took
the view that each individual passes, during his life, through
eight major stages, fighting a particular battle at each stage
(see C. ALEXANDER, Major Changes in Environmental Form
Required by Social and Psychological Demands in: ARCH+ ,
2(1969) H. 7, p. 31; Alexander uses such concepts in order to
develop his pattern language).
11<$
2.2.3 THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL; THE STRUCTURE OF THE
FORMAL BASIS
A major assumption from the discussion about
activities is this: although activities represent a
coherent basis of approaching the built environment at an
intermediate level, they are themselves subject to a
deeper analysis. Such an analysis can reveal institutional
characteristics which influence both the structure of
activities as well as the structure of the built environ¬
ment, in which these activities take place. Roughly, this



























The different thickness of the horizontal arrows in
the above diagram represents the different degree of
/H7
cohesion between the images of an environmental struc¬
ture, as we move from the surface to the deep level. For
example, in the study of the Master Development Plan of
the Bath University19 it is easier to relate the strong
interdepartmental connections with the dominant idea of
a basic pedestrian movement and with the linear pattern
of the environmental development of the University than
to relate the detailed academic regulations with the
simulated activity images (which are used to aid the
design process) and with the complex built forms of the
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Institutions, by definition, represent a generaliza¬
tion and abstraction of activities. According to D.
Bell, institutions are
"activities which are repeated or continuous with¬
in a regularized pattern that is normatively
19. BATH, University of, The Proposed University of Bath.
Development Plan, Rep. No 1, 1964,pp. 14,32,47,81,98,110.
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sanctioned ... and they are studied comparatively
in order to see how different societies organize
their ... life."20
Thus, the investigation of a built form at the insti¬
tutional level implies the explanation of the institutional
identity of the activities which take place in it.
Moreover, as a consequence of the argument discussed
previously, such an investigation reveals the deep
structural patterns which dominate the environmental,
activity and institutional characteristics of the built
form and which are so deep that they are common to.all these
categories of characteristics.
Consciously or unconsciously, most of the history
of architecture is dominated by a coordination of such
patterns. The institutionalization of particular build¬
ing patterns which correspond to particular activity
patterns and, consequently, the classification of building
types according to their institutional origin is a
dominant element in the production of the artificial space.
I have already mentioned this fact writing about the
development of prototypes in Chapter 1.4. In order to
understand better this attitude, it is worthwhile to
mention the opposite view taken by one of the strongest
polemists versus this kind of semantic purism. R.
Ventouri writes in his 'gentle inanifests' for a
'Nonstraightforward Architecture':
20. A. BULLOCK and 0. STALLYBRASS (eds.), The Fontana
Dictionary of Modern Thought, Fontana / Collins 1973,
p. 313, (article by Prof. D, BELL).
W
"Architects can no longer afford to be intimidated
by the puritanically moral language of orthodox
modern architecture. I like elements which are
hybrid rather than 'pure', compromising rather
than 'clean' , distorted rather than 'straight¬
forward' , ambiguous rather than articulated ...
inconsistent and equivocal rather than direct and
clear. "21
The 'radical eclecticism' of what is called post¬
modern movement in architecture22 introduces a kind of
semantic pluralism of the built forms which makes in difficult
for the observer to understand the path from the environ¬
mental surface to the deep institutional identity of the
23artificial environment. In fact, post-modern ecclecticism
is not merely a style since the whole explanatory model
(used in this study to incorporate styles and building
types) is seriously affected by the logic of the
'nonstraightforward architecture'. It becomes much richer:
21. R. VENTURI (1967), op. cit. , p. 16.
22. According to Jencks' view, in: C. JENCKS (1977), op. cit.
23. See also C.B. WILSON, Physical Relationships in Architecture, in:
H.HAKEN and M. WAGNER(eds..), Cooperative Phenomena, Springer 1973.
for an analysis of the physical aspects of the huilt environment
in relation to what is called here"the. process of internalization"
(especially the introduction).
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Summarizing the basic components of the hypothetical
basis which constitutes the descriptive dimension of our
enriched linguistic paradigm, it is necessary to make
something clear: these components of such a formal
basis are themselves rich enough to provide the investi¬
gator with a plurality of approaches. Architects are
familiar with this plurality as it appears mostly at the
environmental level. Different semantic bases (climate ->
building as climatic modifier, geometry -> building as a
form, etc) are involved in the understanding of the artificial
space and some of them already include components of an¬
other level of approach (activity or institutional). In
any case, these three families of concepts, however
interconnected and complex, seem to be clear enough to




OPERATIONAL MODIFICATIONS OF -THE LINGUISTIC PARADIGM:
CATALYSTS OR PROBLEM-SOLVING MODIFIERS
A formal basis for organizing the descriptive dimen¬
sion of the linguistic paradigm in architecture is,
alone, not enough to include the operational structural
principles, required for a comprehensive explanation of
the artificial space. Some ways of involving such
principles in the explanatory task have been mentioned
previously. One, for instance, is the particular import¬
ance acquired by many planners to the level of activities.
Another is Ventari "s attitude in favour of a multiplicity
of the meanings which are created at the surface level
of the built forms and in favour of non-direct routes from
the surface to the deep level and from the environmental
images to the institutional ones.
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What has been not yet shown is how such simplified or
even more complex general principles may affect the
generative semantics of the artificial space, either by
articulating meaning according to the structure of the
formal theoretical basis mentioned before, or/and by
influencing the elementary deep structures of a semantic
syntax of the artificial space. Such principles are of
course not arbitrary. They highly depend on
particular ideologies and on the solution of particular
problems which they promote. On the other hand, these
principles are so strong that they play the role of
catalysts for the description of the artificial space.
That is, they make theories comprehensive and coherent
and they also articulate them in order to deal effectively
with environmental practice.1
We can speak, therefore, of a second level of an
operational modification of the descriptive apparatus, the
level of overall catalysts. The hypothetical formal basis
of the three levels of approach is influenced in its
structure by these catalysts and corresponds to the
social evaluation of the built environment which is
introduced by the catalysts. In other words, a problem-
originated catalyst does not constitute but a formaliza¬
tion of what I have called 'system of social evaluation'.
Such a system is particular for the actor who performs
1. See Ch.1,2.1.
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description and its formalization shows the way to a
practice which is, of course, equally affected by the
ideological context of the catalyst.
The particularity of catalysts does not necessarily
imply an arbitrary subjectivity in selecting them. A
'modified description' is arbitrary to the extent that
the ideological context of it is itself arbitrary.
Besides, the ideological context of scientific research
is a concept which is used under various interpretations.
At least two of these interpretations are clearly
defined and their antithesis illustrates the fundamental
contradiction between the 'mapping' philosophy of the
syntactic approach on the one hand, and the generative
philosophy of the operational structuralists on the other.
The 'mapping' philosophy is interested in a scient¬
ific inquiry which must be autonomous and accepts
'ideology' as a prism. This prism may transform the results
of scientific research to the technology needed to promote
purposes which might be humanitarian but also might not.
Chomsky, himself a supporter of autonomous science but
at the same time strongly involved in political thinking,
has described such a function of technology as follows:
"To the system the technical intelligentsia make
a very definite contribution, not only by the
design of technology and the implementation of
policy but also at an ideological level - in pro-
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tecting policy from criticism by investing it with
the aura of science."^
This interest in the' use of science signifies
also some interesting views of the connection between
science as such and the ideological representation of
science. Such views advocate that it is possible to
invest politics with science and signifies this level of
'mapping' as 'ideological'. What it does not mention is
that science itself may be invested with the aura of
politics or, in other words, be ideologically influenced
at a much deeper level. Such an attitude leads to the
second philosphy concerning the ideological structure of
science. This philosophy adopts -the vie^ -ibdT hot of)Ly use
technology but even the research apparatus and method¬
ology might be coloured by the ideological context of
praxis. A. Gramsci emphasized this fundamental difference
from the model of pure science writing that
"In reality, science itself is a structure which
belongs to man's superstructure ... it is ideology.
Without human intervention which constructs every
value, even scientific, what would 'objectivity'
mean? ... Scientific research has two main faces.
The one reviews the methods through which knowledge
can be acquired and investigates and reinforces
the instruments for observation; it also refines
the apparatuses of experience and of its control.
The other identifies what all humans can control
and understand in the same way... "3
2. N. CHOMSKY, Responsibility, in: J. ALLEN (ed.),,March 4,
Scientists, Students and Society, M.I.T. Press, 1970
p. 11.
3. A. GRAMSCI, II materialismo storico e la filosofia
di Benedetto Croce, Greek Edition^l973, pp. 96-97
(translated from the Greek text).
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Marxist philosophy has been quite often misunder¬
stood concerning the point that Gramsci discusses. It
has been not rarely believed that it provides the
apparatus to understand the world. It has been also
ignored that even theoretical Marxism is itself subject
to the rules which are implied by its own view of the
world and that, in the end, these rules emphasize the
highly ideological and praxially orientated nature of
research.
The same happens with any paradigm. By implying a
linguistic metaphor we have to be aware of the limitations
of it and of the fact that this metaphor beyond its
modifications is itself subject to the present state of
explanation in architecture and by no means constitutes
the metaphor or the paradigm. Nevertheless, although
the linguistic paradigm is not yet established as a
generally accepted explanatory apparatus in architecture,
it can function as what Kuhn calls 'normal science'4 ,
provided that it can outline its boundaries and limita¬
tions .
4. Kuhn is also very sceptical against any attempt to produce
neutral languages for scientific observation (T. KUHN, Logic
of Discovery or Psychology of Research? in: I, LAKATOS and
A. MUSGRAVE (eds.) (1970), op. cit., p. 18). On the other
hand, Badiou writes that, "if we try to find a formal back¬
ground behind any science (and to connect all these back¬
grounds either among them or with an artificial language) it
means that we confuse the development of a system with the
rule which governs its production, since we can combine
these rules only when the real subject of a science is
absent .... " (A. BADIOU, Le concept de la modele,
Greek edition, 1972 ( © 1970), p. 27. The part in
12 6
What is, therefore, the kind of catalyst which would
not only articulate in a specific manner the hypothetical
descriptive dimension of our extended paradigm, but also
would modify the elementary structures of the artificial
space?
Inevitably, this question has to be ahswered within
a double context. First, in connection with the problem
which is supposed to be served by the introduction of
such a catalyst. Second, within the particular context
which is introduced by the institutional character of the
environmental structures concerned with the above problem
area. Both these considerations derive from the way in
which we understand the 'semantic pluralism' of space
In the following, I shall attempt to show an example of
a problem-originated modifier with catalytic effects on
the description of the artificial space, i.e. the
alienation modifier. Although alienation cannot be
considered as the 'overall problem' it is significant
enough to show how the logic of a 'modified description'
can work.
parenthesis is summary of Badiou's reference to Carnap,
where Badiou criticizes the logical positivism of the anglo-
saxon type; Charles Wright Mills has also referred to the
construction of what we called "useful models" when criti¬
cizing both "grand theories" and "strict empiricism",
(C. W. MILLS, The Sociological Imagination, Penguin
1973 ( © 1959), p. 51). Mills attitude is very near to
Piaget's "reflective abstraction", to which Piaget arrives
starting also from a criticism of "apriorism" and "empiricism".
According to Piaget, both apriorism and empiricism take pre¬
existing realities for granted, as opposed to reflective
abstraction where realities are constructed "by the way we act
on things" (J, PIAGET, Genetic Epistanology, Norton Library
1971 ( © 1970), p. 77). The main parts of the above discussior.
have been developed in: A. K0TSI0P0UL0S, Participation in
Architectural Actions , op. cit,, p. 40-43,
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CHAPTER 1,2.4
AN EXAMPLE:THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION
2.4.1 ALIENATION AS A PROBLEM
Alienation is one of the most controversial concepts
in contemporary thinking . The general meaning of
alienation is an estrangement from society,
"a feeling of 'powerlessness' to affect social
change, or a depersonalization of the individual
in a large and bureaucratic society.
The development of the interest of political theory
in the concept of alienation is mainly due to the dis-
1. A. BULLOCK and 0. STALLYBRASS (eds.), (1973), op. cit., pp. 16-17.
(article by Prof. D. BELL),
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covery of the early writings of Marx2in which the strong
influence of Hegel is reflected
It is, of course, outside the scope of this study to
discuss in general the origin and the social significance
of alienation. To understand, however, the importance of
this term for the study of the artificial environment, it
is necessary to examine some fundamental aspects of
alienation. This examination will be based on two
important studies on alienation by E. Mandel (1970)
and by I. Meszaros (1970)^ , following the path from the
conceptual understanding of alienation towards some
aspects of it (mainly economic and 'aesthetical') which
have close relations to the environmental phenomena.
Meszaros writes in his introduction that Marx's
concept of alienation may be interpreted in four distinct
ways; that is, (a) as man's alienation from nature (which
expresses dialectically the relation of a worker with
his product and at the same time with his sensuous
2. Namely, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
( or Paris Manuscripts ) and Grundrisse (or, as titled
by the first editors of the manuscripts, Grundrisse der
Kritik der politischen Okonomie).
3. E. MANDEL, The Causes of Alienation, in: E. MANDEL and G. NOVACK,
The Marxist Theory of Alienation, Pathfinder Press 1974
( © 1970); I.m£szXR0S, Marx's Theory of Alienation, Merlin
Press 1975 ( © 1970). See also R. SCHACHT, Alienation,
Allen and Unwin 1972 C ® 1970).
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external world), (b) as man's alienation from himself
(that is, from his activity, which is the act of produc¬
tion), (c) as man's alienation from his 'species-being'
(that is, man turns into a being alien to him, into a
means to his individual existence), and (d) as man's
alienation from man (that is from other men) 4 . Meszaros
emphasizes that these aspects are interconnected and lie











The central point of such a structure is that alien¬
ation is mainly explained as 'alienation of human powers
from man through his own productive activity'® .
Meszaros' analytical understanding of the above structure
consists of the following:
4. I. M^SZXrOS (1970), op, cit., pp. 14-15.
5. Ibid., p. 108.
6. Ibid., p. 108.
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"(1) Man (M) is split into private property (P)
and wage labour (L);
(2) Property and labour antagonistically oppose
each other;
(3) The original man (M)<—>industry (I)<—>nature(N)
reciprocity is transformed into the alienated
interrelationships between:
(a) Private property (P)'.<—>alienated industry
(AI)<—>alienated nature (AN) and
(b) Labour (L) <—>alienated industry (AI)<—>
alienated nature (AN).
Furthermore, since now everything is subordinated
to the basic antagonism between property (P) and
labour (L) , we ,have the additional alienated
interrelations of:
(4) Property (P)<—>Labour (L) <—>alienated
industry (AI) and
(5) Property (P) <—>Iabour (L) <—>alienated
nature (AN)."7
Meszaros attempts also to illustrate the involvement
of various disciplinary areas in the structure of












7. Ibid., pp. 108-109.
8. Ibid., p. 110.
131
Meszaros' understanding of alienation presents the
multiplicity of explanations of this concept but,at the
same time, it is very general to show directly how this
fundamental problem of industrialized societies would
serve as a methodological apparatus for the description
and planning of the built environment. His main contri¬
bution to such a task is hidden under the more or less
misleading title of ' aesthetical aspects' of alienation.
Marx's writings on aesthetics have created many
controversial and one-sided consequences on artistic
\
creation. Especially responsible for this seems to be
Marx's concept of realism. In general, Marxist Realism
is described by Meszaros as follows:
"(1) there is something significant - with char¬
acteristics of its own - to be depicted, and fail¬
ure to grasp those characteristics through the
specific potentialities and means of art counts
as misrepresentation or distortion, and as such is
aesthetically unacceptable;
(2) one must be able to apply certain standards
to the organs of depiction, otherwise it would be
impossible to raise the question of misrepresenta¬
tion and distortion;
(3) similarly, one must be able to apply certain
standards to the organs of aesthetic experience,
otherwise there could be no aesthetic judgement;
(4) the standards of creative depiction, aesthetic
experience and critical judgement must have some
common denominator, otherwise there is no guarantee
against internal contradiction that would inevitably
make vacuous the concept of realism.
In other words: both the object of depiction and
the artistic form in which it appears, just as much
as the aesthetic experience itself under its
various aspects, must have objective criteria of
assessment."®(author's emphasis)
9. Ibid., p. 199,
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To discuss these 'criteria' it is necessary to
remember that; for Marx, the fundamental characteristic of
artistic creation is the dialectical interconnection
between meaning, value and need, which can be only under¬
stood in the inherently historical concept of the 'self-
mediating self-constitution' of the human natural being.
Thus, the dichotomy of 'is' and 'ought' is false as
regards the genesis of human values, and it is an artefact
of the historically conditioned inability of abstract
philosophers to account values except in a metaphysical
form^ .
According to Marxian aesthetics, therefore, the
phenomenon of alienation appears historically when
artistic creation fails to match the objective criteria
of assessment mentioned before which are ,in the end,
connected with the human natural being itself and its
'needs'.
The great danger of this kind of aesthetics is of
course that, because it does not give clear guidelines for
artistic creation and also because it can be interpreted
in many different ways, it can be seriously misleading.
In architecture, for instance, it would easily lead
towards either a strict purism of form or a naive
symbolism. This has happened quite frequently ,
10. Ibid., p. 192.
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not only in the U.3.S.R. in the age of 1 Socialist Realism'
but also in England by producing what Jencks calls,
"the 'People's Detailing', the English version of
'Social Realism' or Marxist aesthetics, that
became mandatory at the LCC in the early fifties:
pitched roofs, bricky materials, ticky-tacky, cute
lattice-work, little nooks and crannies,
picturesque profiles all snuggled within a card¬
board-like rectitude -*2
It would be one-sided aspect to understand the phenomenon
of alienation in the mere communicative sense that such
distortions seem to promote.
Alienation occurs not only when an artefact does not show
clearly the 'objective criteria of assessment' of it.
It appears mainly in the process of its production.
Meszaros seems to have understood clearly this meaning
when he writes about the significance of aesthetic
education:
"As far as art is directly concerned, Marx's
message means that artistic creation has ultimately
to be transformed into an activity the social
individuals as readily engage in as in the produc¬
tion of the goods necessary for the reproduction
of the conditions of their life. It means above
all that the existing-alienated-relationship
between production and consumption must be radi¬
cally changed, so that the creative aspect of
consumption enhances and intensifies the inherent
creativity of artistic production. The only form
in which this can happen is a reciprocal participa¬
tion of both sides in the various processes of
artistic production and consumption."^
11. See D. SHARP (1972) op. cit,, p. 135 and C. JENCKS, Modern
Movements in Architecture , Pelican 1977 ( @ 1973),
pp. 88-89.
12. C, JENCKS (1973), op. cit., p. 245,
13. I. MfiSZ^ROS (1970) op. cit,, pp. 213-214,
AW
In the case of environmental artefacts, this
attitude expresses clearly that space products become
alienated from man when they are produced and consumed
within a process, the rules of which are not controlled
by the users of the products. The 'selection' of such
products cannot replace participation. In addition to
this, Meszaros' final conclusion on 'aesthetic alienation'
is that a process towards disalienation is not conceivable
without the aesthetic education of man, which, however,
implies a radical change in all human relations
Meszaros' major conclusions on the importance of
participation and aesthetic education (as the only anti¬
dotes against alienation in industrialized societies) are
more empirically than structurally derived. Although his
work is marked by a unique effort to structure Marx's
concepts on alienation, his recommendations for action
express an esoterically articulated point of view, and do
not -funt+iovi wdeq itftl-edy as a tool for structuring an
explanatory apparatus for artificial space. However,
some of Meszaros' basic conclusions are quite important
for such a task: first, that alienation may occur at
different levels either as a pure aesthetic estrangement of
the user from the artefact, or as a basic characteristic
of the process of producing it. In the latter case it is
likely that 'aesthetic' alienation may also occur. The
14, Ibid,, p, 214 (reference to Marx),
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second important conclusion from Meszaros1 contribution is
concerned with the disalienation process in which
'aesthetic education' and participation, or the former
as a result of the latter, play a significant role.
Mandel's approach is interesting, especially because
he attempted to hierarchize in a comprehensive way the
effects of alienation. Using, as Meszaros, the original
Marxist concept fes it appeared in the "Manuscripts of
1844" and later in the "Grundrisse der Kritik der
politishen Oekonomie" (1857-58)) he stressed that alienation
may be understood at different stages and always in
connection with two other concepts, what he calls the
"complicated word 'reification'" and the "still more
complicated 'commodity fetishism'"^ .
The first stage of alienation is what Mandel calls
'economic alienation'. Economic alienation is, according
to Mandel, the most decisive element in a comprehensive
theory of alienation. Economic alienation can be approached
at different levels. First, as
"the separation of people from free access to the
means of production and means of subsistence."16
15. E. MANDEL (.1970) op. cit, , p, 19,
16. Ibid., p. 20
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Second, as 'alienated labour',
"when part of society was driven off the land, no
longer had access to the means of production and
means of subsistence, and, in order to survive,
was forced to sell its labor power on the market."17
Third,
"when a wage earner has sold his labour power for
a certain part of his life to his employer, and
the products of his labour become the property of
the employer. " 18
When this happens, a part of the working class has
no control even on time in conflict with the normal
rhythm of human life . This causes psychological and
nervous disorders.
Finally, the most advanced stage of economic aliena¬
tion appears when, as a result of the previous effects,
"a basic aspect of human nature, the capacity to
perform creative work, becomes thwarted and
distorted." 19
It is this form of alienation which allows Mandel
to proceed towards a wider application of the concept
of alienation beyond the economic sphere. He starts
from explaining what 'leisure time' is. The wage earner
"considers the hours passed in factories or in
offices as time lost from his life. He must spend
time there in order to get freedom and capacity
for human development outside the sphere of
production and of work.
17, Ibid,, p, 21V
18, Ibid., p, 22.
19, Ibid, , p. 23,
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Ironically, this hope for fulfillment during
leisure time turns out to be an illusion. Many
humanitarian and philanthropic reformers of liberal
or social-democratic persuasion in the nineteenth
and the beginning of the twentieth centuries
thought that men could become liberated when their
leisure time would increase. They did not under¬
stand that the nature of leisure was likewise
determined by the nature of wage labor and by the
conditions of a society based on commodity produc¬
tion and wage labor.20
... The system must provoke continued artif¬
icial dissatisfaction in human
beings because without that dissatisfaction the
sales of new gadgets which are more and more
divorced from genuine human needs cannot be
increased.
A society which is turned toward creating system¬
atic frustration of this kind generates the bad
results recorded in the crime pages of the daily
newspapers. A society which breeds worthless
dissatisfaction will also breed all kinds of anti¬
social attempts to overcome this dissatisfaction."21
(my emphasis)
It is important to study Mandel's transformational
logic as he moves from the surface to the deeper
implications of alienation on human nature.
"Alienation of human activity in general,
leading towards the alienation of human
beings in one of their most fundamental features,
the capacity to communicate and also, something
much worse, the tendency to transform relations
between human beings into relations between things;
the tendency towards 1 reification' . "^my emphasis)
He illustrated these transformations on two
examples. First, on the reification process:
"I heard one waitress address herself to a person
and say, 'Ah, you are the corned-beef and cabbage.'
You are not Mr. or Mrs. Brown, not a person of a
20. Ibid., p. 23.
21. Ibid., p. 25.
22. Ibid., p. 25.
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certain age and with a certain address. You are
'corned-beef and cabbage' because the waitress has
on her mind the orders taken under stress from so
many people."^3
and second as regards the elimination of communication:
"For a long time one of the main methods of social¬
izing young children has been through playing with
dolls. When children play with dolls, they
duplicate themselves, project themselves outside
their own individuality and carry on a dialogue
with that other self. They speak two languages,
their own language and the language of the doll,
thereby bringing into play an artificial process
of communication which, through its spontaneous
nature, facilitates the development of language
and intelligence.
Recently, industry started to produce dolls which
speak. This is supposed to be a mark of progress.
But once the doll speaks, the dialogue is limited.
The child no longer speaks in two languages, or
with the same spontaneity. Part of its speech
is induced, and induced by some capitalist
corporation.
It is also important to study the way in which
Mandel attempted to find a coherent and more structural
element behind all these kinds of alienation and the
transformations from one to another. This central element
is the development of the logic of individuality, as this
logic is conceived at a philosophical level. Since the
oppressors themselves are alienated from part of their
human capacity through their inability to communicate on
a human basis with the majority of society, individualism,
as a fundamental element in consumer society, has been
23. Ibid,, p. 26.
24. Ibid., p. 27; also quoted in: A. M. KOTSIOPOULOS, E.A.R./5
(.1978), op. cit., p. 52,
13?
pushed to the extreme. The creation of activity,
communicational and many other kinds of barriers is
inevitable, as opposed to the eventual collective and
integrated life in societies which were characterized
by a different mode of production.
The antithesis between Mandel's Marxism and certain
existentialist philosophers about the basis and cause of
individuality and loneliness in man's nature constitutes
the core of a further discussion on alienation. It is
outside the scope of this study to develop such a dis¬
cussion on the moral basis which is underlined by the
above antithesis. There is no doubt, however, that the
notion of barrier,which is central in both Mandel's
thinking as well as in the general theory of alienation,
describes the nature of this problem at a deeper struc¬
tural level.
2.4.2 ALIENATION AND A BARRIER-LOGIC
The concept of barrier, as a fundamental component
of a semantic syntax of the built space, has already been
discussed in Chapter 1.2 of this study. To what extent
this concept is useful for a description, which would be
modified according to a disalienation logic, is a question
which will be discussed in the following. To begin with
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such a discuss ion, it is necessary to understand and classify
some of the basic forms of alienation as regards the
artificial environment and the production of it.
a. first family;barriers which occur in the production
of the artificial space
The first family of meanings of alienation is that
which has been developed by the classical Marxist theory
and elaborated by a series of humanitarian Marxists such
as Meszaros and Mandel. The basic characteristic of
this family of meanings is that alienation is understood
as a property of the capitalist mode of production and it
appears as alienated labour.
The artificial environment can also be seen as a
commodity. Therefore, it is expected that similar
phenomena would appear in the process of its production.
These phenomena mainly refer to the relationship be¬
tween the wage labour in the building industry on the
one hand, and the building product or the components of
it on the other.
Our interest in this way of understanding alienation
is inevitably limited because of the broader character
of these phenomena. It is clear that processes towards
a disalienation of this kind have a broader character and
are those which Meszaros connected with 'a change in all
human relations'^. However, although such broader
processes belong to the general sphere of economic
25. I. M^SZ^ROS (1970), op. cit., p. 214,
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phenomena and are inevitably related with major social
changes, it is obvious that they function as the source
of other problems which belong to other families of
meanings of alienation. Mandel's transformational
explanation of alienation indicated why this happens
b. second family; barriers which occur at the levels
of environment,activities,and institutions
The second family of meanings of alienation corres¬
ponds to the levels of social life . where alienation
occurs as a result of the consumer characteristics of
society. The deep structural element in Mandel's model
(that is, the barriers created at any level of social
activity) is the basic component of this family.
According to this family of meanings, alienation can be
understood at an institutional level as a property of
the organizational system of society at an activity level
as a barrier-system, which divides human activities,and
at an environmental level showing the way in which insti¬
tutional and activity barriers are 'translated' into the
physical barriers of artificial space.
Our interest in this way of understanding alienation
is more serious. According to the previously developed
levels of approaching the built space (Chapter 2.2), it
is expected that there is a kind of cohesion in the total
image of the artificial space and, therefore, an insti¬
tutional barrier-structure represents the deep structure
of barriers, which can apparently be conceived at an
environmental or activity level.
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An example of the simplest possible understanding of
an environment barrier-structure in its surface character¬
istics is clearly developed in an article by A.G. Window,
entitled 'Towards Barrier-free Environments'. Winslow's
interest is in creating a good environment for elderly
and handicapped people. It is really astonishing how
well known and commonly used architectural elements can
be conceived as communicational, activity or functional
barriers from the time that a strong catalyst like the
inabilities of disabled persons is introduced26. A
similar simple understanding of environmental barrier-
structures can also evolve through a comparative study
of equivalent building-types in different climates or
in different institutional states.
The fact that physical barriers are understood as
creating and, at the same time, signifying activity and
institutional barriers is well incorporated in the pre¬
viously developed logic of approaching artificial struc¬
tures at different levels. As opposed to other commodi¬
ties, however, the physical substance of the built space
has some unique properties. The most serious property
is what might be called the 'accumulation of the environ¬
mental products on land'. Although the environmental axtefacts
26. A. G.WINSLOW, Towards barrier-free environments; criteria
and policies for site design, working paper, Virginia State
University,1977.
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themselves are incorporated in a production-consumption
circuit, they are also based on land and remain there for
a period of time longer than the potential of the construc¬
tion industry would eventually imply. Therefore, these
artefacts transfer the characteristics of their process
of production from the one historical moment to the other
by continuously transforming their semantic and pragmatic
value^. The environmental artefacts function through
these transformations of their pragmatic value as a
material infrastructure for institutional and activity
barriers which did not originally belong to the mode of
production in which these artefacts were initially
produced. The majority of contemporary urban barriers
and barriers at the scale of buildings correspond to a
way of life different from ours. They signify that way
of life (in fact, they constitute the best signifier of
it) but, at the same time, they are transformed in order
to incorporate the existing institutional and activity
2ft
barrier-structures r
To what extent these barriers are consciously
internalized is illustrated in a text by the poet
Villiers de l'Isle-Adam in the age of the Paris Commune,
when the citizens of Paris suddenly saw their city as a
09
'festival' . It is also illustrated in the way Lisa
Peattie, one of the protagonists of the participation
27. See hlso E.A.R./3, op, cit,, p, 39 and E.A.R./5,
ot>. cit, , p, 52,
28. For a general discussion of social structures in relation
to spatial structures, see: R, E. PAHL, Patterns of
Urban Life, Longman 1973 ( © 1970), especially chapters
3 and 4 (social structure and spatial structure I and II ,
pp. 36-68).
29. S. EDWARDS (ed.), The Communards of Paris , Cornell
University Press 1973, pp. I'l0—l'l2*
movement, explains the educational results of participa¬
tion:
"Norton Long (1958) has described the city as an
'ecology of games'. For some purposes, it seems
to me, one might better describe it as an ecology
of dramatic performances ... The image of 'theater'
also expresses more handily than the image of the
game the quality of emotional engagement charac¬
teristic of the urban social order ... Some dramatic
performances produced in the urban scene do have
specified participants and a clear division
between the players and the audience, as in
traditional stage theater. Traditional planning
was of this sort ... Other dramatic performances
are much more like the audience participation
productions of the Living Theatre or even like
those guerilla theater actions in which the aim is
to provoke bystanders into becoming part of a play
which is as much the 'reality' of the bvstanders
as the 'theater' of actors" 30(author 1 s emphasis,
my emphasis)
c. third family; barriers which occur in the process
of internalizing the artificial space
The problem of understanding the internalization and use
of barriers leads to the third family of meanings with
which alienation is connected. This family refers to the
alienation of the observer of user from the potential
semantic pluralism of the built space, and is related to
the 'aesthetical' aspects of alienation. This family of
meanings of alienation is especially important because
of the practical 'beyonds' which it implies and which are
embedded in contemporary theories of participation
(although such beyonds are not always clear in the
manifestos for user planning and design action).
30. L. PEATTIE, Drama and advocacy planning, A.I.P. Journal,
Nov. '70, pp. 407-408.
^45"
The barrier between the artificial space and its
user - as opposed to the barrier between the producer
and the product - is a concept which is not sufficiently
developed in the classical theory of alienation.
However, there are many peripheral interpretations
included in this theory, which might lead to a better
understanding of such a barrier. Mandel's discussion,
for instance, of the general effects of alienation, i.e.
the elimination of the capacity to communicate, the
distortion of the capacity to perform creative work, the
illusion of the leisure time as well as the artificial
increase of needs, are undoubtedly related to this
problem. On the other side, it is also true that users
often accept and internalize their environment either
because they do not have the chance to act in a different
way and are influenced by the widely distributed illusion
that they have chosen it, or because they create their
own semantic systems of the artificial space they own
and, in the best case, they transform it to match such
systems. There are numerous examples of how the
cultural background of the users influences their way of
transforming - even primitively - their environment, but
there are also numerous examples where this transformation
is itself incorporated in a production-consumption
circuit and has nothing to do with the cultural background
or the human needs of the users.
The natural semantic pluralism of space seems to
function quite effectively in such processes, by produc-
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ing alternative ways, according to which the user is able
to internalize his environment. The different kinds of
participation in the design, production and use of the built
space, which have occurred and occur in the historical
process, show this plurality of the potential solutions
of the problem. What Alexander calls 'unselfconscious
Of
culture , for instance, is a perfect example of a
comprehensive internalization of the built space by the
users, however unconscious it is. Vernacular architecture
signifies this comprehensiveness by its success, its
historical survival and its attraction to contemporary
professional architects. On the other hand, movements like
that of the 'owner-builders' show an understanding of
the activity barriers which have been created by indus¬
trialized building production. Such movements, therefore,
introduce attempts to modify the existing built space in
order to match pre-existing activity images. In some
cases, this understanding becomes a protest against the
institutional structure of society and favours a non-
participation in the modes of production of the artificial
space, which are incorporated in this structure^.
Advocacy planning is a characteristic example of this
kind of meaning adapted to the built environment although
the users themselves are not responsible for it.
31. In the "Notes on the Synthesis of Form", op. cit.
32, An example of this attitude is the so called "provocacy
planning"; see, A, STRUNK, Provocacy Planning, in: ARCH+
(1970) H 10, p. 57,
w
It is obvious that there are, in fact, different
ways of evaluating socially the barrier structure of
built space, which are different as regards their depth
and semantic context. It is not surprising, therefore,
that different and often opposite strategies have been
proposed. The antithesis between advocacy planning and
what has been called 'provocacy planning* is an example
of this .
The fundamental issue concerning this third family of
alienation problems is indeed an issue of communication.
Yet, this issue does not refer directly to the elimination
of communication between individuals but mainly to the
elimination of communication between environmental
artefacts on the one hand and their users on the other.
We have to stress here that the notion of 'user' is far
from being plain. In the pure 'aesthetic' understanding
of alienation, for example, the user is identical with the
observer of space. Within this context, any environ¬
mental artefact has the natural function of communicating
in a clear way its meaning to any observer, regardless
of his involvement in the use of the artefact. A deeper
involvement of the user, however, leads to a process of
internalization and it is not generally expected that
during such a process the observable values presented
by the artefact will remain the same. It is during the
course of such an internalization that what I have called
'semantic pluralism of space' is normally developed. A
first aspect of such a pluralism refers to the richness
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of meanings developed by the discovery of the whole
structure of the environmental artefact. Every corner of
a house, for instance, creates surface images different
from each other but still structured together in an over¬
all understanding of it. The continuous discovery of the
artefact constitutes a procedure quite distinct from what
we can understand as a mere 'observation'.
A second aspect of this semantic pluralism, however,
is more important. This is related to the development of
different bases of social evaluation of the environ¬
mental artefact. The plurality of such bases becomes
richer when the use of the environment proceeds from
one stage to the other. A usual first step towards the
discovery of such bases ib, for example, the development
of a liaison between the environmental and the activity
image of space. Activities are incorporated, structured
and guided by the physical elements of the built environ¬
ment, creating norms which may well be defined as
'institutional'. Yet, institutional prototypes themselves
are also used as activity and space modifiers.
What has alienation to do with the above abstracted
procedure? What are the 'liaisons' which are damaged
by such a socially originated phenomenon? It would be
quite amateurish to attempt to describe such effects in
an equally abstract way without having the results of
empirical research on the problem. Since alienation is,
by definition, an overall phenomenon, we should imagine
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that every liaison is to some extent damaged, either
concerning the structure of the total image of the built
environment or concerning the integration and conscious
internalization of the different levels of approaching
it. The environmental artefact is consciously accepted
as it is, and the whole pattern of the user's life is
seriously influenced by the values which are originally
incorporated in the production-consumption circuit,
through which the artefact has been created. Further¬
more, the initiatives by the user to promote an opposite
procedure by transforming its own environment are also
damaged. They either do not exist at all or belong
themselves to the same circuit as a surface fulfilment
of leisure-time. There is no creative development of the
cultural values of the user on the environment. He
simply becomes another liaison in the system of the
artificial increase of 'needs'.
The dangers described above are more or less serious
depending on some more general societal characteristics.
Whole cultures have been alienated in such a way in
under-developed or developing societies. At the same
time, however, there is no doubt that the whole system of
the building industry in industrialized societies does
not seriously contrast with the values which are
incorporated in the environmental prototypes originally
developed in these societies through history. In
industrialized societies, it is obvious that alienation
does not follow the path of brutally destroying culture.
15*0
Yet, even indirectly its effect is clear and the
general form of this problem is represented by the contro¬
versies of the participation and advocacy movements.
However, there is still a major question concerning
the communicational effects of alienation. The question
is to what extent a building product can itself
eliminate communication among the users or between it and
the users. Are the physical elements of the built
environment powerful enough to function in such a way?
The immediate answer following the classical Marxist
view of aesthetics would be positive: the environmental
artefact can create strong alienatory effects if it
does not clearly present, within the context or realism,
the natural human needs for which it has been built. It
is needless to say, however, that this is only one way to
answer the question and, of course, a dangerous one. The
"natural human needs' cannot be easily formalized and,
even if they can, their surface image is seriously trans¬
formed by the particular conditions of each historical
period. Socialist Realism and Purism have shown, in
their inadequacy, some of the dangers of such formaliza¬
tions. It is, in fact, difficult to establish a set of
rules which would describe the route from the surface
image of the built environment to its deep structure.
It is, however, far more difficult to judge such rules
and to decide that there are some which can give the best
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possible results in communicating the deep pragmatic
value of a building. Such an argument is weak in itself
and, in any case, has proven historically false.
Meszaros's analysis, for instance, of why what he calls
OO
the "various 'isms' ..... capitulate before the artistic
alienation which they had set out to oppose"^ is not:
convincing and is also based on a generalization of what
Marx has described as 'genuine human needs'. At least in
the field of architecture there are numerous examples of
how a piece of art can be understood, used,and internalized
in multiple ways and with multiple pragmatic meanings.
The surprising manifesto by Ventutri (discussed previously
in Chapter 2.2) and the variety of modes in re-using
buildings which originally belonged to various kinds of
'isms' are convincing enough for the inability of answer¬
ing such questions in mere stylistic terms.
There are, however, other kinds of positive answers
to the question of whether the physical elements of a
building can create alienatory effects among the users or
between the building and the users.
The first kind of positive answers concern the
communicative barriers among the users. I have already
noted that environmental artefacts may signify,
33. That is, "imagism", "expressionism", "dadaism", "analytic
and synthetic cubism", "futurism", "surrealism", "constru--
ctiyism" etc. See I, m£sZ^R0S (1970), op, cit., p, 196,
34, Ibid. , p, 196.
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emphasize or, in the worst case, create activity barriers.
I have also mentioned some of the particular character¬
istics of tr?e artificial space which are due to the
accumulation of buildings on land. Following this
property of accumulation, environmental and activity
barriers can be preserved and can influence the whole
pattern of societal life.
It is evident that, in order to understand such
effects, we need a logic based on barriers instead of a
logic based on relations. Such a barrier-logic would also
colour the apparatus for describing the built space and
for establishing a formal semantic syntax of it. We
cannot solve any alienation problem by a planning action
based upon the logic of inventing theoretical relation¬
ships only; barriers of this kind exist and we have to
identify them.
The second and most important kind of positive
answers is concerned with the problem that Marxian
aesthetics itself tries to solve; that is, the communica¬
tion barriers between the environment and the users.
We have, however, to define this problem in a more
pragmatic and dynamic way.
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I developed previously a schematic process according
to which the internalization of the built space by its
user takes place. There are two aspects of this process.
The first refers to the richness of meanings which
evolves as the user discovers the complexity of the
structure of an environmental artefact. The second refers
to the development of different bases of social evaluation
of the environment. ;that is,the environment becomes
significant for its user within different contexts.Liaisons
are developed between the physical elements and the
activities and, also, the activities are integrated and
structured by the physical elements of space. The crucial
point, now, is that this process is continuous and
dynamic. The eventual absence of this dynamic character
of the process is essentially connected with the
phenomenon of alienation. The built space becomes
alienated from the user when it cannot sufficiently
respond to an eventual development and transformation of
}iis activity and institutional patterns. Similar
alienatory effects also appear when the activities cannot
respond to the development and transformation of the
physical elements of the artificial space. On the contrary,
when the built environment is constructed in that way that it can
respond to such demands, there is room for the develop¬
ment of creative initiatives by the user and, in that
case, alienation is not likely to appear.
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The participation movement has shown to some extent
how Utopian it is to try to solve the problem of aliena¬
tion by promoting the participation of users merely in
the design and construction of their environment. Most of
the theorists of participation seem to have conceived
only one aspect of the problemThey promoted the
development of users ' creativity during a very limited
period of time; in fact, the period when the building
itself does not exist but in schematic and ambiguous two-
dimensional substances only. On the other hand, the
professional expertise seems to have a more important
role to play in designing a technical infrastructure
for a continuous interaction between the built space and
its users than in promoting the participation of the users
in the design process. Participation in design only means
that user 'needs' are conceived in a static way. It is
contradictory to produce a solid and inflexible environ¬
ment however satisfactory for the initial demands of the
user it is. Even if the user is well known (as rarely
happens), his 'needs' constitute a theoretical and
35, See P. Davidoff's view CP- DAVIDOFF, Advocacy- and Pluralism
in Planning, A. I. P. Journal, Nov, '65) and also L, PEATTIE'S
summary of several views in: L, PEATTXE, Reflexions on
Advocacy Planning, A. I. P. Journal, March '68, (p, 81;
"Advocate planners take the view that any plan is the embodiment
of particular group interests, and therefore they see it as
important that any group which has interests- at stake in the
planning process should have those interests articulated. In
effect, they reject both the notion of a single "best" solution
and the notion of a general welfare which such a solution
might serve. Planning in this view becomes pluralistic and
partisan - in a word, overtly political".
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oversimplified set of abstract formalizations which is
most likely to change continuously as the semantic
pluralism of space starts to develop.
When, of course, the user is unidentified, partici¬
pation in design only, being possible through an ambiguous
representation process (where representatives represent
the future development of semantic pluralism of an
unknown space on behalf of their unknown constituency
using a language for design unknown to them) is not likely
to satisfy any 'needs' at all. For the majority of
building types, including housing in a massive ^icale,
this is one of the most crucial problems which the parti¬
cipation movement has to face. Some aspects of this
problem in the case of universities will be discussed in
the second part of this study (Chapter 1.3)
'Infrastructural design' is a concept which gives a
certain answer to the problem of alienation in the form
discussed above,. Y. Friedman's Utopia of a large catalogue
of possible personal contributions to an existing basic
structural skeleton 'like in a restaurant'^ and
Habraken's more pragmatic proposals for 'support
structuresare two well known examples of the philo¬
sophy of infrastructural design and have largely
36, Y, FRIEDMAN, Pour 1" architecture scientifique , P, Belfond
1971, ch. VI.
37. N. J, HABRAKEN, Supports, An Alternative to Mass Housing,
The Architectural Press 1972 C © 1961), mainly pp, 59-65.
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influenced later developments58. To what extent a well
organized infrastructural design can function in this
direction is a question not yet answered. However, in the
theoretical field this form of participation, as an antidote
against alienation, is closely related to a very important
issue; the use of space as a learning or educational
apparatus for a more general disalienation process. The
limitations of such an approach will be discussed later
in this chapter.
d. summary
Summarizing the principal modifications caused to
the descriptive apparatus for space by the problem of
alienation, we can distinguish between two main areas:
The problem of alienation introduces the notion of
barrier at any level of approach to artificial space.
I have already mentioned in Chapter 1.2 the elementary
form in which the 'barrier-logic' is incorporated in the
structural understanding of the built environment. The
development of this logic is shown in the following
diagram!39
38. For a summary of such developments see, A, M, KOTSIOPOULOS,
Participation in Architectural Actions, 1975, op. cit.,
pp. 183-181!.







































































This development, however, does not explain in
detail how a semantic syntax of the kind presented in 3
can integrate the modifications which are caused by the
problem of alienation in the descriptive form of a theory
of the artificial space. I shall, therefore, proceed
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further discussing, first, such modifications in a more
analytic form and, second, the potential nature of the
transformational rules which are involved in a modified
description of the built space.
If we summarize the principal modifications of our
descriptive apparatus for the artificial space caused by
the problem of alienation, we shall have the following
diagram. This diagram shows the differences between a
non-modified description and a modified one:
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The above diagram reflects , first,the dual origin of
description in architecture, that is, the influence of
other disciplines on the one hand and the problem—origin
of descriptors on the other The case (a) is not an auto¬
nomous abstract syntax. The elementary deep structure of
the built space is understood there as ha'ving a semantic
content which is influenced by the existing peripheral
disciplines and the metaphors they produce, as well as by
the implicit semantic pluralism of space. The case (b) is
also a semantic syntax, but in this case this syntax is
ideologically influenced and orientated to the solution of
problems. The elementary deep structure of the built space
is understood in this case as having all the above mentioned
characteristics but also as including an elementary normative
operational rule aiming at the solution of problems
like alienation.
Second, while "mapping' is involved in the case of the
non-modified description (a), it does not exist in the case
of the modified description of (b). This is an important
point and it needs to be clarified; how can 'mapping' be
involved in a semantic syntax of space? The answer is incorpo¬
rated in what we have called the 'semantic pluralism' of
artificial space. Language has a pure communicative
identity and no other mapping is essential for solving its
problems although there are cases where linguistic super-
surface structures reflect a mapping operation in order to
40, See Chapter 1,1.
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communicate meanings, which are richer than those of the
super-surface structure:
Since the understanding of the built space, however, is
not always clearly orientated towards operational action, an
established language of it can be modified to promote planning
purposes. Alexander's flexible but already defined patterns
constitute a characteristic example of this. They reflect a
specific attitude to planning but they are still open to map¬
ping procedures. In general, mapping is not forbidden since
it may appear at a certain stage during the elaboration of a
pre-modified syntax (before being incorporated in this syntax,
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Third, the levels of approach (environmental,
activity, institutional), which belong to a hypothetical grid
for description, are also structured and hierarchised according
to the effects of the problem-solving catalyst. An alienatory
understanding of an elementa-ry environmaital deep structure
inevitably promotes the activity and institutional barriers
while in the non-modified semantic syntax the environmental
physical barriers dominate the others.
Finally, the transformational rules of the second case (b)
do necessarily include the dialectical character of a problem-
solving process. They explain and propose simultaneously. On
the contrary, in the first case (a), such rules simply explain
the transformations of a deep elementary structure into structures
of a higher order; this order is higher in both syntactic and
semantic terms, since even the case (b) is still a semantic and
not an autonomous syntax.
This fina,l assumption leads to the core of our question
of modification, that is, the nature of modified transforma¬
tional rules.
I shall not attempt to give the answer to this question
but only an example of such an answer. This example presup¬
poses that a disalienation process is inevitably connected with
a participatory strategy.
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2.4.3 PARTICIPATION AS A COMPONENT OF A MODIFIED
DESCRIPTION OF THE BUILT SPACE;PARTICIPATION
VERSUS ALIENATION
Mandel, following an Althusserian way of thinking,
has stressed that the theory of alienation
"implies and contains a theory of disalienation
through the creation of conditions for the grad¬
ual disappearance and eventual abolition of
alienation. " 41
There has been a long discussion concerning the extent
to which participatory strategies function in such a way.
The discussion refers to two areas of understanding participa¬
tion. First, at a general level where participation is consi¬
dered as a fundamental constituent of the theory of democracy,
and second at a more specific level where the role of parti¬
cipation in the production of the artificial space is dealt
with. I have already mentioned some aspects of the problem
of participation as regards artificial space. I shall
return to them in the end of this chapter in the discussion of
the effects of a participatory logic on the structure of our
descriptive apparatus. Before that, however, it is necessary
to identify some of the ideas included in the more general
understanding of participation.
Carole Pateman's work on 'Participation and Democratic
Theory' is a profound investigation of recent theories about
participatory democracy. She shows that most of these
theories, like those by Schumpeter, Berelson, Dahl, Sartori and
Eckstein,contain and sometimes misrepresent earlier theories,
41. E. MANDEL (1970), op. cit, , p. 30,
163
namely those by Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and G.D.H. Cole.42
She also emphasizes that, although Dahl and the others have
explicitly rejected the charge that they have produced a new
normative theory, in reality (as also Taylor has pointed out),
the chosen descriptive dimension in those theories supports
a normative position, a position implicit in the theory itself^
This is a first important point which also supports our attitude
that there is no way of producing a 'value-free' descriptive
theory in such domains; and there is no reason £or +ryincj b do so e'rfl?er .
Dahl's theory is interesting especially because it sum¬
marizes some important aspects of participation in a. structu¬
ral way. In Dahl's model, participation is one of the two
basic dimensions which lead from 'closed hegemony' to 'polyarchy'.
The model has the logical structure of the 'commutative square',
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Pateman's criticism of Dahl's work did not take into account
the recent development of his theory (published in 1971) and did
42. C, PATEMAN, Participation and Democratic Theory,
Cambridge University Press 1974 I 0 1970), pp, 1-44,
43. Ibid., p. 15.
44. R. DAHL, Polyarchy, Yale University Press, 1971, pp. 6-7
and also p. 34.
not consider it as an original theory of participatory democracy.
After examining the routes of contemporary participatory thinking
in Rousseau and J.S. Mill, her interest is concentrated in G.D.
H. Cole's work. According to Pateman, Cole's work is significant
because
"he developed a theory of participatory democracy
that not only included and extended the basic
postulates of the classical theories of parti¬
cipatory democracy, but was set in the context of
a modern large-scale, industrialized society."45
The essential point in Cole's theory of society is
that there is a distinction between what he calls "the exi¬
stence of repersentative institutional arrangements at
national level" and real democracy as he understands it. And
he understands real democracy within the context of ' guild
socialism':
"Society is a complex of associations held to¬
gether by the wills of their members and not by
force."45
As Pateman pointed out, there is a very essential lesson
to be learned by Cole's approach. This lesson refers to the
fact that in modern societies
"industry provided the all-important arena for
the educative effect of participation."47
(my emphasis)
Although Cole's view is different from harxian thinking,
the development of Marxism and especially what has been cal¬
led 'humanitarian Marxism' coincides with Cole's theory as far
45. C. PATEMAN (1970), op. cit., p. 21.
45. Ibid,, p. 36 (reference to G.D.H. COLE, Guild Socialism
Restated, Leonard Parsons 1920, p, 12).
47. Ibid, (Pateman), p. 38.
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as the connection between alienation and participation is
concerned. Pateman,in her review of Cole's theory, does not
mention 'alienation' as such. She describes it,however,
indirectly as follows:
"One of the Cole's major objections to the
capitalist organization of industry was that
under it labour was just another
commodi ty and so the 'humanity' of labour
was denied."48(my emphasis)
Cole has proposed a coherent model of societal organiza¬
tion based upon participation, which many of the contemporary
advocates for design participation in the built environment
would find satisfactory as a framework of their ideas. It is,
nevertheless, beyond the scope of this study to discuss such
proposals here. I shall mention, however, some of the dangers
included in a participatory aspect of society, especially those
connected with the production of artificial space.
The core of these problems refers, at an abstract level, to
what P. Selzick has defined as co-optation :
"Co-optation is the process of absorbing new
elements into the leadership or policy-determining
structure of an organization as a means
of averting threats to its
stability or existence. "49
(my emphasis)
The phenomenon of co-optation describes in our language
that quite often, behind an apparent collapse of a barrier,
there are other more sophisticated barriers, which become
48. Ibid., p. 39 (reference to G.D.H, COLE, Labour in the
Commonwealth, Headley Bros. 1918, p, 24).
49. P. SELZNICK, Foundations of the theory of organizations,
in F, E, EMERY, (ed.), Systems Thinking, Penguin 1972,( © 1969,
Selznick's article: © 1948), p. 277,
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stronger because of this collapse. Selznick stressed that
participation in activities and responsibilities is used as
an excuse for reinforcing institutional and power barriers,
although in some cases (where an organization is in a despe¬
rate situation and is obliged to abolish any barriers) the
organization tries to weaken the groups of participants by
co-opting only selected parts of them.
It is exactly this overall view developed in the General
Theory of Organizations which seems to constitute the back¬
ground for what Mandel called 1 the illusion of creative leisure
time'. This view is also the reason of the strong opposition
of many writers to the use of participation as a disalienation
process in the production of artificial space. This
attitude has been expressed in many forms from cocrrtoons ,
as those shown below, to alternative strategies, which oppose
Poster by students, - Just a minute Jackson; I simply want you
Sorbonnes, Paris 1968 to participate in the following decisions!
(By T.W. Taylor, "TIME" 21.4.75, p. 10).
51
50, Ibid., p. 278 (also quoted in E.A.R./5, op, cit,, p, 56.
51. Both in: A. M. K0TSI0P0UL0S, Participation in Architec¬
tural Actions, 1975, op. cit., pp. 162 and 164,
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participation and 'advocacy planning'. S.Arnstein has
described the limits of participatory strategies writing that
"There is a critical difference between going
through the empty ritual of participation and
having the real power needed to affect the out¬
come of the process ... It allows the powerholders
to claim that all sides were considered, but makes
it possible for only some of those sides to
benefit. It maintains the status quo."52
Before discussing some of the proposals for participation
in the production of the built environment, it is necessary
to mention Selznick's final conclusion. This conclusion is
encouraging for the advocates of participation. He wrote:
"Cooptation reflects a state of tense between
formal authority and social power ... When the
formal authority is an expression of social power,
its stability is assured. On the other hand, when
it becomes divorced from the sources of social
power its continued existence is threatened. This
threat may arise from the sheer alienation of
sentiment or from the fact that other leaderships
have control over the sources of social power. Where
a formal authority has been accustomed to the
assumption that its constituents respond to it as
individuals, there may be a rude awakening when
organization of those constituents on a non¬
governmental basis creates nuclei of power which
are able effectively to demand a sharing of power.
The significance of cooptation for organizational
analysis is not simply that there is a change in
or a broadening of leadership, and that this is an
adaptive response, but also that this change is
consequential for the character and the role of the
organization ... The concept of cooptation thus
implicitly sets forth the major points ...: it is
an adaptive response of a cooperative system to a
stable need, generating transformations which
reflect constraints enforced by the recalcitrant
tools of action."53 (author's emphasis)
52. S. ARNSTEIN, A ladder of citizen participation, A.I. P.
Journal, Jul. '69, p. 216.
53. P. SELZNICK (1948), op. cit. , pp. 278-279.
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The movement for user participation in the design and
construction of the built environment reflects positive and
negative attitudes to the concept of participation, similar
to those developed in the general theory of democracy and
social organizations.
The model in which the movement for'exhorted'participation
seems to believe is what Alexander called the 'unselfconscious
process' of vernacular architecture. In such a process, there
are no barriers between built products and users and the process
is well integrated in the mode of production and life of the
closed social forms, where it belongs.54
A crucial stage in the development of modern participatory
movement was P. Davidoff's work 'Advocacy and Pluralism in
Planning' published in 1965. According to Davidoff,professional
1
designers and planners have played a negative role in the
production of the modern built space by promoting their own
views of the environment and by not being sufficiently intere¬
sted in the needs and preferences of the various social groups
and individuals to whom the built space is addressed.
L. Peattie offers a comprehensive summary of Davidoff's
ideas as follows : the advocate planner accepts
that , in any project, the different interests of
various social groups are represented.For that reason,the
54, Formalizations of the difference between closed and open
societal forms have been developed by E. Durkheim ("mechanical
and organic solidarity") and by Ch. Alexander ("unselfconscious
and selfconscious cultures"); see, A, GIDDENS (ed.), Emile
Durkheim, Selected Writings , Cambridge University Press
1974 C © 1972), pp. 141-142 and, also, C. ALEXANDER (1964)
op. cit.
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advocate planner believes that the essential property of the
planning procedure is that every group is able to formulate
in a clear form its interests which are in danger during the
procedure. The planners help each group to define its
objectives and the hierarchy of them. Consequently, there is
neither 'best solution' nor 'common interest'. Planning
becomes pluralistic and the final project does not represent
but the balance between the various groups which are involved
in the planning process.55
Davidoff's ideas have found serious support by the several
planning groups and have been worked out within the framework
of the Federal Urban Renewal Programs in the United States
(such as the 'Antipoverty' , 'Community Action' and mainly
the 'Model Cities Programs'). Such Programs were mainly
interested in the disadvantaged communities of slums and
ghettos. There were numerous transformations of the basic
idea of Davidoff. These transformations aimed not only at
pluralistic plans but mainly at the educative effects of
participation, where 'education' was used in its broader
sense as John Palmer noted in the introduction of R. Goodman's
'After the Planners':
"The professional, leaving behind the privileges
and symbols of his former position, joins with the
people in a joint educational process."56
(my emphasis)
55, See note 35 of this chapter.
56. R.GOODMAN, After the Planners,(Introduction
by J. PALMER), Penguin 1972.
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So,education means both, education of the planners
in order to involve them in the community life and to
make them learn from it, as well as education of the
community members to make them more conscious of their
identity and power.
The political motives of the advocates of participation
are quite clear. The production of the built environment is
used as one area of developing political consciousness and
promoting communal action,regardless of the fact that there
have been also cases where participation is merely understood
as an administrative technique to eliminate the problems of
growing bureaucracy.^
The movement towards "exhorted" participation has a
clear aim as I ha,ve previously mentioned: to make the
artificial space more suitable for the needs of the users;
in our terms that is, to eliminate the alienation effect
caused by a strange and industrialized product, and to abolish
the barrier between the artificial environment and the user.
What was discovered later, however,«;ois that exhorted
participation has other effects on the participants
which are perhaps more important ;that is, participation
promotes the understanding of the language of artificial
57, According to S. Damer and C. Hague (_S, DAMER and C, HAGUE,
Public participation in planning: evolution and problems, in:
C. LAMBERT and D. WEIR (eds.), Cities in Modern Britain,
Fontana 1975).
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space so that the participants-users become capable of inter¬
nalizing better their environment. Moreover, the communal
action in large-scale planning and the interchange of ideas
within the framework of the pluralistic planning model promote
a better social self-consciousness of the groups involved and,
also, a better political background for any social activity.
This means in our terms that the educative effect of participa¬
tion is extended to the abolition of barriers, which are more
complex and important than those in the design process.
The polemists of participation claim that such broader
effects are not really possible. The whole procedure is well
co-opted by the power-holders and no real concession to a
re-distribution of power has to be expected. Participation,
according to them, becomes an 'empty ritual' or an illusionist
fulfilment of leisure time.
The semantic pluralism of space is so complicated that
participation has to be understood as a dynamic and continuous
process. We need an understanding by the user of the language
of built space but we have to equip him with the material
infrastructure to apply this language in practice. Otherwise,
participation would be in ~ danger of becoming another
movement of an 'effective design method'; this would mean,
in the long term/that participation could not function
as an effective process towards disalienation .
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2.4.4 THE FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE ALIENATION-
-PARTICIPATION MODIFIER
/
In the following/ I shall be attempting to express in a
formal way the effects of the alienation-participation bipolar
on the descriptive apparatus of - artificial space. We have
to remember that our problem deals with the fundamental trans¬
formational rules,,whicbotfe tn/tiveti if) the modified semantic syntax of
the built environment. Such rules, we have concluded, should
explain and propose at the same time, and should lead from
elementary deep structures to forms which are higher both
logically and semantically.
a. general characteristics
The basic model of how transformational rules are included
in the semantic syntax of the built space was presented
previously as follows:
Deepness
' rules J rules -J
T=(TvT2 ) 1 = 'T1-T2 '
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It has been also shown that this semantic pluralism leads
to an understanding of this model in a more complex form, as
follows:
I have also referred indirectly to the transformational
rules which are included in this model, and I have shown the
differentiations among different semantic syntaxes when dif¬
ferent semantic bases or descriptors are used. In the following
diagram. such differentiations are illustrated in a form
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The following diagram combines the hypothetical formal
basis of the three levels (environmental, activity, institutio¬
nal) the deepness levels (surface, prototypic, deep) and
eventual transformational rules, which are analogous to those
presented in the above diagram.
















A more schematic form of this combination (which will be
used in the rest of this study) is the following where deep
structures tend to coincide, as opposed to surface ones.
This means, that our understanding has to be concentrated only
on the one half of the table.
AREA FOR EXPLORATION
Normally, our explanatory task starts from a plurality
of surface images, which are different in terms of substance













The term 'semantic pluralism' means, at this level, that the
deepness chain is still ambiguous; that is, the institutional
surface regulates the activities and the activities define the
meaning of the built surface. At the same time, however, the
built space re-defines the activities and the activities
influence the institutional surface, etc. The whole structure
at the surface level, is in a dynamic equilibrium.
This equilibrium expresses the complexity of the internaliza¬
tion of the built space by the user.
At the intermediate prototypic level, however, things are
simpler. Environmental prototypes coincide with activity pat¬
terns since no environmental prototype may be defined without
reference to the activity context of it. Yet, environmental-
activity prototypes interact with institutional patterns.
They may be either antagonistic or in agreement.
tem,& ^=%X)
Finally, at the level of deep structures, there is no sense
in differentiating between substances; deep environmental pat¬
terns express activity patterns and both of them express,in the
477
end^an institutional category. There might be antagonisms but
the meaning of deep structure is that such eventual
antagonisms are integrated in a coherent deep image:
Therefore, what we have called 'semantic pluralism1 of
artificial space can be expressed in the following general model,
by using our hypothetical three level descriptive-substance basis:
This means that,since the whole system is in a dynamic
equilibrium, the most unexpected connections may appear in order
to provide the user with the richness of meanings with which the
built space is naturally equipped. The dynamics of design action
shows some examples of this complexity. For instance, it is
supposed that, in general, activities and institutional rules
correspond and are in balance with the physical characteristics
of the artificial environment. When the activity image changes
corresponding to a different activity pattern, an 'anomaly'
appears and is most likely that design action will be initiated
-178
after a more or less complex procedure of internalization of
the 1 anomaly' :
Such 'anomalies' are very important for design action and,
also, for explaining the dynamics of artificial space- I shall
return to them in the final chapter of this part.
It is interesting to remember that each octagon in the
previous diagrams is, in fact,complex. Such octagons contain
the complexity chain from the elementary to the complex structures
and the transformational rules, which govern this chain:
W
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The above diagrams illustrate a typical example of an non-
modified description, in which a series of semantic bases are
involved in the form of the hypothetical basis: of the three
substance levels of approach. The whole process of dealing with



























OF TCSCRiPrORS— levels OF
approach
The'neutral rules', which are mentioned in this semantic
representation of a problem-solving but yet non-modified descriptior
deal with the complexity chain. They explain how complex prototypes
derive from elementary structures.Both,elementary structures
and prototypes,are semantically equipped but their meaning is not
necessarily orientated towards problem-solving. The context of
such rules does not necessarily refer to the 'explain-propose'
bipolar we mentioned previously. Instead, problem-solving
prototypes derive directly from the neutral prototypes through
an empirical and comparative mapping process.
The inclusion of normative action in the heart of trans¬
formational rules is indeed our task here. The aim is to reach
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In the following, I shall be trying to outline the general
character of this task as regards the problem of alienation.
There is no doubt that definite answers are not expected here.
The main purpose is to prescribe a methodology of dealing with
such matters and not to find the exact transformational rules.
This is the reason, why the basic transformational rule of
'explain-propose1 is itself very simplified.
b. complexity
The form of commutative square, used previously to
incorporate the neutral semantic bases (such as 'permeability
of climatic barrier' or ' continuity of channels' etc), may
equally apply to the 'explain-propose' bipolar. Here, the
major conceptual key is that the 'explain-propose' bipolar is
translated into an ' explain-* scheme where, however, the diale¬
ctical 'explain-propose' logic is integrated . Thus, the one
set of transformational rules is used to explain how the
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effect which is included in the definition of the problem
might increase, while the other set is used to explain how this
effect might decrease. This logic in the case of the problem of
alienation becomes as follows: the one set of rules is used to
explain how a barrier promotes increased alienatory effects, and
the other set to explain how the abolition of a barrier promotes



























By applying this general rule to our basic model
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Intermediate orders may also be produced by an increased
operation of one or both of the Ta and Tb rules
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It is obvious that the above examples of certain very
elementary structures cannot reflect the capacity of the aliena¬
tion-participation bipolar to the extent I have discussed this
capacity in the previous part of this chapter(2.4,b) .
Alienation is a phenomenon which is inevitably connected with
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the complexity of the environmental, activity or institutional
barriers. Thus, participatory strategies, in order to cope
with such problems, have to be equally complex themselves.
However, even in this elementary form, it is clear that planning
action can be formalized according to the structural characte¬
ristics of what is explained. It is far more difficult, for
example, to conceptualize a barrier-abolition practice at a complex
prototypic level by using a more or less empirically originated
mapping procedure than to organize planning action in close con¬


















(return to a-b order)










explain as a transformational
product at all levels and find
possible routes through which
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AT THE FINAL "STAGE 16
COMPLETE RiNJ> EFFECTIVE.
c. deepness-substance
All the previous examples refer to the problem of alienation
as it is conceived in the simplest possible form. Alienation
is understood there as a characteristic which is conceived at
one or all the approach levels of an environmental structure
and it is caused by barriers, which again might appear at one or
all these levels.
In the beginning of this chapter, however, I have already
noted that this constitutes only one family of the possible
translations of the problem of alienation. The next question,
therefore, is how the other aspects of this-problem can be
presented in the form of a modified semantic syntax. This means
that we have to elaborate in terms of a modified semantic syntax
the alienatory effects, which appear in the production of the
artificial space, when space is seen as a commodity. It means
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also that we have to elaborate in terms of a modified semantic
syntax the alienation of the user from the potential semantic
pluralism of the built environment.
The first point, which we have to clarify here,is that the
above simple explanation of alienation as a barrier-problem is
basically related to transformational rules from elementary to
complex syntagms. A barrier is developed when complex,
environmental, activity and institutional images are produced
by applying a set of transformational rules to simpler structural
images. Nevertheless, the complex syntagms of a semantic syntax
are unavoidably supported by a higher semantic content so that
such barrier -structures (as we have already seen in the examples)
contain a plurality of alternative alienatory interpretations and
may lead to a plurality of participatory strategies.
Now, when we deal with the adaptation of the artificial
environment by the user, our interest is mainly in the inter¬
actions between the semantic levels of space (either deepness or
substance levels).
In a diagrammatic form , the richness of the semantic





If this is a state of dynamic equilibrium where all
the possible interactions may function, no alienatory effects
appear. They appear when some of the links shown in the
above diagram are destroyed or intentionally obscured.
1 Barriers' ,in this case, have a different meaning. They signify
the fact that some transformational rules, which would normally
'transfer' the user from the surface to the deep base or from
the physical to the institutional image of the artificial space,
are destroyed, eliminated, or changed to pseudo-rules. The
following example shows, for instance, an alienatory effect,
which is caused by the absence of an activity interpretation




SPACE AND THE USER
CAUSED BY THE ABSENCE
OF AN INTERMEDIATE
ACTIVITY PATTERN OF THE
BUILT SPACE.
POSSIBLY ORGANIZATIONAL
RULES ARE DIRECTLY APPLIED
TO THE BUILT SPACE
AND VICE-VERSA.
What the reasons and the practical consequences of
such alienatory situations are is a different question and cannot
be answered without an empirical study. There are, however,
some other important points about the formal representation of
alienatory effects of this kind, which might be useful for
answering this question.
A?0
c 1 . are all the levels real and necessary ?
The first point is this: we mentioned that for the
investigator of the built space deeper structures coincide,
as opposed to surface ones. While it is essential to differentiate
between the surface physical, activity, or institutional
features of an environmental artefact, deeper structures
automatically contain or should contain all these features.
There is an important question, whether this always happens
and especially whether this happens in the real process of
the internalization of the artificial space by the user. Some¬
times, for example, alienatory effects may be caused by the
easiness of abstracting environmental images:
In this example,the interest of the investigator
or of the user of the built space is in the physical
characteristics of it. There is a kind of internalization
process but the exploration of the autonomous and undispufcable
prototypic and deeper images results in a kind of closed circuit,
where everyone is satisfied and has no interest in a broader
understanding of the artificial environment. Such cases
characterize, we have to admit, predominantly the professional
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expertise, where the development of empirically or 'scientifical¬
ly' designed autonomous languages of built space is a common
reality.
c2. characteristic routes
The second point refers to characteristic routes, which
appear in the process of internalizing space. Such routes do
not have a strict meaning of time, but do represent summaries
of characteristic stages of such an internalization process.
Since such routes are described in terms of our three-level,
three-substance hypothetical model, we can produce a taxonomy
of some characteristic alienatory effects, where our model
functions as a taxonomic basis. Again, such characteristic
routes have to be classified after an empirical research and
apply equally to professionals and users*.




different substances at a
surface level only;
however, frequent changes
of the physical characteri¬
stics of the artificial
environment, caused by
"anomalies" in the cor¬

















dialects of the artificial
space.
Creation of languages
concerned with the physical
and the activity characteri¬
stics of the artificial
space. Pseudo-levels beyond
the prototypic level, such
as "needs".
c. Some complex barriers
o o
..-The dominance of activity
languages and behaviourist
approaches. Organizatio¬
nal rules of the surface
are considered as
regulators of activities.
Human needs are dealt
with at the pseudo-level
of deep activity structures.
Hie exaggerated institutio¬
nal understanding of the
artificial space. Any
problem of the surface is
directly referred to insti¬
tutional problems. Design




c3. internalization and complexity; scale
The third point deals with the involvement of the complexi
chain in the above deepness-substance structure. In a simple
form, I have previously presented the general model of this
as follows:





What is important in a syntagmatic syntax is that complex
syntagms are more loaded semantically than the elementary ones
so that the problem seems not very decisive. However, our
experience of artificial space is full of overall images of
very complex structures, which themselves look very simplified.
Alexander's discussion of the tree-pattern of a
city is a clear example 58. The same happens with the basic
pattern of the University of Bath 59.
UNIV. OF BATH, MASTER PLAN "THE PATTERN OF EJRCWTH
To architects and planners the concept of scale has proven
to be very useful. By using the established groups of concepts
58, C, ALEXANDER, A city is not a tree (1966) in: G, BELL and
J, TYRWHITT (eds.), Human Identity in the Urban
Environment, Penguin 1972, p. 401.
59. BATH, University of, op, cit.
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in each scale, they succeeded in avoiding an endless search
for those environmental patterns, which would belong to a
purely elementary level. For a structural understanding of
space such a search, although is does not directly contrast
the essence of structural analysis, it could not avoid the
danger of producing extremely complex systems. An endless or,
at least,very complicated complexity path would not succeed in
combining wholeness with simplicity Thus, environmental
syntagms have to be understood as belonging to a more or less
discontinuous path from the elementary to the complex:
elementary orper.









60. See the whole discussion about combining wholeness with
simplicity in structuralist thinking, in ch, 1.1.
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There are two major remarks concerned with this dis¬
continuous path, as regards professional practice. First,
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2* EDUCATION
Second, any attempts to apply the same transformational rules
between all the disciplinary scale-areas are semantically
valuable and are normally considered as a fundamental attribute
of a well designed environment. Functionalist architectural
education is full of adviGe to apply the same constitutional
logic from the smallest to the largest elements of a building.
In fact, the whole path, functions more semantically than
syntactically. The elementary city structures are atoms in
terms of complexity, and the same happens with the elementary
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building structures. The barriers which constitute the 'non-
science' voids between the paradigms of each scale are mostly
understood in semantic than in syntactic terms. The gap is
normally bridged at the surface level through a pure relation¬
ship-logic, which is accompanied by the semantic context of
the elementary deep structures:
The above discussion has shown some additional barriers,
especially concerning the understanding of space by the
i?e>
designers. Theoretically, the form of barriers as regards
the total model, including scale, can be presented as follows:
$ ^
In fact, although disciplinary barriers are clear in the
designers' understanding of the artificial space, what happens
in the case of users is still obscure. To what extent the
internalization of the city image has something common with
that of the house is a question which could be answered only
after empirical research.
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the identification of harriers
of participatory action
and the nature
In order to complete this section about the formal repre¬
sentation of the alienation-participation bipolar in our modified
semantic syntax of the artificial space, we have to deal with
another subject: We have seen how participatory action can
be included in the semantic syntax concerned with the path from
the simpler to the more complex barrier-structures.
What remains is to understand how participatory action can be
represented in terms of the total model and, particularly, that
part of it which deals with the process of barrier-production
in the internalization of the artificial environment.
The simple model is as follows:
OF APPROACH
It has been also mentioned that these eventual

















problem is considered as
being caused by institu¬
tional problems.Design is
considered as possible
only after major institu¬
tional changes.
What has to be stressed now is that even these routes
are not correctly expressed in the above static way. In reality,
they function in a dynamic way. This means that the overall
equilibrium, presented in the above two examples, has been
stabilized after an alienatory procedure. For instance, the
























































In general, we should expect that empirical research
would provide us with a dynamic taxonomy of such cases. This
means that we could understand how a case, where a 'horizontal'
communicative barrier exists, may be transformed into a case
characterized by a complex barrier, etc.:
G Q O
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A general form of the above examples is the following:



























In fact, the linear form is not sufficient at all to give
a coherent idea of the reality. Usually, for instance, the




and might achieve the optimum non-alienated form,
pseudostu<Tl'£o
by passing through continuous reversable transformations
concerned with alienated cases of the kind described
previously. Some of these cases are characteristic as
regards their state of dynamic equilibrium.
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In these terms, participatory action means a reverse
dynamic procedure from the highly alienated towards the
optimum cases.
Being dynamic, this procedure has also to pass through
stages of equilibrium which function as infrastructures
for subsequent less alienated cases. Disalienation, I
have already stressed , is a gradual procedure and these
infrastructural intermediate stages of equilibrium are
essential for the procedure as a whole. An example of this
is the following.
w0n moptrfp description
ldpl°l I Ojo o•
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The importance of this definition of participatory
infrastructures is double: first, it enlarges the way in
which participation itself is understood (not only as
design participation, but also as a continuous process concerned
with the user-environment connection) and second, it
enlarges the concept of infrastructure; infrastructures are
not only conceived as material backgrounds for transforming
the physical elements of the built space, but they are also
conceived as activity or institutional infrastructures;
that is, at different levels of approach and different
siabstances. More important, however, is that they are
conceived also as dynamic equilibrium infrastructures;
that is, as intermediate useful states, where some barriers
still exist but these barriers are important for the procedure
of internalization of the built space as a whole.
There are two clear general conclusions from the above
discussion. First, the entire way of thinking about parti¬
cipatory planning is highly ideological. Participation
exists only in order to lead to a non-alienated
exploration of space by the user and, as such, it depends on
the definition of alienated communication between space
and user. Second, the participation-alienation logic, as
any problem-solving normative logic, deals predominantly
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with the dynamics of the environmental structures. I shall
end, therefore, this part of the study concerning the
linguistic paradigm and its development with a discussion
on some aspects of the dynamic behaviour of the artificial
environment; namely the aspects which require a logic of
contradictions in order to understand the transformations
of the built forms.
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CHAPTER 1,2.5
NOTES ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL STRUCTURES
AS SEEN THROUGH THE LOGIC OF CONTRADICTIONS
To some extent, it is an exaggeration to discuss
'structural dynamics' within a structuralist context;
'dynamics' are automatically included in the concept of
structure itself. Before introducing the particular
reasons for this discussion here, I feel it useful to clarify
the concepts of 'structure' and 'transformation'. These
concepts have also been discussed in EAR/4 ('Description
and Descriptive Theories in Architecture' ) and I shall
start from there.
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2.5.1 THE CONCEPT OF TRANSFORMATION ; SOME CLARIFICATIONS
In EAR/4, we stressed that there are two major
semantic bases according to which two different values are
adapted to the term 'structure'.
"(i) the conditions under which a structure can be
applied as such: For Piaget, for instance, the con¬
ditions of 'wholeness', 'transformation', and
'self-regulation' are applied to define 'structure'
as a system of transformations under some well
defined transformational rules-' . Two extreme examples
produced according to this basis may be given: the
'mathematical group' (to Piaget, the finest proto¬
type of his definition of structure)^ and a concept
in general use, the 'social structure' where no such
formal conditions may necessarily be applied^
(ii) the degree of abstraction applied to a certain
reality which is necessary in order to understand
a structure ... According to this basis, structures
are to be identified either at the abstract level
of deep structure4 or, alternatively, at the surface
level of the observable reality. One attitude
identifies a structure at a surface level under the
condition that there is a deep level
which is itself the structure,
while a second attitude accepts the deep level
analysis as inevitable without imposing conditions
in identifying a structure at a surface level."5
(my emphasis)
1. J. PIAGET (1968), op. cit., p, 5 (.also quoted in A, AWADALLA,
A. M. KOTSIOPOULOS, T. MARAVELIAS, Description and descriptive
theories in architecture, E.A.R./4, 1977, p, 26),
2. Ibid, (Piaget), p. 5.
3. See E.A.R./4, op. cit,, p. 26, n.6; "social structure", even in
its broader sense, may depend upon higher structures. For a
discussion of this dependence, see H, GERTH and C, W, MILLS,
Character and Social Structure; the Psychology of
Social Institutions, Routledge and Kegan Paul © .1957.
4. Ibid.,(E.A.R./4), p. 8.
5. Ibid. , p. 26.
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A broader understanding of the above duality, more
connected with my previous analysis of artificial structures,
would lead towards two quite clear translations of the
concept of 'structure': the first defines 'structure' as
the overall reality which is under investigation, regardless
of the conditions under which 'structure' is understood
(within the structuralistic methodology these procedures
inevitably involve Piaget's conditions as well as trans¬
formational chains as those mentioned previously). It is
in this context that the expression 'environmental
structures' is used.
The second defines'structure'as the set of character¬
istics which dominates the analysis of an overall struc¬
ture. As such, structure refers mainly to the rules and
the methodological apparatuses which are used in order to
investigate an overall structure. The expression 'the
structure of the environment' - or, strictly, 'the structure
of the environmental (overall) structures'—belongs to this
translation.
The reader who is already familiar with the use of the
term 'structure' in this study will understand that, in
the end,there is no essential difference between the two
ways in which 'structure' is conceived. This clarification,
however, is useful for the discussion of the dynamics of
the environmental structures.
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Now, the initial question; what is the meaning of
the 'dynamics of the environmental structures'? Are there
any new concepts introduced by this, apart from the trans¬
formational rules of the complexity chain and the semantic
pluralism of space?
The hidden problem behind this question deals with
the concept of 'transformation' itself. It is obvious that
buildings are usually stable and the question is whether
the term 'transformation' is merely adapted to the compara¬
tively rare cases, where the existing environmental
artefacts are modified in order to satisfy new 'needs' or
new activity patterns.
The phenomenon of transformation in language is an
everyday reality . Linguistic syntagms are in a state of
continuous production. So, there is a rich statistical
sample for identifying transformational rules in the grammar
of language. This is done either by tracing the similarities
and differences between recorded syntagms or by mentally
analysing the way in which a syntagm might have been
produced. We have to accept, however, that although archi¬
tectural syntagms are much 'heavier' than the linguistic
ones and, also, accumulated on land in a more complex way,
the nature of their 'transformations' is conceived in a
similar manner as in language. Transformations, that is,
are first recorded in the paradigmatic way of comparing
simpler to more complicated forms and, second, in a purely
mental syntagmatic way, where it is supposed that a super-
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surface environmental artefact corresponds to deeper
structural representations and creates a semantic pluralism
at different substance levels.
J. Lyons gives an idea of the controversial polysemy
of the terms 'generative' and 'transformational' within the
context of linguistics itself:
.. But first we must say something more about the
terms 'generate' and 'generative', since they have
often been misunderstood. The first point to be
stressed is the negative one: a generative grammar
is not necessarily a transformational grammar....
(the term generative) was first introduced in the
sense of 'projective' (or 'predictive'): to refer
to any set of grammatical rules which, explicitly
or implicitly, described a given corpus of sentences
by ' pro jecting' them upon, or treating them as a
'sample' of, a larger set of sentences. A grammar
of this kind is 'predictive' in that it establishes
as grammatical, not only 'actual' sentences, but
also 'potential' sentences. It is important
to realize that most of the grammars that have ever
been written throughout the history of linguistics
are generative in this first sense of the term.
But the term 'generative' was subsequently used in
this section in a rather particular sense of
'explicit' ... When we say that a grammar generates
the sentences of a language we imply that it
constitutes a system of rules ... which are
formulated in such a way that they yield, in
principle, a decision procedure for any combination
of the elements of the language in more or less
the above sense."® (my emphasis)
The above dichotomy refers to the basic distinction
between a more or less paradigmatic way of thinking and a
clearly syntagmatic one (in the case of the structural
generative grammar and, especially, the transformational
grammar'') . However, it is the concept of prediction which
6. J. LYONS (1968), op. cit,, pp. 155-156.
7. Ibid., p. 248.
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gives a new dimension to the above discussion and which is
of course particularly important for 'architectural grammars'.
The reason is that the concept of prediction signifies the
conscious design action with which environmental practice
is largely connected. So, transformations in both linguistic
as well as in architectural practice constitute a mental
apparatus which is necessary for planning the action on the
communicational and the environmental artefacts respectively.
Where, however, the environmental structures are
richer is exactly in the domain in which we apparently
understand them through their material substance. This
means that they are transformed on an ad hoc basis and what
is transformed is their material substance. This happens
in addition to the possibility of explaining and designing
the environmental structures also through a transformational
logic. On the contrary, linguistic syntagms are too flexible
and too numerous to behave in the same way. Their material
transformations (and undoubtedly these transformations are
equally numerous as the linguistic syntagms) are inevitably
incorporated in a mental process of continuous reproduction.
The argument which this discussion attempted to
promote is that it is exactly the semantic pluralism of
artificial space and the different substances through
which this pluralism is communicated which give to the
concept of 'transformation' of built space an inter¬
pretation broader than that implied by the linguistic para¬
digm.
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Therefore, when we talk about the dynamics of the
environmental structures, we mean not only the mental
paradigmatic and syntagmatic procedures, through which
space is explained and produced but we also mean the
material differentiations of the built space through the
course of time and through a distinct ad hoc design action.
Design action is also incorporated in language when
very complex syntagms are produced. Nevertheless, language
is perhaps the less characteristic system in the domain of
artefacts as regards design action. On the contrary,
in the case of the artificial space the distinct character
of design action is closely connected with the differentia¬
tions of the substance of the artefact, before the artefact
takes a three-dimensional physical form. In this sense,
design action is both mentally transformational (since it
needs a continuous feedback from the deep to the surface,
from the large scale to the small, from the physical to the
activity and the institutional and from the elementary to
the complex and all these in explanatory and propositional
terms) as well as dynamically transformational (since it
deals with the change of an existing reality to a new one,
even if this 'change' belongs to the extreme case, where a
physically new artefact takes the place of an institutional
or activity mental formation). In this chapter, we shall
especially discuss the latter case of transformations and
the term 'structural dynamics of the built space' refers
mainly to them. Needless to say, however, continuous
reference will be made to the syntagmatic understanding of
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transformations, without which no 'dynamics' (in the latter
strict sense) can be understood.
2.5.2 CONTRADICTIONS AND POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION
Tf is serious jnorfferclaim that there are general laws
which govern the development of man either at the level of
societal characteristics or at the level of mental or
material artefacts. Popper, for instance, rejects completely
the idea that human history can be interpreted in the same
way as natural sciences:
"I wish to defend the view, so often attacked as
old-fashioned by historicists, that history is
characterized by its interest in actual, singular,
or specific events, rather than in laws or
generalizations. This view is perfectly compatible
with the analysis of scientific method, and esp¬
ecially of causal explanation ... Against my
analysis of historical explanation it may be
argued that history does make use of
universal laws contrary to the emphatic declaration
of so many historians ... But these laws may be so
trivial, so much part of our common knowledge, that
we need not mention them and rarely notice them."®
(author's emphasis, my emphasis)
Although the position taken in this study is different
from Popper's view, such a discussion is far more general
than the scope of this study allows. I have to make clear,
however, that Popper's attitude against any attempt to
construct theories concerned with artefacts and their
8. K. R. POPPER, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge and,
Kegan Paul 1976 ( © 1957, 1960, 1961), pp. 143 and 145.
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historical embodiment is, even indirectly, in obvious
opposition with the scope of a socially valuable but system¬
atic understanding of the structure of a artificial space.
The argument that contradictions are the fundamental
constituents of transformations is apparently concerned
with a 'law', which Popper would consider as a historicist
illusion. And this law is not of course a 'trivial' one
which we would not need to mention?
Kuhn represents an example of thinking, in which the logic
of contradictions is organically embedded in a theory of
history even if this history is a history of science. Kuhn
himself becomes an advocate of 'historicism' writing:
"How could history of science fail to be a source
of phenomena to which theories about knowledge may
legitimately be asked to apply?"*0
However, he is really a 'historicist' when he traces
the close connection between the societal characteristics
of scientific communities and the development of scientific
paradigms:
Kuhn's epistemology is a clear effort to prove that
'anomalies' and contradictions within the context of the
normal-science paradigms constitute the potential for the
transformation or complete change of the paradigms. Yet,
Kuhn does not present something new. The profound import-
9.Ibid.,p.145,Popper is not interested in laws which are trivial
and are part of our common knowledge.
10. T.S. KUHN (1960), op. cit., p. 9.
11. Ibid., postscript.
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ance of contradictions for the development of structures,
material or mental, is to be found in materialist dialectics
and its origins. Mao Tse-Tung, for instance, made an
epigrammatic summary of these attitudes writing that
"Contradictoriness within a thing is the
fundamental cause of its development, while its
interrelations and interactions with other things
are secondary causes ... Contradiction has a
twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists
in the process of development of all things, and
the other is that in the process of development of
each thing a movement of opposites exists from
beginning to end."12 (my emphasis)
The 'antithetic' character of structural dynamics is
a very attractive field for a general discussion in the field
of 'natural' sciences, the sciences of the artificial and
especially in the field of epistemology. It must have been
clear to the reader of this study that the basic philosophy
of contradiction has already been integrated in the way
in which the whole issue of the linguistic metaphor of
architecture has been dealt with. The very elementary
form of the commutative square, for instance, where
antithetic transformational rules constitute the potential
for the development of the structure to higher orders, is
an indication of this. However, it is difficult to discuss
here the general epistemological problems of contradictional
thinking. Instead, I shall proceed to some aspects which
offer a basis for the conceptualization of the notion of
contradiction and for its extention to the study of the
12. MAO, TSE-TUNG, On Contradictions, in: Selected Works, Vol. 1,
Foreign Language Press 1975 (People's Publishing House © 1960),
pp. 313-316.
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dynamics of environmental structures. The following
part refers to these aspects and it is extracted from the
team work in EAR/4
e One basic point is the differentiations made between
principal and secondary contradictions. Mao's attitude on
this might be concluded from the following extract:
"The fundamental contradiction in the process of
development of a thing and the essence of the pro¬
cess determined by this fundamental
contradiction will not disappear until
the process is completed; but in a lengthy process
the conditions usually differ at each stage. The
reason is that, although the nature of the funda¬
mental contradiction in the process of development
of a thing and the essence of the process remain
unchanged, the fundamental contradition becomes
more and more intensified as it passes from one
stage to another in the lengthy process. In
addition, among the numerous major and minor contra¬
dictions which are determined or influenced by the
fundamental contradiction, some become intensified,
some are temporarily or partially resolved or
mitigated, and some new ones emerge; hence the
process is marked by stages."^(our emphasis)
In reference to Mao's work Althusser defines contra¬
dictions in terms of principal and secondary ones. For
the first ones, he prefers the term 'general
contradictions'. He defines a general contradiction as:
"the contradiction between the forces of production
and the relations of production, essentially
embodied in the contradiction between two
antagonistic classes."^
13. E.A.R./4, op. cit., p. 33.
14. MAO, TSE-TUNG (1960), op. cit., p. 325.
15. L. ALTHUSSER, For Marx, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press 1971
( © Maspero 1965), p. 99.
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He also writes that this 'general contradiction'
cannot of its own explain neither a 'revolutionary
situation' nor the 'rupture and triumph of the revolution'.
He specifies that , in addition to this general contra¬
diction
, there must be an accumulation of what we might
understand as 'secondary contradictions', which are not
necessarily solely derived from the same base as the
general contradiction though they might be affected by
it. He s ays:
"... They derive from the relations of production
which are, of course, one of the terms of the contra¬
diction, but at the same time its conditions of
existence; from the superstructures, instances
which derive from it, but have their own consistency
and effectivity, from the international conjuncture
itself, which intervenes as a determination with a
specific role to play." 16 (author ' s emphasis).,^
\
(part taken from EAR/4,p. 33).
An interesting example of how contradictions are
related to the process of production of artificial
space is given by D. Harvey. Harvey accepts a transform¬
ational logic which was similar to that mentioned previously
in this chapter. He proceeds, nevertheless, to a deeper
analysis:
"... structures have to be defined through
an understanding of the transforma¬
tional rules that shape them ... A higher order
structure may be obtained from a lower by way of
transformation ... Lower and higher order structures
may thus coexist ... But such a hierarchical view
does not seem adequate to interpret the relation¬
ship between, say, a mode of production and an
16. Ibid. , p. 100.
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ecological structure. In this last case we cannot
derive one structure from another through a
transformation ... One consequence of this is that
we are obliged to distinguish between contradictions
within a structure and contradictions between
structures ...
... Godelier ... suggests that many of the contra¬
dictions which Marx exposed were of the internal
variety, but that some of the more fundamental ones
are to be interpreted as contradictions between
structures ...
... Following Marx, the only valid way to approach
the question of urban origins, is to seek out the
internal and external contradictions present in
pre-urban society and to show how these contradic¬
tions were resolved through the transformation to
urban forms of social organization ... Such a trans¬
formation generated new contradictions and tensions
(in particular the antagonism between town and
countrv) which eventually would have to be resolved. "17
(author's emphasis, my emphasis)
Harvey's work is concentrated on the nature of urbanism.
In his conclusions he gives an idea of how urbanism has to
be regarded:
"Urbanism has to be regarded as a set of social
relationships which reflects the relationships
established throughout society as a whole. Further,
these relationships have to express the laws whereby
urban phenomena are structured, regulated and
constructed. We then have to consider whether
urbanism is (1) a separate structure with its own
laws of inner transformation and construction, or
(2) the expression of a set of relationships embedded
in some broader structure (such as the social
relations of production)."^
Harvey gives an answer to the above questions in
connection with Lefebvre's works*®
"... we also both accept that urbanism has to be
understood as a self-sustaining entity which
expresses and fashions relationships with other
17. D. HARVEY (1973), op. cit., pp. 293-294.
16. Ibid., p. 304.
19, H. LEFEBVRE, La Revolution Urbaine , (1970), La Pens6e
Marxiste et la Ville (1972), Editions Casterman, Paris.
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structures in the totality. Neither of us regarded
urbanism as something simply derived out of other
structures. Lefebvre also attempts to incorporate
adequate concepts of space into his analysis. He
notes the conflict between the dialectics of the
social process and the static geometry of the
spatial form ... But urbanism is not merely a
structure fashioned out by a spatial logic. It
has attached to it distinctive ideologies (urban
versus rural images for example) ..." 20( author's
emphasis).
Harvey proceeds to the kinds of contradictions he
realizes:
"The city as a built form and urbanism as a way
of life have to be considered separately from each
other for they have become separated in reality ...
But as the old antagonisms between town and
country come to play a much reduced role, so new
antagonisms emerge in the heart of the urbanization
process itself. At the global level there is the
conflict between the metropolitan centres of the
world and the underdeveloped nations. At the local
level we see the import of rural problems into
the city, ... usually in shanty towns around the
edges of the major cities. Urban poverty is, for
the most part, rural poverty refashioned within the
city system ... the urbanization of the countryside
involves a subsidiary ruralization of the city??.."22
"Traditional conceptions of property rights no
longer appear adequate and have to be supplemented
by the creation of collective property rights
through the political organization of space ...
The difficulty of distinguishing between public and
private (generated out of the urban form of spatidl
organization) establishes the necessity for greater
governmental participation ..."22
Harvey also accepts that some particular contradictions
evolve as a result of the fact that "urbanism is becoming
less homogenous":
20. D. HARVEY (1973), op. cit., p. 307.
21. Also, according to Lefebvre.
22. Ibid. (Harvey), pp. 307-308.
23. Ibid. , p. 308.
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"... Created space replaces effective space as the
overriding principle of geographical organization ...
The urbanization of the countryside implies the
elimination of regional life-styles through the
forces of the world market ... Created space comes
to dominate effective space as a consequence of the
changing organic composition of capital.
It is possible that our culture, conceived as of
an ethnic domain, emanates from created space more
than it succeeds in creating space. A frequently
expressed alienation from urban culture and an
antipathy to the image of the city in part arises
out of a deeper estrangement. Neither the activity
of space creation nor the final product of created
space appear to be within our individual or
collective control but fashioned by forces alien to
us ... We still tend to analyse urban phenomena as
if effective space (largely understood as efficiency
of movement) were the only appropriate
concept."24 (author's emphasis, my emphasis)
Harvey's last remark advocates a new problem-solving
way of analyzing urban phenomena ; a way which deals
with the present contradictions of spatial formations
and the problems these formations create. According to him,it is
obvious that antagonistic situations are to be resolved
towards a new urban reality and also that our way of
understanding and acting on artificial space has much
to do with this process of transformations.
It is interesting to attempt to'trans late' Harvey's
conclusions about the nature of such antagonisms into the
language which was previously adopted for the present study.
The additional reason for doing this is that Harvey's
philosophy of praxis is based upon a view of the
importance of description, which is similar to the view of
this study2^.
24. Ibid., pp. 309-310.
25. Harvey's work, although adopting such a problem-solving
explanatory philosophy, remains itself descriptive in
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For Harvey, contradictions constitute the power which
allowed the transformation of pre-urban society to the
urban forms of social organization. These contradictions
are so related in the course of history that an urban
structure of a higher order includes the causes of its
production and also contains contradictions, the resolution
of which would lead to new orders.
Harvey emphasizes that urbanism proceeds following a
double process. First, following the substantial
antagonisms between the stability and accumulation of its
physical elements on the one hand, and the dynamics of human
activities and institutions on the other; second, following
the leading forces which appear in the societal structure
itself and, therefore, following the struggle between
ideologies which are not directly connected with urbanism
but are mapped on it ("it has attached to it distinctive
ideologies (urban versus rural images for example)"):
the traditional use of the term. His final conclusion functions
as a logical barrier in its unexpected generality: "An urbanism
founded upon exploitation is a legacy of history. A genuinely
humanizing urbanism has yet to be brought into being. It
remains for revolutionary theory to chart the path from an
urbanism based in exploitation to an urbanism appropriate for
the human species. And it remains for revolutionary practice









Finally, Harvey accepts that these antagonisms follow
a generative process, leading from 'ancient' forms (like
between urban and rural) to contemporary ones (urbanization
of the countryside and ruralization of the city). All these
antagonisms have also deeper levels, such as 'created
space' versus 'effective space' (a deep description of the
process produced by the antagonism between physical elements
and societal characteristics).
One of the important conclusions by Harvey is that it
is useless and misleading to find structures everywhere.
Of course, everything is structured but it is outside the
scope of operational structuralism to invent or discover
theoretical artefacts which are not originated from real
problems. So, the process of production of the artificial














there are structures and transformations but there are
also domains in this process which are independent or
loosely related to each other. It is this discontinuity
which allows productive exploration of contradictions
towards praxial beyonds.
This logic of discohtinuity is apparent in this
study, especially concerning the 'hypothetical three-level
basis' (physical elements, activities, and institutions)
of approaching built space and also concerning the
notion of 'prototype' as an intermediate level of the
deepness chain. It is, therefore, within the framework of
this logic to think that antagonisms appear between the
images of the artificial environment as these images appear
at those three levels of approaching it and also that these
antagonisms are organically embedded in the semantic
pluralism of built space. Furthermore, it is also
logical to think that such antagonisms constitute a
potential for the transformation of environmental structures
as both Harvey and Lefebvre have shown as regards the
'beyonds' of contemporary urbanism. In EAR/4 we called this
kind of contradiction 'normal anomalies'. We defined then
as follows:
It is our thesis here that a descriptive theory in
which there are various descriptive levels - such as the
'environmental', 'activity' and the 'institutional' ones -
articulates respectively the kind of contradictions which
are eventually identified as connected with the trans-
formation of the structure as a whole. Apparently,
contradictions between the different images of the struc¬
ture at those descriptive levels are by no means
impossible. On the contrary, experience has repeatedly
proven that such contradictions constitute fundamental
causes for 'design action'. It is logical, however, to
expect that such 'inter-level' contradictions (for
example, an environment which is not corresponding to a
changing activity image or an institutional framework which
is far beyond an environmental image or much behind an
activity one) do express the existence of more general
contradictions which are more intelligible at higher
descriptive levels.
In particular, when we consider structures in terms
of their environmental image, it is possible to distinguish
a specific category of contradictions caused by the
differentiation of substance between the descriptive
levels. We prefer to call this category of contradictions
'normal anomalies', the most common kind of which are
those between the stable environmental and the changing
activity image of a structure. Normal anomalies of this
kind on the one hand, and conservative design on the
other, are perhaps the most typical bipolar in architec-
26
tural design action^ (taken from EAR/4).
Harvey and Lefebvre realized the existence of such
'anomalies' (which are 'normal' within the framework of
26. E.A.R./4, op. cit., p. 35.
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industrial capitalist society) when they wrote about the
"conflict between the dialectics of the social process and
the static geometry of the spatial form". They do not
seem to accept, however, that such 'anomalies' constitute
a more general phenomenon which existed even in the pre-
industrial societies before the ' urbanization of the country¬
side and the ruralization of the city'.
In EAR/4 we proceeded towards a further understanding
of such 'normal anomalies' (which in our view are 'normal'
in general and not only within the context of industrial
capitalist society).We wrote that
"it is logical to expect that such 'inter-level'
contradictions do express the existence of more
general contradictions which are more intelligible
at higher descriptive levels."27
We also defined the nature of these more general
contradictions as follows.
"Leading contradictions, as opposed to normal
anomalies, are more general and less circumstan¬
tial. The adjective 'leading' means simply that
they are present and recognizable in different
forms, perhaps at more than one image of a built-
environment structure. The character of leading
contradictions depends on the individual attitude
of the architect or planner, on his general
position against the particular structure under
investigation and on the particular system of
social evaluation employed in the investigation of
this structure."28
Harvey and Lefebvre seem to accept this kind of
contradiction. For Harvey, "urbanism is not merely a
27. Ibid., p. 35.
28. Ibid., p. 35.
/
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structure fashioned out by a spatial logic. It has attached
to it distinctive ideologies". For Lefebvre such contra¬
dictions appear through "the conflict between the dialectics
of the social process" as opposed to "the static geometry
of the spatial form". They emphasize, however, that these
contradictions refer mainly to the general societal process^®
and they have nothing to do with the internal, or even the
activity, characteristics of the spatial forms. The reason
for this simple reference to the dialectics of societal process
is that,in fact, in Harvey and Lefebvre's work all contra¬
dictions are considered as equally important for urbanism,
although Harvey distinguishes between contradictions within
a structure and contradictions between structures. Harvey's
interest is more in hierarchizing and explaining how such
contradictions are generated in the process of urbanization
and how they lead to the fundamental antagonism between
created space and effective space. His interest is also
in explaining how all this takes place mainly as the
expression of a set of relationships embedded in some broader
structure (the social relations of production) and less
as an internal attribute of the built space.
There is no doubt that this would be a right way of
explaining the spatial dynamics. There are, nevertheless,
29. I don't think that they would have serious objections to call them
'leading'; at least,this is what Harvey stresses,mentioning this
part from Lefebvre's work; "...No.The reality of urbanism modifies the
relations of production without being sufficient to transform them..."
D.HARVEY(1973),op.cit.,p.306;reference to H.LEFEBYRE(197Q),op.cit.,p,25.
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two serious difficulties. First, the whole procedure has
to be understood in a more or less continuous way/ in spite
of what I understand as Harvey's advocacy in favour of a
discontinuous operational understanding of urban realities.
Second, Harvey and Lefebvre's subject belongs to a
disciplinary domain - what they call 'urbanism'-which is
itself more coherent and continuous in its generality than
'umbrella' concepts like 'architecture' or 'production of
the artificial space'.
'Urbanism' as a concept is richer and more comprehen¬
sive than 'design' or, moreover, concepts like 'design
implementation', 'construction','use' etc. As such,
'urbanism' belongs to a larger domain than the physical
elements of the environments would imply and it is, there¬
fore, not suitable for taxonomic elaborations of the kind
proposed throughout this study. Urbanism includes 'leading
contradictions' of the built environment itself, which
provoke the physical renewal of ..c spatial forms. It also
includes leading contradictions which appear at the level
of activities and cause the re-organization of activities
as a result of problems of large numbers and complexity.
In EAR/4, we used this highly hypothetical conception
of 'leading contradictions' at any level of approaching
spatial forms, precisely because of the taxonomic value of
it. This value is important also for another reason. Oirr
interest was in understanding contradictions as one expression
of the potential for transformation, with which both
spatial dynamics as well as design action are closely
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connected. And it was clear to us that, apart from any
summarization like the 'dialectics of social process',
antagonisms occur not only as a characteristic of the
dialectics of society in general, nor as a mere lack of
correspondence between a heavy accumulated space and the
societal reality of a given time. They also occur first
as problems created by the physical elements of the built
space (such as the antagonisms of the different materials
which are forced to co-operate or the antagonisms between
the designed physical elements and the non-designed ones,
etc.), and second as problems created by the activity
characteristics of the built space (such as the antagonisms
between activities which are forced to take place simultan¬
eously in an environment of a limited capacity, etc.). It
would be, indeed, irrelevant to the scope of this study to
separate those surface antagonisms from their contribution
to structuring the deeper institutional dynamics of the
artificial space.
The following is a list of the characteristics of
'normal anomalies' and of 'leading contradictions' as they
have been presented in EAR/4.
normal anomalies leading contradictions
a. Diachronic contradictions
caused by differentiation
of substance and, conse¬
quently, lack of corres¬
pondence between different
descriptive levels of a
structure.
Present and recognizable
in different forms with¬
in each descriptive
image of a structure.




b. More objectified, since
the objectivity of the
descriptive theory is re¬
flected in the ability of
N.A. to represent real
causes for transformation
of a structure.
More subjective and ideo¬
logically influenced
since they heavily depend
on the individual atti¬
tude and the general
position of the architect
or planner against the
structure he investigates.
c. High potential for trans¬
formation of a structure
in terms of design action,
because normal anomalies
due to their nature, always
suggest to a certain
degree the spatial implica¬






transformation in terms of
design action due to their
ambiguity in suggesting
ways for their resolution.
This ambiguity stems,
mainly, from their repre¬
sentation in a very general¬
ized form and only within
one descriptive image of
a structure.
d. Related to the system of
social evaluation involved
in the investigation of
the structure, in terms of
the ability of this system
to construct predominant
descriptive images of this
structure.
Related to the system of
social evaluation involved
in the investigation of
the structure, in terms of
the ability of this system
to construct predominancies
of descriptors within each
descriptive image of this
structure.
From the arguments previously given and summarized
in the table above, the structural role of social evalua¬
tion can be seen in terms of:
(a) Identifying the structure and hierarchy of normal
anomalies and leading contradictions, thus, defining
transformation both in terms of its nature and its
context within a structured whole.
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(b) Arranging the logical tools of the descriptive theory
and, in particular, the descriptive dimension of the
structured whole by influencing the theoretical
conception of the problem and indicating particular
design action, thus, operating within a given mode
of 'theory-practice'. 1
Therefore, the resolution of contradictions - either
in the form of design action of a conservative character,
or as a revolutionary process, especially concerning the
leading contradiction - takes place within a historically
determined system of social evaluation which itself is
contradictory and characterized by such leading
contradictions.
According to a fundamental assumption of this study -
oA
especially discussed in EAR/3 - description as a whole
reflects this system of social evaluation and, therefore,
the contradictions within the context of its subject¬
ivity. Although it is an exaggeration to claim that this
subjectivity can continuously change the nature of the
logical tools that a descriptive theory uses, on the
other hand it is necessary to admit that these tools
express different concepts at different times. In our
case,without losing their abstract and generalized
character ,they should be articulated in order to
30. E.A.R./3, op. cit. , pp. 37-38.
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include a 'contradictional' interpretation of the trans¬
formations of structures which are of specific interest
for the study of the built environment. It seems,
therefore, that there is seme rocm,here,for an interesting
task for the theorist: that is,to check his tools and the
concepts which are involved in any dynamic consideration
of environmental structures from this particular point
of view^ (from EAR/4








INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE
STUDIES THROUGH SOME MAIN




This is the basic question which should follow the previous
extensive analysis of a general and more or less theoretical
approach to the problems of understanding and planning the
spatial forms.
There are two main ways in which this question might be
answered. The first is concerned with the origin of this study
and has been sufficiently discussed, I think, in the general
introduction. This remains, nevertheless, a highly subjective
and circumstantial answer. Thus, I shall be attempting here
to discuss the second one, which is much more objective and deals
with the extent to which universities constitute a satisfactory
domain for evaluating the conclusions of a general approach
to the explanation of and planning action on the artificial
environment. There is, also, another problem, which derives
234
from this second answer. This problem refers to the kind of
case studies, which would fulfil the purpose of such a
discussion. Is it necessary to study the whole history of
universities as institutions, the recent examples of campus
design or, eventually, the techniques for structuring this
design? Since I shall be dealing in the next chapters with
each of these cases, I will include the reasons of my choice
in the general discussion here.
Universities constitute a unique category of buildings,
activity patterns and institutions. Most architects, urban
designers and planners tend to refer as well as to conceive of
them as being 'microcosms'of a city' and in general they are
right. Universities coincide with urban formations in terms
of scale (although they never reach the scale of urban
metropolitan structures) in terms of complexity of activities
and of the actors involved in them (although these activities
follow more organized and simpler patterns than in ordinary
urban forms and although the actors involved are mostly
temporary and do not cover such a large age spectrum as in
city life) and also have some common institutional characteristics
with cities (although they are much younger and do not express
the totality of institutions of a mode of production, as urban
forms generally do). It would be, therefore, reasonable to
argue that studying such microcosms would give sufficient
evidence of the validity of a general method of approaching
and explaining the built environment.
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Although the structure of this study advocates that
such a view is generally accepted here, it is necessary to
stress some important problems concerned with what, in the end,
is a mere simplification. To do this, I shall try first to
identify some particularities of universities and then to
discuss the consequences of these particularities on the value
of the general theoretical conclusions, which were
introduced in the first part of this study.
Following the logic of our general paradigm, we expect
to identify these particularities of universities at different
levels, from the physical environment to the institutional
characteristics. We also expect that such particularities will
deal with the dynamics of university structures. Finally, we
expect to find out that the proposals of explaining and plan¬
ning the universities as they are elaborated by historians,
architects and planners are affected by such particularities.
At the same time, however, we also expect that such proposals
reflect their general views of built space. Such general
views are expected to supplement the particularities of
universities and reveal the underlying attitude that universities
are indeed microcosms of urban formations. To quote Alexander
and his colleagues:
"... the master plan for the university ...
describes a practical way of implementing these
ideas in a community although this is a very
special kind of community."J
1. Ch. ALEXANDER, M. SILVERSTEIN, S. ANGEL, S. ISHIKAWA, D. ABRAMS,
The Oregon Experiment, Oxford University Press 1975, p. 3.
21)6
So, what are the particularities of universities?
At the level of the physical environment such particularities
depend strongly on the historical origin of a university.
Universities may be small-sized independent formations but
may also be well incorporated in a city structure, as normally
happens in the case of old European Universities. They may
consist of highly specialized and technically equipped
building units but they may also simply reflect the institutional
attraction of a 1 temple of knowledge' as it happened in the
past and continues to happen. Universities are, therefore,
mixtures of such quite different ideologies and their buildings
represent the accumulation of such mixtures on land .
A unique characteristic of university buildings,
however, is that,until now, they have been conceived as
representatives of the dominant architectural dialect of the
time in which they were designed and constructed. So, the
first particularity emerges: -universities have been continuously
emphasizing or even exaggerating such dialects and the mode
of production represented by these dialects, both in terms
of scale as well as in terms of what can be defined as the
'environmental institutionalization' of university buildings.
At the level of activities, differences are less
important than some theorists believe. The importance of the
particular activity identity of universities has been recently
exaggerated, I think, by the introduction of highly
sophisticated techniques, used in order to plan the building
program of a university through its activity image.
237
The failure of such methods is due to the dif¬
ficulties they face in including activities which cannot be
scheduled but, on the other hand, are very important for
university life. However, such methods reflect the high
degree of dependance of university normal activities on
academic patterns and on programmed time-tables. Still, in
terms of activity patterns, . or, there are some other
more important particularities of university structures.
The first one is concerned with the virtually triple
structure of a university in terms of human groups. Students,
staff and non-academic staff do not represent classes nor
sub-cultures but distinct role systems. In an urban formation
these role systems are more complex and overlapping and, most
important, are continuously transformed according to
identifiable patterns through time circles. The employee
becomes the boss in the family, leisure time functions
as an antidote against the alienation of labour etc.
The university image is less complex in these terms.
Universities seem to correspond more to the commercial urban
kernels, where concrete role systems are performed^, than to
the 'ecology of games' of the city as a whole (as N, Long
has described it£).
The second particularity of universities as regards
their activity image refers to the structure of human groups,
which take part in these activities. The 'users' of the
2. See Ch. 2.4.2, n. 30 (L. PEATTIE, A.I.P. Journal (Nov. 70),
op. cit., pp. 407-408).
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university - especially the students - change continuously
and/ also, belong to a particular age spectrum. Moreover,
they belong to a distinct intellectual class and this is,. I
believe, the most important particularity of all,
Universities have repeatedly played a role of societal
guidance 3 (successful or not, pragmatic or illusionist) and
this had nothing to do with the 'unknown' identity of their
users. It had, also, less to do with the age of the users
than with their intellectual identity. As Rashdall wrote,
the case of medieval Bologna proved that basic transformations
of university institutions were performed by students of
'mature age and professional ambitions' and not by enthusiastic
young revolutionaries.
However, the most interesting components of the particular
identity of university structures belong to the institutional
level. 'Universitas' originally means 'guild' or 'aggregate
of persons'. It is important ■ how such aggregates have been
formalized to such an extent that they have been characterized
by the complex superstructure, inherited to our times from the
Middle Ages. As Rashdall has stressed, many contemporary
institutions have a medieval origin but it is the university
which is probably the most distinct of them. The dominant
view among historians is that the concept of 'university'
does not equally apply to famous ancient institutions of high
3. The concept of societal guidance has been extensively •
discussed by K. Deutsch and John Friedmann; see J. FRIEDMANN,
Notes on societal action, A. I.P. Journal, Sep. 69, p. 311,
23?
education such as the Hindoist Schools, Plato'"s Academy,
Aristotle's Lyceum or the Arabic Schools of Medicine. It is
the particular institutional superstructure which signifies
the beginning of university history from Salerno, Bologna and
Paris regardless of how important the transformations of the
deep institutional structure of universities have been through
the course of their history.
Such transformations, nevertheless,reflect fundamental
institutional characteristics, which could hardly be adapted
to any other building-type or to any urban form. The most
important, I believe, as I have already mentioned,
is the role of 'societal guidance'which universities have played.
It is not unlikely that universities function today as
'educational State apparatuses' (a term used by L. Althusser^
to emphasize the function of universities as the basic media,
which reproduce the conditions of capitalist production through
education).However, it would be a mistake to accept that they
do not influence the political arena directly or, perhaps most
significantly, indirectly by playing an important role in the
production and distribution of applied knowledge and
technology.
I believe that it is exactly this institutional particula¬
rity of university structures which constitutes the core of
our question about the identity of universities. This
t. L. ALTHUSSER (1971), op. cit..
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institutional particularity of universities has also some
important consequences on the use of universities as case
studies for a theory of spatial artefacts. Before discus¬
sing some of these consequences, however, I feel that it would
be useful to examine some aspects of university dynamics and
especially those aspects, which are particularly concerned
with planning.
J
One important particularity is the development of overall
design techniques for Universities. This development is
undoubtedly connected with the need for new universities in
the past twenty years, At the same time,however, it reflects
the almost anxious tendency of planners to find an area for
applying the conclusions and the experimental methods, which
have been conceived during the 'scientific design age' of
functionalist architecture.5 There are, for example, innumerable
studies which deal with computer models for time-tabling, and
also other studies which try to apply such models to an
overall design method for university complexes.
Thus, universities offer an interesting field to test the
efficacy of such methods/ either in terms of the conditions
which these methods introduce for themselves or in more
general terms.
The second important particularity of the dynamics of
universities is their 'vertical' function in terms of planning.
5. See Ch. 1.1, n. 8 and 9.
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This function distinguishes universities from other
building types and institutions because of their scale. At
the same time, however, it distinguishes university planning
from urban planning because of the catalytic role which
universities are supposed to play in regional development. So,
'vertical' means that,normally, university planning involves
decisions which range from a top governmental level to a local
one, as well as decisions which range from a purely political
level to a purely environmental one. It seems to me that this
large spectrum of decision-making (equipped with the particular
catalytic role that universities are expected to play) is one
of the reasons for which design techniques have been so much
developed for universities (although these techniques do not
question the political or academic context of universities) and,
also, for which university buildings have always been and still
are semantically overloaded. This means that the environmental
symbolism of university buildings is used by _h designers as
a means to justify the significance of universities as. this
significance is conceived in terms of decision-making.
University structures, nevertheless, (and this is a final
particularity in terms of university dynamics) are gtill
characterized by important contradictions/ either of the kind
we have called 'normal anomalies' or of a more general nature.
Such contradictions have influenced the potential for
transformation of university structures in the past and there
is no reason to believe that they will not influence this
potential now. The strong institutional character of the first
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'student university1 , for instance, was contradictory ~to its
lack of any stable environmental representation. It was
exactly the resolution of such a contradiction which signified
a total alteration of the institutional deep structure of the
'student university', transforming it into a 'State-dependant'
university. Contradictions between dogmas like 'academic
freedom' or 'autonomy' and the economic dependance of
universities on the State, are likely to initiate equally
important transformations in the future with serious
consequences on the environmental image of universities. It is
exactly this particularity of contradictions that also
differentiates universities from urban formations, the dynamics
I
of which seens to follow different laws. There is no problem of
antagonism between urban and rural, for instance, in the case
of universities and, even if there is, it plays a much less
important role in the development of universities. Even
urbanization as a process, (to remember Harvey and Lefebvre)
hardly affects universities as such, and the contradictions
included in this process simply support or oppose the basic
contradictions, which are internal to university dynamics.
What are the consequences of the particularities
mentioned before to an eventual verification of a theory of
understanding and planning the spatial forms?
We have to remember that we are dealing with a theory which
has mainly a taxonomic character. That is, it accepts a
general borrowed paradigm and modifies it to solve a problem.
And it does so, to introduce particular descriptive theories
for particular problems eventually concerned with particular
institutional categories and building-types.
So, there are two criteria for verifying such a theory;
first, it has to be formulated in terms of the particular
problem-area and, moreover, it has to prove through this
formulation its general value. Second, it has to be ap¬
plied to a particular institutional category (and, therefore,
to a formulation of the problems of this category) and, more¬
over, to outline through this application the identity of this
particular institutional category.
Both of these criteria are not as simple as they appear.
Take the first one, that is, the formulation of the theory in
terms of a specific problem:it is a misleading logical circle
to understand a 'problem1 only through the apparatus of the
theory. The theory should not invent problems (although it
could be used to clarify them and to illustrate well obscured
sub-problems) but it should be capable of translating generally
accepted and important problems into its language. In the first
part of this study (concerned with the problem of alienation),
I attempted to do exactly this; to take a generally accepted
problem, to illustrate how this problem can modify the theory,
and to show some hidden sub-problems expressed through the
theory and integrated in its main corpus. This did not prove,
of course, the general value of the theory. This can be
achieved only by extensive empirical research and by applying
the theory to other areas of problems.
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Take, now, the second criterion, the application of the
theory to a particular building type of a specific institutional
origin and identity. It is a very serious task indeed to
apply such a general taxonomic theory to any university, for
example, at any period of time or even to characteristic cases
of universities at characteristic historical periods. Although
there is nothing contradictory in such a task (on the contrary,
strictly speaking, this is what 'application' means, though for
only one institutional category) there is one hidden danger:
to create a logical circle again. That is, to manipulate
universities, to re-define them using the tools of the theory,
so that they would loose, in the end, their commonly understood
identity and their connection with generally accepted problems.
In fact, the linguistic paradigm is dangerous precisely
because it is elastic enough to be applied to everything.
Only a huge scale application of it could really verify its
ability to structure pragmatic situations and problems after
decomposing these situations and problems through the logical
apparatus of the theory.The other way,however,
of applying the linguistic paradigm to a particular building type
is to study this paradigm comparatively with other already
structured paradigms. Instead of studying the subject itself,
i.e. the universities, we can study theories of approaching
the subject; either theories which are descriptive (as in the
case of Rashadall's history) or planning strategies which have,
nevertheless, a descriptive component (as in the case of
'activity models' and of the 'Oregon Experiment').
Generally speaking, what we expect from the linguistic
paradigm and its modification is that it should show itself
powerful enough to be applied to a series of pragmatic situations
in the artificial space as well as to produce sub-theories for
these situations in order to give sufficient evidence for the
taxonomic value of it. Still, this also is not as simple as it
looks. A borrowed paradigm cannot function as 'normal science1.
If there are any hopes for this to be established, it can only
happen through time and after an extensive series of applications
to particular cases. It is in favour of such hopes that
structural linguistics and semiotics gain increasing support
in architectural thinking but this still occurs in a strongly
hypothetical context.
Taking these criteria and reservations into account,, we
can discuss our question about the value of studying
universities through an accepted theoretical apparatus. I
m
believe that the value of a university study lies predominant¬
ly in the dual identity of these structures. University
structures constitute a representative building, activity and
institutional category through their similarities to the
urban formations. At the same time, they constitute an
exaggerated case in which most of the well-balanced
characteristics of urban forms are particularly emphasized.
The built forms of universities are large, well designed and
symbolically overloaded. Their activities follow clear pat¬
terns but,at the same time, they include many of the non-
scheduled components, which enrich city life. Finally, their
institutional characteristics are distinct, socially important
and include internal contradictions, which to some extent can
explain the dynamics of university structures.
There is no doubt that such similarities and particula¬
rities have been taken into account for structuring the plan¬
ning methods which have been proposed for universities.
Some of these methods emphasize the similarities (as the
'Oregon Experiment' does) and some the particularities (as
'activity models' do, since they are based on assumptions
which are unique for universities). Our linguistic paradigm
can function as. an apparatus to evaluate the comprehensiveness
of such methods and,in addition to this, its own comprehensive¬
ness. Moreover, it can function through this comparative
study as an apparatus to clarify and enlarge our knoweledge
about universities. And it can do so, either by considering
universities as a particular institutional category which has




THE NATURE OF THE CASE STUDIES
»
There is a large variety of studies about universities,
which would be useful as a field for testing the value of the
linguistic paradigm and for promoting the solution of
problems concerned with universities.
These studies may be classified into three categories.
The first category refers to studies which deal with the
development and the present status of universities as
institutions. This category contains both historical studies
(from the Middle Ages until now) as well as numerous
investigations into the present institutional character of
the university and the eventual transformation of this
character. University histories are either general (as the
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famous works of Savigny, Deniffle, Rashdall and D'lrsay*)
or particularly orientated towards a specific institution
or a specific aspect of investigating university history (as
the study edited by J.K.Baldwin and R.A.Goldthwaite
'Universities in Polities' 2 ,which will be extensively
used in the first chapter of this part). The studies
about the present problems of universities constitute either
general views (as Max Weber's or Karl Jasper's3 work) or
particular references to particular problems of descriptive
or normative character. There are also studies in the more
general field of political science, which do not start from
university studies as such, but have important consequences
on the way we understand the institutional identity of
universities (such as Althusser's 'Ideology and Ideological
State Apparatuses'4 , or the collection of student texts
of 1968 edited by Cockburn and Blackburn under the title
'Student Power'5 ).
1. H.' S. DENIFFLE, Die Entstehung der Universitat des Mittelalters,
Berlin 1885 ; F.K.von SAVIGNY, Geschichte des Roemischen Reechts
in Mittelalter, 1834; H. RASHDALL, The Universities of
Europe in the Middle Ages , 1896 (edited by F. M. POWICKE
and A. M. EADEN, Oxford 1936); S. D. IRSAY, Histoire des
Universitfis, Paris 1935."
2. J. K. HYDE, Commune, University and Society in Early Medieval
Bologna, in: J. K. BALDWIN and R. A. GOLDTHWAITE (eds.),
Universities in Politics, The John Hopkins University
Press, 1972.
3. See, E. SHILLS (ed.), Max Weber on Universities, The
University of Chicago Press 1974 ( © 1973) and K. JASPERS,
The Idea of the University, P. Owen 1965 ( © 1959),
4. L. ALTHUSSER (1971), op. cit.
5. R. BLACKBURN and A. COCKBURN (eds.), Student Power, Penguin 1959,
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The second category refers to methodologies for
university planning or to more general works which, never¬
theless, are concentrated upon the environmental and activity
image of universities or, at least, take these images
seriously into account in constructing their models.
Architects and planners are essentially involved in such
studies as opposed to the category mentioned previously.
The methodologies for university planning are either orienta¬
ted towards the solution of a given problem or adopt more
comprehensive views and attempt to apply them to campus-
design in general . It is necessary to stress here that
there are also planning methods which do not refer directly
to the built environment of the universities (as the time¬
tabling techniques or the methods of studying universities
as subjects of regional development or as parts of an
educational system6). Unfortunately, comprehensive works
dealing with all the aspects of universities and paying at
the same time particular attention to their environmental
image are rather rare. One of the studies which attempt
such a comprehensive approach is the study carried out by the
U.C.L. and L.S.E. joint team ('The University in a.n Urban
Environment' ) 7 .
6. See, A.M.KOTEIOIIOYAOI, 'EuySpaaeys xwv npoypapyctTWV
EtxouSwv axij Ayadyxaaua Exe6!"Ciayou twv navercuatriyyojv
'Em.cn:. 'Enei. noA-uteyv. Ey. A.n.©., T6uoq E.' 1972
(A. M. KOTSIOPOULOS, The role of time-tables in university
design, Bulletin of the School of Technology, Arist.
Univ. of Thessaloniki, Vol. E, 1972), pp. 351-422 (especially,
p. 415, bibliography); See, also: H. LINDE (ed.),
Hochschulplanung, Werner Verlag 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 114-121,
7. P. COWAN (ed.), The University in an Urban Environment,
Heinemann,1973.
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The third category refers to examples of university
planning and design. World-wide experience during the past
twenty or twenty-five years is rich in projects, implemented
or not, for new universities. Most of them refer to the
design of new campuses, which vary considerably in terms
of size and academic structure. There is, also, a limited
number of studies for what could be called 'university renewal'
(such as the projects by G.Carlo de Carlo et al.for Pavia and
Urbino 8) as well as projects for new urban university net¬
works (such as the project for the Metro-Education in Montreal ).
Some of these projects are accompanied by an extensive
analysis, which in some cases (as in Bath University and
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum ®) has reached the point of implying
coherent methods for university planning and design.10
Each one of the above categories of studies promotes
a particular aspect of universities. With all the dangers of
generalization, we could argue that the first category promotes
the institutional understanding of universities, the second
the understanding of them through the language of activity
patterns, and the third has no alternative but to promote its
8. The Universities of Pavia and Urbino are presented in A.A./183,
Jan.-Feb.1976, pp. 53,57.
9. BATH, University of, op. cit,; Die Universitat Bochum,
Gesamtplanung, Band 1, Karl Kramer 1965.
10. We have to mention here the role of the Zentralarchiv fur
Hochschulbau, Stuttgart, in collecting the material of all
these examples and in publishing a very useful reference book
(H. LINDE (ed.), Hochschulplanung, Vol. 1,2,3,4, Werner
Verlag 1970-1971).
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main interest, that is, the understanding of universities in
terms of built space.
The main case studies X shall be dealing with here
belong to the first two categories; that is, the history of
universities and the planning methods proposed to solve the
problems of contemporary university environment. In the
following chapter of this introduction, I shall explain in
detail how these case studies will be discussed through the
development of our linguistic paradigm.
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CHAPTER II,o.3
THE CASE STUDIES THROUGH THE LINGUISTIC PARADIGM
An obvious way to understand what a university is, is
to study the past and recent examples of universities and
to attempt general conclusions about what could be called
the 1 university model-structure' . A more advanced form
of such a task would be to study these examples by means and
through the prism of a general theory and then to attempt
also general conclusions, which will be based, however, on
the logical apparatus of the general theory.
A less obvious way to understand what a university is,
is to study how other theorists have approached such an
understanding and have constructed their own university model-
structures. They could have done this either directly by
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describing universities or indirectly by implying a descriptive
theory of universities through design methods and proposals.
A more advanced way of understanding universities through this
comparative study would be to study such approaches by means
and through the prism of a general theory and then to
attempt general conclusions, which will be concerned both
with the extent such approaches coincide with the theory as
well as with the eventual problems of the theory itself.
For reasons explained previously and concerned
predominantly with the interest in testing the linguistic
paradigm, I have already indicated that I shall follow the
last of the above mentioned paths. As is clear, however,
the comparative study of theories through our theory does not
exclude the possibility of studying universities as such
and particularly what has been mentioned as a university
model-structure. Although there is no hope of exploring
such a model-structure entirely and in full depth, the material
included in the case studies provides enough information to
outline some of the basic characteristics of it.
Thus, inevitably, the case studies acquire a double
character which signifies a double use of the linguistic
paradigm; that is, to discuss first the theories of explaining
and planning the universities and second the universities
as such (although the latter will evolve through the former).
An important consequence of this double character of the case
studies is that the conclusions of the first part about the
linguistic paradigm may be considered in two different ways
and may also be classified into two different groups.
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The first group contains the conclusions about the
requirements from a descriptive theory in general, such as
the problem-solving character, the comprehensiveness of the
theory and the optimal degree of abstraction of it.
The second group contains the conclusions about the
description of an environmental structure like universities
through the paradigm developed in the first part of this
study. Such conclusions refer to the multi-dimensional ap¬
proach, the semantic syntax including the deepness and
complexity chains, the nature of the elementary structures
and the semantic pluralism of the built space. This group
contains also the conclusions included in a description,
modified under the influence of a particular problem. Since
these problems have to be identified dynamically, the whole
discussion about the problems and the dynamics of universities
can only take the form of a highly ideological speculation.
I shall try, now, to analyse these two groups of
conclusions about the linguistic paradigm.
Group 1: Conclusions about descriptive theories in general,
and, therefore, about theories of universities.
Conclusion A: The problem-solving nature of description.
One basic conclusion of the discussion in the first
part was that descriptive theories imply (directly or in¬
directly) practical 'beyonds". Most of the case studies
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refer to theories, which are indeed orientated to planning.
What is obscure is rather the opposite; that is^the ap¬
paratuses hidden in such planning studies which can explain
the spatial forms and universities in particular. The
general philosophy which governs these eventual apparatuses
is also obscure, although a close investigation of them would
prove that there are hidden paradigms which influence both the
explanatory tools as well as the planning strategies which
these studies propose. So, a first task is to explore the
eventual existence of such hidden paradigms through the
taxonomic conclusions of our linguistic paradigm.
Conclusion B: The nature of descriptors and the need of
comprehensiveness.
A second conclusion in the first part of this study was
that, within the context of problem-solving, description has
to reach a certain degree of comprehensiveness. Any description
does not constitute a 'descriptive theory1. It has to
involve a variety of descriptors, which will be organically
structured and which can be modified in order to serve the
solution of problems. The use of a borrowed paradigm does not
as such guarantee the comprehensiveness of a theory. However,
the criteria for testing the comprehensiveness of a descriptive
theory are themselves quite obscure. I have tried in the
first part of this study to show why a modified linguistic
paradigm can be comprehensively structured when it refers to
the solution of a problem like alienation. A similar elabora¬
tion has to be made apparently for any particular descriptive
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theory concerned with a particular problem-area. It is very
difficult to do this here. Instead, I shall give a definition
of what I understand as a basic criterion for a 'descriptive
theory' by modifying Althusser's 'criterion of correctness'
for such theories * .
A descriptive theory is correct since it is perfectly




in its domain, which is




in the domain with
which it is concerned
y" ALTHUSSER'S CRITERION
Correspond to the definition it gives to
the model-structure with its object
reference to which the
descriptive theory has been y
created o
So,the descriptions used in the case studies will be
discussed in terms of descriptors, in terms of the correspond¬
ence of their descriptors to our hypothetical three-level
basis, in terms of the structure of their descriptors serving
the explanation and the action on a problem area, and finally
in terms of their dynamics. 'Dynamics', we have to remember,
1. L. ALTHUSSER (1971), op, cit, , p, 249.
2. What I have done here is a modification of Althusser's criterion
of empirical evidence for the comprehensiveness and correctness
of descriptive theories, according to the language introduced
by our paradigm. Such a "mapping" is one of the available ways
of criticizing the comprehensiveness of descriptive theories,
though it is highly subjective.
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refers to the transformational rules, which are involved in
the description and, also, to the degree to which such rules
deal with the contradictional potential of the structures.
During the course of this second part, it will gradually
become obvious that few of the above concepts are actually
involved in the descriptive apparatuses, which are used in
the case studies. On the other hand, however, it is possible
to translate most of these apparatuses into the language of
our paradigm. For example, it is easy to identify the use
of the three-level basis in almost all the cases and it is
also possible to realize that some of these cases introduce
a basic logic, which is opposite to the logic of barrier we
introduced in our paradigm. In any case, this 'mapping' has
something useful to say about the descriptive theories, which
are in current use in university planning.
Conclusion C: The optimal degree of abstraction .
This third conclusion is a consequence and formalization
of the previous two. In the first part of this study, it was
noted that the strong syntagmatic character of the architectural
practice combined with the high level of complexity of the
architectural prototypes suggest that,for the descriptive
theories of the spatial artefacts, an intermediate level of
abstraction is the most useful.
This means that very high abstraction makes theories
universal but eliminates their capacity of solving problems;
on the contrary, very low abstraction facilitates problem-
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solving purposes but, at the same time, it eliminates their
comprehensiveness and, consequently, the social value of their
problem-solving capacity.
Group 2: Conclusions about university model-structures and
their dynamics, as seen through theories about universities,
as these theories are seen through the linguistic paradigm.
Therefore, conclusions about university model-structures
as seen through the linguistic paradigm.
There is a large variety of concepts, introduced by
the linguistic paradigm and its development, which may function
as conclusions useful to describe university structures.
Here, I shall give only a list of such concepts and I shall
try to hierarchice them.
A first family of conclusions refers to the basic
concepts introduced by the linguistic metaphor before modifying
it in order to serve the solution of a problem. This family
-includes conclusions mainly about the syntagmatic character
of description in architecture. That is, elementary deep
environmental structures are meaningful in a sense which
allows a multiple evaluation of them as they are transformed
from the deep elementary to the super-surface structures of
a higher complexity. Social evaluation (i.e. the broader
sense of 'meaning') is important for the built environment
and reflects a kind of balance in the societal system, where
such an evaluation takes place.
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A second family of conclusions refers to the concepts
introduced after the modification of the linguistic paradigm.
These conclusions deal mainly with the dimensions of the
semantic pluralism of the built space as these dimensions
are transformed by the dialectical, explanatory and
propositional character of the problem-modifier. Such
conclusions refer to concepts like the set and the hierarchy
of descriptors, the nature of the elementary deep structure
and the nature of the transformational rules, which are
involved in the syntax of the built environment.
In the first part of this study, the discussion about
the 'modified description' was directed towards the problem
of alienation and the participatory strategies to solve it.
So, concepts like the barrier-structure of the artificial
space and the semantic pluralism of it were introduced. It is
not expected,of course,that this particular direction will
be obvious in any example of university structures.
Finally, a third family of conclusions refers to -the
dynamics of the spatial structures. The basic concepts
introduced here were the 'normal anomalies' (observed
diachronically, between the different images of a structure
and constituting the basic stimulation for planning and design
action) and the 'leading contradictions' (effecting the total
status of the structures and influencing major institutional
transformations of them). Enough room will be devoted here
to these dynamic problems, the importance of which for





THE STUDENT-UNIVERSITY OF MED-IEVAL BOLOGNA
AS SEEN BY H.RASHDALL AND J.K.HYDE
The historical studies of the medieval universities are
important for two reasons. First, they express a unique way
of explaining universities and their dynamics,
quite different than that of architects and planners.
Second, they describe a crucial period in the evolution of the
institutional status of universities illustrating the conditions
under which such institutions were generated and transformed.
An interesting point is that the first transformations of the
medieval universities took place in a rather short period of
time and, therefore, they are easily readable. In this chapter,
I shall attempt to explain both the language used by historians
to describe those prototypic university forms and their
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transformations, as well as the university structures them¬
selves through the conclusions which derive from our
linguistic paradigm.
The medieval universities are generally classified into
two categories. The southern 'student universities' and the
northern 'universities of masters'. The University of Bologna
is probably the most representative of the student universities,
while the University of Paris is undoubtedly the most
representative - and the prototype too - of the universities
of masters. The study of student universities , however,
is particularly important because of the significance of the
transformations which took place in the first decades of
their life. These transformations signified the transition
from a state of independence and mobility to a state of
integration and institutionalization as regards the relation¬
ship .between the universities and the State.And this happened
in a clearer way than in the case of the northern 'universities
of masters'.
Hastings Rashdall's history is perhaps the most
important in the English language concerning the medieval
university prototypes. Although his work is not free of
repetitions and problematic hierarchies of important points
(see introduction by F.M. Powicke, Rashdall, XXV-XIIV), it
represents a typical view of universities and contains some
significant personal remarks which are surprisingly progressive
for the time this history was written (1895)*
1. F. M. POWICKE, Introduction,in: H. RASHDALL fed. 1936),
op. cit., p. XXV.
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There is a considerable effort in Rashdall's work to
determine the nature of a university and to establish some
standard descriptive tools for it.. He was very reluctant,
for example, to attribute the name 'university' to institutions
such as the ancient Greek schools or the famous Arabic
schools of medicine, although he accepted that they had most
of the characteristics of what we called 'universities'2 .
Apparently, Rashdall considered the institutional identity of
a university (and especially one particular kind of institutional
identity) as the most significant feature of it, as is
shown in the following extract from his epilogue;
"The genius of the Middle Ages showed itself above
all in the creation of institutions. The institu¬
tions of the Middle Age are greater - they may
prove more imperishable - even than its
cathedrals* The university is a
distinctly medieval institution ... The very idea
of the institution is essentially medieval, and it
is curious to observe how largely that idea still
dominates our modern schemes of education."2
(my emphasis)
What the particular institutional identity - that Rashdall
realized as the inheritance of the Middle Ages- was
and to what extent this inheritance met Rashdall's personal
views is expressed in a negative form as follows;
2. See, H. RASHDALL (1936), vol. Ill, p. 459, B. FLETCHER,
Universities in the Modern World, Pereamon Press 1968,
PP' 11-13, and A. M. KQTEIOnOYAOE, To oriyeptvo Ttavenu—
axnyuo yeaa aito xpv' dvaAuan xwv npurnov navEnuaxnyyaxuiv
deaySv" xo yeaayaivuxo cpoyxnTUxd navenyaxnyyo xhs
Bologna , Euyxpova ©£uo.tcx, 4/1979, (A. M. KOTSIOPOULOS,
The modern university through the analysis of the first university
institutions; the student university of Medieval Bologna,
Synchrona Themata, 4/1979) p. 41.
3. H. RASHDALL (1936) , op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 458.
"Universities ... did not exist in the most highly
cultivated societies of the ancient world. It is
entirely misleading to apply the name to the schools
of ancient Athens or Alexandria. If higher educa¬
tion is to exist, there must obviously be teachers
to impart it, and it is likely that particular
places will become famous for particular studies.
But it is not necessary that the teachers should be
united into a corporate body enjoying more or less
privilege and autonomy. It is not necessary that
the teachers of different subjects should teach in
the same place and be united in a single institution...
It is not necessary that studies should be grouped
into particular faculties, and students required to
confine themselves more or less exclusively to one.
It is not necessary that a definite line of study
should be marked out by authority, that a definite
period of year should be assigned to a student's
course, or that at the end of that period he should
be subjected to examination and receive, with more
or less formality and ceremony , a title of honour.
All this we owe to the Middle Ages. In the form in
which we have them, teaching corporations, courses
of study, examinations, degrees, are a direct
inheritance from the Middle Ages; and it would not
be difficult to show that these inherited institutions
carry with them not a few assumptions in educational
theory and method which might have appeared
questionable enough to an ancient thinker."4
It is possible to identify the descriptive tool adopted
by Rashdall to signify the emergence of universities in the
Middle Ages: "this descriptive tool corresponds to a definition
of a university as 'a set of institutionalized high educational
activities'. Through this kind of definition Rashdall identified,,
in the above extract,the university model-structure at a
surface and at a deeper level ("these must be obviously
particular studies"). He clearly stated that the Middle Ages
have established a complex and semantically overloaded
institutional surface for a structure, the deep level of which
►
can be identified in simpler terms. There is no doubt that
4. Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 459-460.
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Rashdall would accept that this deep structure applies equally
to the previous institutions, which historians do not accept
as universities. It is the institutional surface, however,
which gives the definition of a university structure.
There is also another level in Rashdall's conception of
universities. The reason he does not accept that Salerno was
a university is that
"it never enjoyed that reproductive
power which is so remarkable a characteristic
of Bologna and Paris."5 (my emphasis)
Rashdall showed his respect for this property of re¬
productive power by summarizing a great deal of the history
of medieval universities, as follows:
"Though each type ... was affected in its develop¬
ment by the influence of the other, Bologna ...
exerted more influence over Paris than Paris over
Bologna ... French universities - a curious fact -
are mostly children of Bologna rather than
of Paris ... Scottish universities are in certain
points more closely affiliated to
Bologna than to Paris or Oxford ... English
universities though belonging wholly to the
magisterial type and originally modelled on Paris,
constitute a separate natural order
of universities ..."6 (my emphasis)
A possible conclusion from this remark, if we combine
it with the previous ones, is that the boundaries which
have been drawn around the university model-structure by
Rashdall (and by the majority of university histories on
5. Ibid., vol. I, p. 19.
6. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 18-19.
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which Rashdall has based his work or which followed his
history) are quite weak. The conditions which seem to be
the most powerful are,in fact,of this kind: universities are
attributed their title provided that they fulfil at least one
of the following conditions: first, they are one of the two
generally accepted prototypes (Bologna and Paris); second,
they are direct imitations of them in the first period of
thirteenth and fourteenth century; and third, they are high
educational institutions, which cover a relatively large
spectrum of disciplines and which keep the institutional
surface of the prototypes or of their imitations in the later
period when 'university' had been already established as a
conceptual category.
The attitude,therefore, one can form by reading Rashdall's
work is that,although at a surface level the boundaries of a
university structure are well defined, at a deeper level it is
necessary to use diachronic transformations to define a
posteriori the prototypes. This is, in fact, not peculiar
in the social sciences, but a consequence of this a posteriori
realization is that the institutional descriptor of university
structures becomes necessarily more powerful than any other,
especially than the environmental one. Rashdall had not the
slightest hesitation in naming Bologna and Paris of the
early 13th century as 'universities' despite their complete
lack of buildings of their own. More than that, the mobility
of these institutions is realized as an important factor with
serious results in their reproductive power. Rashdall pointed
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that out starting from the situation of the university of
Paris, but, at the same time, generalizing:
"Each of the faculties and nations constituting
the university had some church or convent which was
usually borrowed for its meetings; but the place of
meeting was not invariable, and neither the
university nor its constituent bodies assembled
in a building of its own ... In this poverty lay
the real strength of the universities, upon
occasions of collision with the spiritual and
temporal authorities. If a university 'seceded'
or 'dispersed', there were no temporalities which
could be sequestreted; it took all its property -
the fees of its students - with it. Wherever
there were rooms to be hired for schools, and
churches and convents to be borrowed for congrega¬
tions, a university could soon make itself at home."''
So, the environmental descriptor is taken into account:
Rashdall identified the source of this reproductive power of
the university prototypes (which firstly was a power for
survival) as tire particular connection between the institutional
and the environmental representation of a university structure.
One could expect that, after all, it was clear in Rashdall's
mind that the process of environmentalization of the university
institutions (a process which started later) constitutes an
important reason for their deep change in character and for
the emergence of features, which were developed later and
which in many aspects would remain unexplained Isuch as the
decline of Rectorship, the emergence of Chancellorship, the
institutionalization of the built environment of the
universities, etc.).
7. Ibid., vol. I,pp.197-215.
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What is for Rashdall the central point which explains
the power of reproduction, the process of institutionalization
and all this game between the environmental and the
institutional images of the first university structures?
This point is a remarkable phenomenon of the Middle Ages :
the formation of professional guilds. Rashdall understands
the institutionalization of the first universities as a process
which is well embedded in the general process of institutiona¬
lization of the guilds. This institutionalization was a general
characteristic of the medieval times and explains the
survival of the guilds through the environmental conditions
in which they appeared. The guild is for Rashdall the core of
the very name 'university'. He rejected the idea that the
word 'universitas' means 'universitas facultatum' and pointed
out that 'university'
"means merely a number, a plurality, an aggregate
of persons. In the earliest period it is never
used absolutely. The phrase is always 'university
of scholars', 'university of masters and scholars',
'university of study' or the like."®
This realization, which refers simultaneously to both
the origin as well as the deep structure of the medieval
university prototypes, is also supported by other authors 9 .
J. K. Hyde''®, for instance, uses the same attitude (that guilds
constituted the core of medieval university structures) and
8. Ibid., vol. I, p. 5.
9. See for example Mumford's view in: L. MUMFORD, The City
in History, Penguin 1973 ( © 1961), p. 318.
10. J. K. HYDE (1972), op. cit.
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extends it to the dynamics of university structures. He
shows that the Bolognese prototype is to be explained through
a series of institutional conflicts, which finally led to the
formation of various guilds created for the mutual protection
of their members. The student guilds represented a special
kind of aggregates of persons who had in common the fact that
they did not belong to the city where they were studying.
Belonging to guilds of foreigners, they had to protect them¬
selves against the hostility of the Commune, but at the same
time they were also necessary to the city and, therefore, they
were respected by the Commune. This contradiction played a
serious role in the transformation of the first student
universities, and I shall return to it later.
If we summarize Rashdall's attitude to the nature of the
first university in Bologna, we will find that from the
arguments developed up to this point, this attitude is the
following: a university is "an aggregate of persons, taking part
in institutionalized high educational activities which have
a reproductive power". There is one point, however, which is
not clear in this definition; this is the meaning of 'high
educational activities'. Rashdall has given enough personal
views throughout his work of what such activities should mean
("there must be teachers ... and particular places will become
famous for particular studies..., for example). But this
rough idea that high educational activities are mostly
11. H. RASHDALL (1936), op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 460,
270
represented by the exchange of specialized information does not
show clearly the nature of the first universities and, more
importantly, does not explain the differences between the
prototypes of Bologna and Paris.
To illustrate this point, it is necessary to have a
clearer definition of the specialization, which was taking
place in the first universities. Rashdall describes this
specialization stating that, since educational activities
as such never disappeared since the ancient world, the dif¬
ference that Bologna made was the emergence of highly
specialized professional education, much more specialized
than in the case of the Parisian prototype. He emphasized
this point with reference to the misunderstandings about the
first universities:
"... We have been told that a university must
embrace all faculties, we have seen that many very
famous medieval universities did nothing of the
kind ... We have been told that the great
business of a university was considered to be
liberal as distinct from professional education:
we have seen that many universities were almost
exclusively occupied with professional education."12
There is an explanation of the development of profes~
sional law studies in Bologna according to Rashdall. In
Italy, although ecclesiastical education was taking place,
the educational traditions of the old Roman world were by-
no means entirely broken off. The details of internal
administration and, above all, the private relations of
native citizens continued to be regarded by Roman Law and
12. Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 4-61.
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tradition. Even in the cities of the north, dominated by
the Lombards, the old municipal pattern of life "died only
13
to rise again with renewed vitality"
Instead of taking seriously into account views which
have related this 'vitality' to the abilities of famous
teachers of the time (as Irnerius, for instance), Rashdall
indicated some particular events, which played an important
role in the development of professional education in medieval
Italy. Such events were, according to Rashdall, first, the
introduction of the Justinian Digest, not partly but as a
whole? second, a more close, more technical and more profess
sional study of the texts ( as opposed to the previous
rather philosophical study of lawl; and third, the separation
of law studies from general education, So, law became
"an element of purely professional study for a
special class of professional students and not, as
previously, a branch of rhetoric and, therefore,
an element in a liberal education."14
Finally, a consequence of all these was that a new
class of students emerged; students who were older and
more independent than the students of the time of monastic
pre-university education. As Rashdall pointed out,
"In this fact - when taken in connexion with the
lay character and high social position already
characteristic of the Italian student - we may
trace the germ of that most characteristic
institution of Bologna, the student-university. It
was from the age of Irnerius, or at least very
early in the century ushered in by his teaching,
that men of mature age - men of good birth and good
13. Ibid., vol. I, p. 96.
14. Ibid., vol. I, p. 124.
272
position - beneficed and dignified ecclesiastics
or sons of nobles flocked from the remotest parts
of Europe to the lecture-rooms of Bologna.
Connected with this change in the position of the
law-students was the rise of the law-doctor in
southern Europe to a position of marked superiority
to that of all other masters. Legal knowledge
possessed then, as it still possesses, a political
and commercial value to which no purely
speculative knowledge can pretend. No teachers
perhaps in the whole history of education had
hitherto occupied quite so high a position in
public estimation as the early doctors of Bologna;
their rise to this position marks an epoch not
only in the evolution of the university-system
but in the development of the legal profession."15
Here, the guilds, this deep structural component of
medieval universities, become for Rashdall particular sub¬
cultures . Their activity characteristics (such as their
unity for mutual protection, the professional orientation
of their education, their mutual economic relation to their
masters, which were dependant on them, and of course their
mobility) are, in fact, a sufficient background to explain
the institutional and the environmental image of the
Bolognese university prototype. Both the description of
the constitution of Bologna university, which Rashdall
analyses in great detail, as well as its environmental
characteristics (that is, the lack of stable installations
and the eventual use of public buildings and of private
houses) reflects,in Rashdall's text,the same attitude
towards the activity and group characteristics of those
students,
However, for Rashdall, there is something more. This
investigation of the social position and respect that legal
15. Ibid., vol. I, p. 125.
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education had at that time seems to be for him a powerful
apparatus to explain the reproductive power and the first
critical transformations of the Bolognese prototype.
Rasndall's attention to such changes is very characteristic,
and the concept of transformation is well incorporated in
his work. However, it is very difficult to find in his logic
any connection between these transformations and the conflicts
or contradictions, which were included in the first
university forms. It is in the work carried out by J,K, Hyde
that this logic of transformations based on conflicts seems
to take a more clear form.
I shall attempt to illustrate an example of this dif¬
ference between the two attitudes? namely, the conflict between
the real institutional character of the Bologna University
and the nature of teaching carried out in it.
Rashdall used a clear language to describe the power of
the empirically originated professional education in Bologna.
The important subject was civil lav/ and the introduction of
canon law was not of the kind that one should expect as a
direct inheritance of the theological studies of the monastic
period. Rashdall emphasized that,instead of theology what had
been introduced was canon law ('concordantia discordantium
canonum') initially tought by Gratian . Canon law studies
were based on the civil law to the extent that "everything
in the canon law was Roman which was not of directly Christian
or of Jewish origin".
16. Ibid., vol. I, p. 133.
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According to Rashdall, the influence exercised by¬
law studies over ecclesiastical education was enough to
explain the independence of the first universities from the
cathedral and the bishop, through the creation of more and
more lawer-style theologians.
However, this attitude does not explain the later
evolution of Bologna and, also, the nature of its influence
over Paris, where civil law was very quickly forbidden, as
opposed to canon law. The question of whether or not there
was an influence of the kind described by Rashdall seems
to impose an insufficient basis of investigation. It does
not take into account the internal contradictions of the
Bolognese prototype. By emphasizing the significance of the
nostalgia of the old municipal life, Rashdall seems to accept
almost exclusively a logic of positive developments.
As opposed to that, in J.K. Hyde's analysis, it is easy to
identify the lacking element of Rashdall's analysis. Hyde
stresses the conflict between the traditional interpretation
of the texts and the situation of the commune, as follows.
"A much wider problem was raised by the doctrine
contained in the texts concerning colleges, guilds,
compagnes, and other associations within the
state ... Of course, texts could be found to
justify certain types of associations, such as
religious fraternities, but what could be said of
the noble tower societies, which were electing
their own officials, exacting oaths from their
members, and passing what th^called acta,
statuta, and ordinamenta which regulated among
other things, the descent of property for their
members, a matter which should obviously have been
regulated by the public law ... The contrast
between the situation de facto and de jure became
more and more blatant. "17
17. J. HYDE (1972), op. cit., p. 92
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In fact, the institutional structure of the Bolognese
University was in an obvious contradiction with the subjects
taught in it. This contradiction or 'contrast', that Hyde
describes above can be considered as 'internal' in the
sense that it is concerned with the contents of university
teaching. Its broader meaning, however, is that the Bolognese
scholars were generally respected because they had the power
to interpret the texts in a way, which was necessary for
their guilds to survive and for the Commune to prove its
own formation as legal. In other words, this contradiction
between the original texts and their self-imposed interpretation
was used by the two institutions (the Commune and the
University of students) to establish their existence and to
develop their relationship, which for a short while was good.
The whole history, however, of the first period of the
Bolognese University is full of contradictions and conflicts
and one might well think that these.contradictions constitute
the core for the transformations of the University.
It is interesting,at this point, to mention the basic
stages of the later development of the student universities*® ,
The first student universities were institutions which
changed very rapidly. We can identify three major axes
around which the basic transformations of the first student
universities took shape. These three axes describe the
18. This subject is also discussed in: A. KQTSIOnOYAOS (1979).,
op. cit., pp. 4-3-4-7. The discussion is based on H. RASHDALL
(1936), op. cit., vol. I, and S. D'IRSAY (1935), op, cit,,
vol. r.
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changes which appeared at all three levels of our paradigm
(environmental, activity and institutional).
A first axis describes the co-optation, of university
institutions by the ecclesiastical and, later, the State
institutions. Even in the first years, the internal dif¬
ficulties in the function of student universities became
apparent. The expenses and the time all officials and
particularly the rectors should devote to university
affairs made these posts a kind of compulsory but not
desirable duty for the richer students. The problem was so
clear that limitations to leaves of absence and trips were
imposed in order to protect the university from an eventual
escape of these officials. In the 16th century, there were
no more student-rectors. They had already been replaced by
professors, obliged to state clearly their obedience to the
Chancellor of Bologna.
On the other hand, the attempts by the papal authority
to control tire student universities were clear, much earlier
than the above internal problems. According to an official
order issued by the Pope Honorius III (formerly Archdeacon of
Bologna) no doctors should be graduating from Bologna University
without the consent of the Archdeacon of Bologna. The initial
reaction to HonoriuS's order was limited probably because
the post of Bologna's Archdeacon was occupied at that time by
Gratia Aretinus, a famous professor of canon law. The official
right of the Archdeacon to intervene in university affairs had
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remained only a formality for quite a long time, because of the
power of students and the economic significance of the
University for the City of Bologna. However, the papal gesture
became the prototype for the ecclesiastical and later the
State chancellorship in the University of Bologna as well as
in all European Universities.
A second axis describes the gradual increase of the power
of professors. Moreover, it describes the internal stratifica¬
tion in their groups. Although their social status and
authority in examining the students were never questioned, their
involvement in the decision-making of the University was very
limited. However, their power increased from the time they
became economically independant from their students. The
transformation of the traditional system of collecta into
the system of salaria (.initiated not in Bologna but in other
Italian universities to compeie with Bologna by absorbing her
famous teachers) signified the beginning of the economic
dependence of universities on the city and later the State.
This transformation had also another important impact on the
stratification of the corpus of teachers. The control exercised
by the city over the university affected the selection of
teachers. Bolognese citizens were preferred against foreigners.
Gradually, the title of 'doctor' became only a formality.
Teaching was transformed only to a small fraction of doctors,
signifying the first separation of university titles from their
original professional context.
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Finally, a third axis describes the decomposition of the
original universitates, that is, of the student guilds. The
first student university was a mobile institution. Until the
middle of 13th century student universities had no studium of
their own activities. The environmental representation of the
student universities was an image of great distribution and
no institutionalization at all. It was exactly the increase of
the social attraction of universities which led to this
institutionalization. The first step was the establishment of
collegia19, sponsored by economically powerful fellow-countrymen
Bologna,historical centre




19. The most famous was the College of Spain, (Collegio di Spagna)
established in 1364 by Albornoz. See, (ed.), Bologna Centro
Storico, Edizioni Alfa 1970, p. 241.
20. Ibid., pp. 239, and 241.
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of the students. Quite rapidly, these buildings settled the
majority of university activities. Institutions
powerful and stable in locational terms were created,
minimizing one of the main sources of student power, that is,
the threat for migration.
At the same time, th© basis for the structure of student
guilds was gradually changing shape. The common origin becajne
insufficient as an attraction for forming uniyersitates, since
common problems were gradually becoming unimportant as the
co-optation of the university by the city progressed. Such a
role was to be played in the future by the common scientific
subject. Thus, what today is known as a kind of cultural
unity between teachers, students and professionals/ united
under the name of scientific specialization,replaced the
initial unity of guilds which was created by the pressure
of common problems.2l
As we have seen, the whole history of the first period
of the Bolognese University (and, also, the other student
universities of medieval Italy) is characterized by internal
conflicts, which functioned as a potential for the
fundamental transformations of the university structure.
The institutional superstructure was very heavy for the
students. The complex system of administration proved to be
contradictory in itself and failed to survive. The major of¬
ficials were powerful in formalities but weak in their ability
21. See, A. KQTEIOIIOYAOE (1979), op. cit., pp. 44-45.
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to carry out their duties. On the other hand, the conflicts
among the professors initiated their internal stratification,
and this stratification was supported by the antagonism
between Bologna and the other Italian cities. University
degrees became contradictory with their real context and new
titles occured (doctores legentes and non^-legentes) .
Even in Rashdall's words, such internal contradictions
are easily recognizable though not clearly explained. What is
also recognizable and, I believe, equally important, is the
basic contradiction between the mobility of the university and
its institutional significance and clarity. It is rather
ironical that this contradiction included the transformational
potential to make Bologna and the other Italian universities
so important and powerful that they had to be enyironmentalized
in a stable and symbolically clear manner.
Bologna,historical centre
: buildings used for




one of the later built(1563)
large university buildings.
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It is difficult to express in a formalized manner the whole
series of contradictions, anomalies and transformations, which
appeared in the first years of the students universities.
Knowing all the dangers of over-simplification j , I shall attempt
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The history of the first student University of Bologna,
as written by Rashdall and Hyde, is an example of the clarity
and comprehensiveness of the historical approach to
environmental structures. Since historians do not attempt to
solve particular problems, their description is optimally
abstracted. They have the freedom to extract general
conclusions and to criticize them through, their own ideology
as Rashdall has repeatedly done. The historical description
is also,by definition,dynamic but not necessarily contradictional,
The important point is that the real facts in the history of
the student universities can be explained through the logic of
contradictions.
It has been also shown previously that the theoretical
three-level basis can function as a satisfactory background for
integrating the contradictional logic. I do not claim thai all
the components of our linguistic paradigm have been transferred
into the previous discussion. ! This would be iuipossib IB
in a small number of pages and by examining only a
specific period of only one case. I hope, however, that both
Rashdall's text as well as Hyde's exploration into the nature
of the Bolognese University have indicated that even the most
elaborated of these components - such as the 'guild1 deep
structure of the sophisticated institutional superstructure
of the University or the inter-level antagomisms between
institutional symbolism and environmental mobility - can
express the real facts.
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CHAPTER 11,1.2
THE ACTIVITY MODELS OF UNIVERSITY PLANNING
Planning models are, by definition, orientated towards the
solution of problems. Consequently, their degree of abstraction
is lower than that of historical studies and their interest in
the environmental image of a structure is higher than in the
institutional. What, nevertheless, makes these studies
important for our discussion here Lies beyond these obvious
properties. As was repeatedly stressed previously , planning models
reflect descriptive apparatuses, explanatory logical tools or
even general paradigms to outline the subject on which action
is concentrated. I do not claim that any lack of interest of
such techniques in other levels of a structure has to be taken as
a symbol of lack of any social philosophy in them. They are
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operational by definition and they do not deal with broader
data if they cannot formulate them. This does not mean ,
however, that they should stay outside the scope of a discussion
about comprehensiveness. The unquestionable problem-solving
capacity of such planning techniques is still subject to a
question concerned with the definition of the problems they i/rfend. to solve.
Modern practice about universities, and consequently the
description of university structures through this practice,can
be considered at two quite distinct levels: first, the level
of educational decisions and,therefore, the level of
describing a university in educational or organizational terms
(such as State policies of high education, orientation of
university teaching, academic structure etc.) and the level
of implementing such decisions, which ends in designing and
building the built environment of the universities. There is
an obvious difference, however, between the new university
campuses and the already existing and stabilized urban universities,
as regards the extent to which both educational and
environmental decisions can be effective. Any possible reform
in the case of the old urban universities is necessarily limited
mainly because of economic constraints (cost of land etc.).
A consequence of this difference is that planning methods deal
predominantly with new universities, while any practice
concerned with existing urban universities is, as a rule,
circumstantial.
The descriptive tools, which are used to determine the
identity of a university for the purposes of modern practice,
205
are clearer than those used in the histories of
universities. The reason is operational. Each step of the
planning process has to be related with the previous and the
following steps and the best attitude to achieve this has been
proven to be the systemic logic of descriptively de-composing
a university structure in order to re-compose it in normative
terms. In fact, what the models of university planning try to
achieve is an analysis of the university model-structure, which
could be easily transformed into the successive steps of plan¬
ning (such as academic organization, input-output, population
and its classification, activity patterns, schedule of
accomodation, location, environmental image etc.). It is
supposed that such an hierarchization of university images
can be combined with the necessity of implementing the 1 larger'
decisions (the educational policy of the university or the
educational policy of the State), It is also supposed that such
an hierarchization can be easily expressed in the built
environment of the university.
What remains unanswered, however, is first,to what extent
such an operationally orientated re-composition results in re¬
structuring a university and not in producing artificial images
of it and second, whether the descriptive tools, which are
created in such a way, are sufficient to improve this
eventually uncomplete re—composition.
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1.2.1 THE MODEL DEVELOPED BY BULLOCK,DICKENS,AND STEADMAN
The models of university planning are numerous and
complicated 1 . In most of these models, the main tool for
bridging the gap between the institutional identity and the
environmental characteristics of a university is the analysis
of activities and, in particular, the description and prediction
of the activity patterns of the university population. A typical
example of these models is that developed by Bullock', Dickens,
and Steadman 2 .
In this chapter, I shall be dealing mainly with this
model. My argument will be that such techniques of modern
university practice are so operational that, in terms of
descriptive comprehensiveness and, therefore, in terms of
understanding the transformations of university structures,
they are of less value than the methods used by the historians.
Thus, they become, in the end, unoperational in broader terms,
that is contradictory with their own initial definition and
purpose. To illustrate more clearly this argument, I shall
1. See H. LINDE (ed,), Hochschulplanung , op. cit. , vol. 2
(Struktur- und Bedarfsplanung); also, P, JOCKUSCH, University
Campus Design, A.D./11/74, pp. 702-717 and A. KQTEIOITOYAOE
(1975), op. cit., pp. 190-214.
2. N. BULLOCK, P. DICKENS, P. STEADMAN, The use of models in
planning and the architectural design process; a theoretical
model for university planning; the modelling of day to day
activities, in: L. MARTIN and L. MARCH (eds.), Urban Space
and Structures, Cambridge University Press 1975 ( @ 1972),
pp. 97-108, 113-128, 129-158.
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close the discussion in this chapter with a brief terminological
analysis of a criticism of modern university planning included
in the work carried out by the U.C.L. - L.S.E. Joint Team on
the 'University in an Urban Environment'3 . My opinion is that,
although this study is still concentrated on the environmental
aspects of universities, it is an example of a more
comprehensive approach to university structures.
Bullock, Dickens, and Steadman's work constitutes a
contribution mostly to the techniques of typical university
planning and not to its conceptual background,which
remains mainly behaviourist. The schedule of accomodation and
the locational patterns of a university derive, after a
series of rather complex calculations, from the activity pat¬
terns, which the inhabitants of the university are supposed to
follow. These patterns refer mostly to scheduled activities
but may also include non-scheduled ones. All this happens within
an institutional contex which is pre-determined. So, the
ambition of the model goes further, to test alternative academic
policies as regards their activity and environmental
performance. As the authors expressed it, the fundamental purpose
of this work is the following:
"At a more general level the model could be used, in a
systematic series of experiments , to investigate the
effects of broadly differing types of academic policy,
of the different policies for the social and residential
organization of the university, of different characteristic
types of site layout and building form; and their impli¬
cations one for another".4
3. P. COWAN (ed.), The University in an Urban Environment,
Heinemann 1973.
4. N. BULLOCK, P. DICKENS and P. STEADMAN (1972), op. cit., p. 150.
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The two major fields, of which the model consists, are
the description of the activities of a university and the
investigation of alternative ways of organizing the physical
layout of it. The clarity, in which these descriptive levels
are represented in Bullock, Dickens and Steadman's work, is
remarkable: the activity image of the university, which
represents "the functioning of the university as an institution"
consists of two basic concepts; "who is where when" and "who
travels when from where to where". So, the combinations of
words like 'who', 'when','where' can,in the end,represent
"patterns of teaching, (...) dining and library use, (...)
activity in residential accomodation (...)" etc.5 The authors
stress, nevertheless, the distinction between those activities
which are governed by time-tables and those which are not.
The environmental image of a university is clarified by
imposing the concept of 'scale', The features which have to
be described are, therefore, classified as follows: the
siting of different elements of the university within the city ,
then the relationship between different buildings on the same
site , and finally the systematic representation of alternative
c*
forms of building and building layout.
The means of representing the activities are described
in detail by Bullock, Dickens, and Steadman in an article titled
'the modelling of day to day activities' (A re-preparation of two
5. Ibid. , p. 136.
6. Ibid., p. 117-128.
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previous papers: 'activities, space/ and location' and 'the model¬
ling of day to day activities patterns')7 . The method can be
summarized as follows: assuming (a) that students attend the
scheduled classes, lectures etc., and (b) that the proportions
of time, which a group of students (which follow a common
pattern of behaviour) spend in various activities over some
repeated period, remain the same, the authors construct what

































































Fig 6.1 'Time-budget': the proportion of
time spent in different activities by arts
and science students, for different times of
the day (A, library study; B, private study;
C, sports; D, social activities; E, town-
based activities).
7. Op. cit.
8. N. BULLOCK, P. DICKENS and P. STEADMAN (1972), The modelling of
day to day activities, op. cit., p. 137.
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In addition to this, assuming that lectures are fully at¬













The next step in Bullock, Dickens, and Steadman's model
is to assume a certain plan for the university installation, on
which the activities are to be mapped through a simulation
process. The next assumption is that activities take place in
different locations, according to a random pattern. However,
the alternatives are not infinite, as the following diagram-
indicates :
table a. Locations allowedfor different activities
Private Library Social: Sports Town-based Eating
study study talking, activities
coffee, etc.
W, Residence □ □ □
M Cafe ;! □ □





Notes: No eating facilities are provided in residence on the teaching site. All
lectures and practicals, as well as supervisions, are taught in the departments.
9. Ibid. ,p.l37,
10. This is a simplification of more complex models of recording
information for time-tables, used in practice. A general
method concerned with the production of time-tables has been
developed in: A. KQTEIOIIOYAOS (1972), op. cit.
11. Ibid'. (BULLOCK et al.), p. 139.
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The critical assumption, however, in Bullock, Dickens, and
Steadman's model comes immediately after the previous one: -the
nearest location is chosen for an activity, following the
'principle of least effort', so that the students' journeys
from one activity to another can be minimized.
The importance of this assumption is fundamental. Using
this assumption, the authors give a semantic content to th-eir
syntactic activity patterns. This assumption means in simple
words that, in the end, the semantic pluralism of space is
roughly expressed in quantitative terms according to the following
principle: in .order to move from one area to another, we will
generally follow the shortest and not the semantically important
path. Thus, the elementary deep structure at the activity level
becomes so one-dimensional that it is very near to an autonomous
spatial elementary structure, liberated from any semantic
component. I shall give an example of how this principle
may be questioned. The example is based on a preliminary
study of the master plan of Ioannina University in Greece12
and shows the applicability gap that this logic has to face,
mainly because of the fact that the central idea in it is
based on'mapping'.
12. See: K. ANTflNIOY, M. BAAAIAAOY, A. KOTLIOnOYAOZ, .
*OpYdvcoan naveTticrcnuiou ' IcoavvCvcov, "Em6. 'EpyaaT.
Ei.6. KTuptoXoyCag 12/1970 (K, ANT0NI0Y, M. VALLIADOU,
A. KOTSIOPOULOS, The Organization of Ioannina University,
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The diagram ,first,shows,the eventual existence of other
mappings apart from ' least effort1 and,also, illustrates the
applicability gap : all the mappings are intentional and
ambiguous and may have serious consequences of the kind
shown below.
So,the question of whether the principle of 'least
effort'is the right one is a pseudo-question. It is certain that
this principle can be a posteriori realized as an abstract
pattern of many environmental and activity realities. The
question concerns the mapping itself. It is difficult to
introduce such principles as design considerations without
structurally integrating them in the planning process.
This point is essential for the logic developed in our paradigm
and I shall return to it later. First, we have to complete











The following tables show the results of a simple
simulation, in which the patterns of student activities and
the location of university facilities are connected through a
'mapping' procedure:
£060
A Residence AT NDKE DI:ITANCEww
OO ©CD @©
(Fig 6.4) Location of university facilities
and patterns of students' activities: the
results of the simple simulation. Central
university site shown in heavy outline. Dots
indicate numbers of students in each
facility, for different times of the day.
Only certain town cells are visited by
students: figures give probabilities of a
given trip to town being made to that cell.
13. N. BULLOCK, P. DICKENS and P. STEADMAN (1972), op. cit., p. 141.
Bullock,Dickens and Steadman have applied their model to a more
realistic situation (taking 10% of a student population of 3,00C,
with actual buildings).As they write,however ,the underlying
assumptions about behaviour,on which their simple example was
based,have remained the same.
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(Fig.6.5)Diagrammaticpresentationoftheesultslar - cale simulationoftudentactivi esf r10%samplefuniv rsity 3000studentsinall.Thti t db ndde oted ffer ntfaciliti s, theclocksthourfday:superimpo edbl klin representthnumb rsofstudentmovingf omneacil yt next,fromneh urtimp riodhnext(tthickn ssf linebeingproportionalthnumbersfstudents).N tlec r inthomorning,econvergencetU if rlu chand dinner,laboratoryclassesa dsportithftern on,own-b s d activitiesintheevening.
oo
(Fig 6.6) Results of the large-scale simula¬
tion (compare Fig 6.5),showing the
pedestrian traffic movement on the main
university site for 3-hour periods during
the day, 8.00 a.m.-9.00 a.m., 1.00 p.m.-2.00
p.m., and 3.00 p.m.-4.00 p.m. The heavy
superimposed lines are proportional in
thickness to the numbers of students moving
along each route.
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(Fig 6.7) Results of the large-scale simula¬
tion (compare Figs 6.5 and 6.6), showing the
movement of students (by all means of trans¬
port) through the city for 3-hour periods
during the day, 8.00 a.m.-9.00 p.m., 1.00 p.m.-
2.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m.-4.00 p.m. (as in
Fig 6.6). Journeys are shown as 'bee-lines'
from the centre of one city 'cell' to
another (small circles). The thickness of
the lines is proportional to the number of
students travelling. The large circle in the
centre of the map is the main university site,
the large circle upper right is the city
centre, and the large circle lower left the
principal group of halls of residence. The
city is divided with a regular grid into half-
kilometre square grid 'cells'.
I have already stressed that a basic purpose of this
model is to make the planning decisions more understandable by
the academic policy—makers. No deterministic relationships can
be established between the requirements of a program and a
resulting physical form; nevertheless, the university administra¬
tors have something to learn about the environmental implications
of their own decisions: according to the-authors, the model is
useful for the administrators, since it can
"... give them facts and figures on a variety of
alternative plans - a kind of 'advocacy
planning' and ... enable them to exercise
their judgement on the basis of better information.
15. Ibid., pp. 146-148.
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Also ... the same information should be available
to architects and planners, for the rapid evalua¬
tion of different design proposals at an early
stage."16 (my emphasis)
This purpose outlines the framework of the discussion on
Bullock, Dickens, and Steadman's model. This model deserves
this discussion not only for its own value but also for being
representative of other similar models, which are based on the
same philosophy . Thus, the main question to answer, within
the context which the model itself outlines, refers to whether
this model fulfils the 'advocacy' function it prescribes.
There are, however, some more general questions concerning the
descriptive value of such models in the broader context of their
explanatory power and comprehensiveness. A part of such an
extended discussion has been developed previously when I referred
to the critical assumption of the model concerning the 'least
effort' principle. There are also two other questions of this
broader kind: a first question is whether the representation of
the university structure that the model promotes is of any
dynamic value. How, that is, can transformations and the potential
for them be expressed through the language of the model?
Finally, there is a third more general question: what is the
ideological background and the limita,tions of this kind of
'advocacy planning'? It is needless to say that an answer to
this question does not merely refer to the particular model but
to a more general tendency in university planning.
16. See: N.BULLOCK,P.DICKENS, Ph.STEADMAN, . Activities, space,
and location, Architectural Review, Apr. 1973.
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So,the main question first: does the model fulfil the advocacy
function it prescribes? The answer to this is generally
positive. This means that the representation of a university
at an activity level can be useful as an intermediate tool,
which facilitates the links between academic policies and
environmental images. However, it does so only to the extent
which is determined by the components of this representation,
i.e. 'who is when, where' and 'who moves when from where to where'.
Whether this constitutes a sufficient activity description of
a university structure is a question for which there is no
i
secure basis of answer, unless we consider the university
structure as a whole and in a transformational sense.
Apart from this, however, there are some problems, which
appear at the descriptive level, which the model itself
outlines. These problems derive from the fundamental assumptions
on which the model is based. The authors admit the weakness
of such assumption stating, for instance, that
"the implication that an activity is decided upon,
and then the nearest appropriate location chosen, is,
clearly an extreme simplification ... more serious
problems could arise through the effect which the
location of some facility might have on the choice
of activity . . .
So, the basic descriptive inability of the model to
express the semantic pluralism of the built space at a deep level
becomes a serious difficulty for the operational purposes of the
model itself. Apart from that, however, there are other
17. Ibid., p. 145.
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problems. One is that the amount of information about student
behaviour is more concentrated on the so-called 1 scheduled'
activities than on the 'non-scheduled' ones. In fact, one
could say at this point that one basic reason for the recent
developments in university planning models seems to be tire at¬
traction of dealing with the stock of concrete and detailed
information which the university time-tables provide. There is
no apparent reason why university planning should be more
computerized than the planning of any urban formation of the
same scale. The explanation why this happens is to be found
more in the availability of information, which is necessary to
make planning models computable, than m the necessity of
doing this.
It is possible to improve the performance of the activity
models within their own context. More realistic simulations
and less significant formulations and assumptions are not
impossible „ It is also probable that even the elanentary
activity structures, on which the whole philosophy about
universities is based, can be semantically equipped. For instance,
alternative semantic bases, more comprehensive than 'least
effort' can be introduced even within the context of a mapping
procedure. It is not necessary to produce advocacy apparatuses,
which would only represent energy saving pedestrian movements.
The importance of some routes because of their environmental
image can also be taken into account and more general
ideologies (for instance, to avoid the creation of environmental
barriers) can also be represented and mapped within the logic
of such models.
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Unfortunately, the problem is more general. Activity
models still belong to the domain of autonomous syntaxes.
The understanding of the built environment, which such models
promote, is based on the logic of relationships and on mapping.
Their problem-solving capacity cannot be transferred into the
internal dialectics of the elementary structures. They cannot
introduce planning patterns which would explain and propose at
the same time. For that reason they are loosely related to
the dynamics of the environmental structures and, even un¬
consciously, they cannot take into consideration the ideologies
they promote.
It is necessary, therefore, to discuss in more detail
the broader questions I mentioned previously. First, the
question about the transformations of universities. Since
planning deals by definition with these transformations, we
have every right to claim that a planning model of universities
could have no advocacy value if university structures
would not be able to be expressed dynamically. The problem is,
of course, what this 'dynamically' means. For Bullock, Dickens^
and Steadman it means 'the dynamics of alternatives'. They
have correctly imagined that there are some basic requirements
by a planning model, which are expressed in terms of its
ability to evaluate alternative solutions. This would enable
the real actors (planners and academics) to influence
objectively the dynamics of universities. As they stressed,
the model serves purposes of the following kind*.
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"to investigate the effects of broadly differing
types of academic policy, of different policies for
the social and residential organization of the
university, of different characteristic types of
site layout and building form; and their implica¬
tions one for another.
The authors do not deny (on the contrary, they emphasize)
that the key to estimate what happens in the university is the
appraisal of alternatives and it is not difficult to extend
this appraisal not only to a synchronic but also to a




It is obvious that the design practice does largely
follow the above logic and that Bullock, Dickens, and Steadman's
model is an honest and elaborated contribution to a kind of
'normal science' of architectural or urban decision-making,
which is based on the logic of alternatives. The following
views do not criticize the model as such but the whole logic of
the paradigm of alternatives. Yet, they are not sufficient to
18. Ibid., p. 150.
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propose an equally operational technique except in a highly
speculative and subjective manner.
The logic of alternatives is a concept central to
systemic thinking and it is contrasted to the structural
transformational logic as regards one particular point. This
point does not concern the possibility of transferring the
logic of alternatives into the logic of transformations;
alternatives may be also generically produced and a transfor¬
mational logic does not deny the possibility of including
alternative routes. Where they «re contrasted -fo each other is
in operational terms. The .systemic logic of alternatives,
aided by its simplified computability, excludes
the necessity of a generic understanding. In our case, we
do mot have to understand a university structure in transforma¬
tional terms. We simply have the models to estimate
alternative proposals. And this would be perfectly acceptable
if these models were comprehensive enough to integrate and
outline the position of the alternatives within the comprehensive
corpus of the models. In the end, as Piaget stressed, any
structural logic has to be expressed through some formulas
There is no objection that prototypes, for example, are
subject to alternative formulations or that Alexander's pat¬
terns are,in the end, selected as in any formal language.
The problem is that there must be some room for a generative
understanding; and this must happen either within the
alternatives and the process in which these alternatives are
produced or,better,within the general model itself. Bullock,
19. J. PIAGET (1968), Structuralisn , op. cit.
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Dickens, and Steadman have chosen the first way. They cannot
influence the alternatives - even those concerned with the
environmental image of the universities - and they do not
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What happens, therefore, in the case of the model we
are discussing? There are some alternative policies of
institutional nature (academic or educational). Obviously,
the language of 'when', 'where', 'who' etc. cannot deal with
who decides about such policies. There are also some
alternative environmental images borrowed from the existing
prototypes of urban formations or the already constructed
university campuses. The architects and planners provide a
list of alternatives concerning such images. However, the
activity language of the model is unable to construct even one
of these alternatives (such a construction is either
mathematically impossible, or it is empirically unacceptable).
The core of the problem is that these levels (institutional,
activity and environmental) exist independently from each
other; each one of them has its own transformational logic and
its own language of practice. Although Bullock, Dickens, and
Steadman's model provides some means to connect the surface of
such structural images, it has also two main disadvantages.
The first disadvantage is that the model does not provide
any method of connecting the transformations which appear at
these three levels. Some institutional transformations, for
instance, take place quite rapidly because of internal
contradictions. Alternatively, other transformations, which
appear at the environmental level, are caused by a tendency to
produce 'perfect architecture' of symbolic value, or others
do not take place at all because of the inertia and nan-
flexibility of the built environment,
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The second disadvantage of the model is that, even as an
autonomous description at the activity level, it does not
provide any means of explaining the transformations of
activities themselves. This happens partly because such
transformations depend upon institutional or environmental ones,
but mainly because of the assumptions and the over-simplified
language of the model. A reference, for example,(even in a
systemic way of thinking) to the relationships or to the
contradictions among the activities which the model describes
would constitute a step towards the explanation of the
transformations of the activities. However, a coherent answer
to this question would require a new attitude .towards the whole
issue of description.
Still within the context of transformations, there are
some other issues. The model seems to have some power in
explaining the 'anomalies' which occur diachronically between
the different images of university structures Cin fact, this
is the fundamental purpose it prescribes), Such a power is
implied by the process of testing alternative academic or
environmental solutions by translating them in an activity
language. However, such work needs a definition:-;of what
'correct' or 'normal' is, since, as previously mentioned, the
model does not deal with the explanation of such 'anomalies'.
Therefore, although it seems possible to identify 'anomalies'
(such as, for example, non-correspondance between an inter¬
departmental course scheme and a decentralized locational
pattern) it is difficult to 'measure' them. The only way of
doing this is by using a series of alternative prototypes which,
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for instance, would provide information about the nature of
'normal', 'A-type abnormal', 'B-type abnormal' etc. The degree
of subjectivity and arbitrariness, which is likely to be
involved in such cx method f particularly at the level of the
institutional prototypes, leads us to a final question:
what is the ideological background of the activity models
and what are the limitations of 'advocacy planning' introduced
by them?
The model is an example of a way of thinking, which
isolates a particular area, outlines some possible connections
with other areas (either in a descriptive or in a practical
sense) and develops the technical details, which describe the
area in such a way that makes it possible to serve the
prescribed connections with the other prescribed areas.
Obviously, the most important question about this is whether
such a decomposition is possible. The search for such a pos¬
sibility in the social sciences is highly ideological. It is
not secure to claim that isolations of this kind are objective,
especially since technical development of the methods which
deal with such decompositions is concerned with a 'lower' level
(like the level of activity) and depends on a higher
institutional level. The less conceptually autonomous this
technical development becomes, the more dependant on the
ideological context of the higher levels it is. In fact, there
is nothing wrong in dealing with a particular descriptor of
representing a structure, provided, however, that the language
of this descriptor is adequate to incorporate the structure
\
30?
as a whole by translating the fundamental characteristics of
the structure (such as contradictions, transformational rules
etc.) into the context of the descriptor. This means that it
should be possible, in the case of university structures,to
oC(l
identify problems of ideological character (such as alienation,
for instance) even at the level of activities ('activity bar-
rierization' in the case of the problem of alienation).
It is a basic argument of this study that to deal with
particular descriptors of a structure does not mean that we
lose the fundamental characteristics of the structure,
regardless of how complicated it is to identify these
characteristics. If we accept the opposite, we open the door
to the ideological manipulation of the 1 lower' representations
of a structure. This would be a step towards what is generally
accepted as 1 technocracy' .
Unfortunately, 'technocracy' is a controversial concept
and, moreover, it rarely describes a conscious process. The
theorists, which produce activity models, for instance, would
quite reasonably claim that such models might be technocratic
only in the case they are abused and that such models are
indeed socially meaningful in the case they succeed in promoting
the environmental expression of socially acceptable academic
patterns.
I would not disagree with such an argument provided
that there are enough guarantees to secure a coherent use of
such models (similar to the processes 1 and 2 of the previous
3/0
diagram- On the other hand,the exaggerated use of the
technocratic danger could easily lead towards what Habermas
describes as a 'life-style of protest', usually 'mixed with
exaggerated generalizations that can turn into sentiment
directed against science and technology as such'?® Fortunately
enough, I think, the activity models for university planning
seem to belong mostly to the category that Habermas calls
'decisionistic model' than to that of the more controversial
and dangerous 'technocratic model' r They rationalize choice
as such by means of calculated strategies and automatic
decision procedures"father than assuming "an immanent
necessity of technical progress, which owes its appearance of
being an independent, self-regulating process only to the way
in which social interests operate in it" or presupposing "a
continuum of rationality in the treatment of technical and
23
practical problems, which cannot in fact exist" . Although
these deojsionistic models express,to Habermas,"the assertion
of the objective necessity disclosed by the specialists over
the leaders* decisions" it is through their criticism that we
can proceed towards what Habermas calls 'expanded decisionistic
model', which incorporates "the new stage of rationalization
into the deeisionistic model". It is also through the criticism
of such models that we can reach the final stage of ' pragmatistic
20. J, HABERMAS, Toward a Rational Society, Heinemann 1972
( © 1968), p. 33.
21. Ibid., p. 63.
22. Ibid., p. 63
23. Ibid., p. 64- (see note 4 of Habermas's text, Ibid., p. 125),
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models' in which the separation between experts and policy¬
makers is replaced by a critical interaction/^
1.2.2 'THE UNIVERSITY IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT':
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
This is a study by the Joint Unit for Planning Research
\ 05
(University College London and London School of Economics/ ,
which criticizes the locational decisions made in the '50s and
'60s by the University Grants Committee. The criticism is
supported by a case study of Bedford College, University of
London. The criticism as a whole is used as a means to prove
the advantages of the urban universities.
There are two main reasons I am discussing this study
here. First, it deals with a fundamental problem of universities;
that is, their relationship with the urban forms and with the
eventual possibility of considering universities as autonomous
structures, independent from the city. Second, the study is
itself interesting as a descriptive approach, because it is
highly comprehensive and multi-dimensional. It is probably a
consequence of this comprehensiveness that the first question
about the autonomous character of universities becomes
24, Ibid., pp. 65-66,
25, P. COWAN (ed.), The University in an Urban Environment,
Heinemann 1973,
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important for the study. I am going to support briefly these
theses here, discussing this study only within a terminological
context.
Both the broadness of the urban nature of universities
as well as the large spectrum of criteria which is necessary
in order to study this nature, constitute the central arguments
of the work by the Joint Unit. First, they take the view that,
"the logic of viewing university and community
requirements as independent crumbles. When we begin
to conceive of a university as a more open insti¬
tution we realize how much its separation from the
community, both conceptually and physically, has
both precluded awareness of the possibility of
certain solutions to existing problems and has
created problems of its own."26
Second, they attempt to explain the general background
of the decisions on university location taken by the U.G.C.
by using concepts like 'paternalism' and 'economics'. Although
their criticism (because of the very subject of the study)
concerns only the locational characteristics of the universities,
which appear at the environmental level, their work can be seen
as a ' descriptive theory' , because first, it deals with university
structures ;in a holistic way and second,it refers to the
transformations of these structures.
What we are interested in. is found mainly in the second
chapter ('Concepts of the University'). The team describe two
distinct attitudes to universities; the attitudes which they
call 'conservative' and 'radical'. The components of this
26 . Ibid., p. 150.
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description are identified as "academic autonomy and certain
kinds of physical, administrative, and institutional arrangements"
Accordingly, the two versions are: For the 'conservative1:
(a) ancient, (b) autonomous, (c) collegiate, (d) dedicated to
education rather than training te) national rather than
provincial and (f) exclusive to a carefully selected group of
students. For the 'radical': (a) comparatively modern, (b)
urban, (c) the servant of the manpower needs of modern society,
(d) largely non-residential, (e) giving a rather vocational
kind of education, (f) geared to a mass rather than a highly
no
selected entry and (g) local rather than national.
Whatever objections one can have against these
descriptive bases, it is clear that all of them deal with the
consequences of the basic antithesis between 'autonomous' and
'integrated' university on the organizational and administrative
characteristics of the university. The study goes further to
identify what this background means for the activity description
of a university. They do this by dealing with the notion of
'academic community': they support the view that this notion
has been continuously promoted by the 'conservative' attitude,
"... -the group has to be such that everyone involved
can fully identify himself with it, intellectually
and emotionally from the professor to the newest
first-year student. "29
27. Ibid., p. 15,
28. Ibid., p. 15.
29. Ibid,, p. 17 (quoting K. WILKIES, Community and Identity
in Higher Education, 1968, p. 37).
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They also identify two critical issues included in this
version; a first one concerned with the activity descriptor (namely,
the population of a university - " an optimum number of students
beyond which a university cannot be a socially coherent unit")
and a second one concerned with the institutional descriptor
(namely, the social control - "within such an academic community
it becomes far less easy for the activists to fabricate a
convincing picture of class-antagonisms, with revolutionary
student-workers ranged against faculty-exploiters"50).
Continuing its explanatory task, the study examines some
implications of such distinct 1 ideologies of university education'
for locational decisions as well as for those policies which,in
turn,influence locational decisions by requiring a kind of
'symbolic physical expression' from them.
The central explanatory apparatus to move from the
'upper' to the 'lower' descriptive images of a university is
always the concept of 'academic community'. Thus, according
to the study, the U.G.C. decisions have repeatedly promoted
the establishment of such academic communities. They have done
so, in two ways; first by creating what the Unit call
'comprehensive urban campuses', and second by choosing
'beautiful cities'5* to locate the new universities. What the
study advocates is that, whatever the practical reasons set up
by the U.G.C. (such as (a) that the need to develop universities
30. Ibid. (Cowan), p. 18 (quoting B, FORD, What is a University?,
New Statesman , 24/0ct. 1969),
31. Ibid. (Cowan), p. 27.
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mainly in the largest conurbations had diminished, (b) that
the cost of urban land is high and (c) that there is a need for
large sites for the comprehensive campuses), these locational
preferences are mostly to be attributed to strong ideological
influences. As they write, "the idea of a university in
England is ... either Oxford or Cambridge or a successful
imitation of them"33. This, according to the authors, explains
partly why the idea of a university in England is mainly
'conservative1.
The problem of the relationship between university and
city has been central in many studies about the environmental
and institutional problems of universities published during
the last years. Especially interesting are those by the
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in the U.S.A. C" The
Campus and the City' , and 1 The University and the City1,33 ) .
These studies extract their conclusions from a series of case
studies. Here,we can find some of the conclusions developed
by the Joint Unit's work and, also, a series of practical
proposals concerned with a more organic connection between
universities and urban institutions.
In both these studies, however, the central point is the
same: universities have been and must be connected with or
integrated in the city. The American experience seems to be
identical to the British one as the Joint Unit describe it.
32. Ibid., p. 27.
33. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, The Campus and
the City, McGraw-Hill 1972; G. NASH (with R. PRICE and
D. WALDORF), The University and the City, McGraw-Hill 1973 .
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Their version of the conservatism of universities, as it has been
practically translated into autonomous campuses,is something
like this:
"The university was born in the city - Salerno,
Bologna, Paris, Prague. But American practice
generally has been to establish campuses in small
towns and rural areas - this practice reflected the
models of Oxford and Cambridge, the Puritan aversion
to the 'evils'of the city, the 'booster'inclinations
of small towns, and the choice of agriculturally
oriented state legislatures in placing state
colleges and universities outside the big cities.
This dominant American practice has resulted (1) in
a deficit in student places in some metropolitan
centres and (2) in a lack of widespread campus
experience in dealing with city problems until
very recent times . "34
The main interest of the study by the Carnegie Commission
is to improve the performance of existing urban universities
and colleges in order to make them able to deal with urban and
community problems. The eventual strategies to do this are
described below.
"First and foremost, the college should become
involved as an educator ...
The second major area ... is their role as
neighbor and citizen ... to rebuild and revitalize
their neighborhoods.
The third ... role ... is to provide services.
Traditionally this has meant to do research.
The fourth way ... is by serving as a model or
example for the rest of society."35
For the Commission (and especially for George Nash )
this is in fact an ideal model-structure ."The Joint Unit's view,
that "the logic of viewing university and community requirements
as independent crumbles", is here translated into a series of
34. Ibid. (1972), p. 1.
35. Ibid. (1973), pp. 2-3.
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relationships, which are essential for this necessary integration
of universities and cities.
The work carried out by the Carnegie Committee is
predominantly normative, although it is based on an empirical
descriptive approach through case studies. These case studies
"outline the methods in which institutions of higher educations
can become involved (in the city) and include both good and
bad examples of such involvement""36.
There are two ways through which this normative thinking
is expressed; either through direct proposals of administrative
character (mainly in 'The Campus and the City' ) or indirectly,
through describing the reactions or certain academics to th.e
above ideal university model-structure.
Such reactions are included in George Nash's Epilogue titled
'Background' in 'The University and the City' .37 It is interesting
to have a brief look at this 'background'. As Nash writes, in
terms of the reaction of academics,
"at least four separate positions have been taken,
and they do not necessarily conflict with each
other. They are:
1 Involvement shoulcf be increased.
2 Special types of institutions of higher educa¬
tion should be created to deal with special
types of urban problems.
3 Institutions of higher education have too many
major problems, as they are presently consti¬
tuted, to permit them to deal effectively with
36. Ibid. (1973), p. 14-3; the case studies refer to the following:
University of Chicago, Southern Illinois University, University
of California (Los Angeles), Lake College (San Antonio Texas),
Morgan State College (Baltimore, Maryland), Northeastern
University (Boston), Columbia University and Wayne State
University (Detroit).
37. Ibid. (1973), pp. 143-151.
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the problems of cities. They should put their
own houses in order first.
4 There are limits to the possible involvements of
colleges and universities in dealing with the
urban crisis - especially when it comes to
rendering services." 38
Some characteristic views advocating the above alternative
solutions are mentioned by Nash. For example, for the first
(increased involvement),
"... Traditional notions about scholarly detach¬
ment, the meaning of 'objectivity', the necessity
for a disconnection between academic thought and
social action, old ideas about how the human
learns, the retreat from the streets of the city
into the superblock campuses, the ways talent may
or should be used - all of these and more deserve
an intensive, fresh look ... The university can
no longer avoid the risks of taking positions on
the conduct and goals which it has chosen to wheel
and deal. Indeed it has no choice about this. So
long as it chooses to wheel and deal in the
maintenance and extension of its own power, it
takes risks - whether it consciously supports and
approves the status quo or not. The twilight of
an older academic era cannot be conjured away.
The sun has set. No critique of the American
university can go far in the absence of a confront¬
ation with the society in which the academic
institution is a power partner (Birenbaum, 1968,
pp. 70-71)."39
For the second (special institutions):
"Kerr commented that many academicians consider
urban and community problems too low-ranking to
be worthy of interest, while they concentrate
instead on national and international problems. He
pointed out that involvement of these urban-grant
universities in their cities would inevitably lead
to controversy:
'when you deal with urban problems, you deal with
urban controversies and with urban politics. And
so, for this university to work effectively, there
will have to be a considerable amount of public
understanding - especially understanding of the
38. Ibid., pp. 143-144.
39. Ibid., p. 145.
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distinction between service based on application of
knowledge and positions taken because of partisan
polities' (Kerr, 1968).
Consequently, there are aspects like this:
"Gerald Leinwand, chairman of the department of
Education at the Bernard M. Baruch College of the
City University of New York, argues for the crea¬
tion of colleges of public education and service,
writing in Urban Review (published by the Center
for Urban Education) in 1969. Such colleges would
replace the traditional teachers' colleges. They
would be single-purpose institutions training
professionals for public service only and would
provide education for all who want to enter public
service - professional and subprofessional alike.
Public education and service colleges would have
close ties to their communities, serving them as the
communities wanted to be served. Such institutions
would build their educational process around field
experience in an urban setting. They would also be
open to all who wish to enter."41
For the third case (internal reform):
"The university fails, says Rossman^, not because
it does research on the wrong things or because it
is afraid to get involved, but because it does a
poor job of teaching and is a poor place for people
to spend time. The university does not provide a
creative environment and is thus a poor educator.
Finally, for the fourth case Climited involvement);
"The person who is accused of suggesting that
universities retreat to the ivory tower is Jacques
Barzun, historian, university administrator, and
commentator on higher education. His critics mis¬
read his book The American University (1968) when
they claim that it is against involvement. What
40. Ibid., pp. 146-147.
41. Ibid., p. 147.
42. Former student leader of the Free Speech Movement on the Berkeley
Campus in 1964.
43. Ibid. (1973), pp. 147-148 (quoting M. ROSSMAN, On Learning and
Social Change, National Student Association).
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Barzun says is that the university as we know it
today is a delicate institution of recent creation
whose central purpose is education. Service
obligations cannot be permitted to disrupt this
central function. One of Barzun's principal themes
is that the services a university must render to
its own students and faculty simply to be able to
continue the process of education have put a
tremendous strain on the university. It cannot be
all things to all men. The faculty must devote
its primary allegiance to teaching and to students."44
The critical component in both the study by the Joint
Unit and the work carried out by the Carnegie Commission, is
their involvement in the institutional problems of the univer¬
sities, There are of course many studies which deal with
universities considered as institutions. Nevertheless, what
these two studies seem to have, at least partly, achieved is a
coherent and holistic image of universities in which the
environmental representation plays a basic role. Despite their
empiricist approach and their inadequacies in dealing with the
transformational potential of universities and the role which
internal antagonisms play in the identification of this
potential, both studies are nearer to what Habermas called
'pragmatistic models' than to the 'decisionistic' or
'technocratic' ones45.
Although our paradigm would eventually require an
explanation of universities different than that carried out
in the studies mentioned here, there is no reason to deny
their comprehensiveness .The Joint Unit's study, for instance.
44. Ibid. (NASH, 1973), p. 149.
45. See chapter 1.2.1 of this part (J. HABERMAS, Toward a
Rational Society, Heinemann 1972, © 1968).
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is comprehensive for reasons of the following kind.
The study, in every step of describing universities, is
supported by and also reflects the basic dualism between
'conservative' and 'radical' views. This dualism, although ci
does not reach the point of constituting a leading contradiction
within the institutional background of the State—university
complex, explains to some extent the dynamics of attitudes
towards university structures and justifies the criticism versus
the U.G.C. locational decisions.
Second, the study imposes the problem of the structural
autonomy and structural identity of a university and illustrates,
at an activity level, the imperative of dealing with universities
at an urban scale (through the case study of Bedford College).
Third, the study deals with the production of the
environmental prototypes of universities and the planning
procedure for this production in a broader sense:
"the university expansion in central sites provides
a unique opportunity for urban renewal."4®
It also introduces (though not clearly) a barrier-logic.
To do this, it borrows Alexander's argument that, unfortunately,
"there are obvious advantages to a planner in
treating the university and the city separately.
If they can be distinguished conceptually, for
planners it is easy to design a walled town
containing all university functions and require-
46, P. COWAN (ed.)(1973), op. cit. , p. 39.
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ments rather than trying to integrate certain
functions and services with those of the city and
foster inter-dependance." {my emphasis) ^7
-fhc
Concerning such issues, Carnegie Commission's work is
less ambitious than Joint Unit's . Yet, it provides us,
especially in the final chapter ("the University and the City"),
with a meaningful collection of alternative views concerned
with city-university interaction. An environmental and
activity question is investigated institutionally, leading to
comprehensive proposals; comprehensive because they interpret
contradictions and show routes for their resolution, a resolution
which could promote the transformation of the university
structure „ Such contradictions deal either with the
internal institutional state of universities (Rossman's view
of the poverty of university education) or with the city-
university environmental and institutional state (Birenbaum's
view of the power confrontation between university and society,
Leinwand'.s view of the fundamental antagonism between knowledge
as such and urban training institutions, or Barzun's theory
of the central educational purpose of a university and its
public and urban involvement). These contradictions are to be
resolved either by completely changing the character of the
university {making it more open in Birenbaum's view and more
efficient in Rossman's view) or by reinforcing its separatism
and identity and even producing new institutional structures
(Leinwand's 'service-colleges' ).
47. Ibid., p. 50 (quoting C. ALEXANDER, A City is not a Tree,
op. cit. ).
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In this chapter, I did not attempt to minimize the
value of the activity models by comparing them with general
and eventually less practically important theories. I simply
tried to outline the identity of all these approaches and to
study this identity through the concepts introduced in the first
part of this study. It is obvious that even pure 'decisionistic'
models as the activity ones, have an important role to play in





1.3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CH.ALEXANDER'S WORK
Christopher Alexander is undoubtedly one of the most
influential theorists in the domain of architectural design.
However, his theories have been frequently misunderstood and
underestimated, IcirgeLy because most of his critics are still
affected by the philosophy of his first ambitious work 'Notes
on the Synthesis of Form1 (1963)* v J. Dreyfus wrote quite
1. C. ALEXANDER, Notes on the Synthesis of Form, Harvard
University Press 1970 ( 0 1964). Some of the ideas developed
in the "Notes" had already appeared in a previous book with
Serge Chermayeff (C. ALEXANDER and S. CHERMAYEFF, Community
and Privacy, Penguin 1966, © 1963).
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rightly at that time that the method presented in the 1 Notes
on the Synthesis of Form' is very near to a kind of 'myth for
scientific creation'3 . It is a mistake, he wrote, to relate
the 'requirements' to the real needs. Requirements are subject
to technical increase by the economic system of a mode of
production and, therefore, the designer is obliged to classify
the requirements, starting from an existing cultural reality.
He cannot find the 'real needs'3.
It is generally accepted now that most of the arguments
presented in the 'Notes' are in fact exaggerations either in
terms of their complexity or in terms of what they try to
interpret or propose. Alexander himself realized such dis¬
advantages concerning both the complexity of his method as well
as the notion of 'requirement' itself. He wrote in the
preface of a recent (1974) edition of the 'Notes':
"... But once the book was written I discovered
that it is quite unnecessary to use such a
complicated and formal way of
getting at the independant diagrams."4 (my
emphasis)
This important remark reflects all the development of
Alexander's thinking, as this development has been expressed
mainly in the 'Pattern Language'. The attempt to produce a
pattern language for the built space gave, in my view, an answer
both to the questions of systemic complexity and exaggerated
2. J. DREYFUS , Christopher Alexander ou le mythe de la creation
scientifique, La Vie Urbaine,2/1971,pp.140-148.
3. See also the discussion on alienation in the first part of this
study (Ch. 2.4) and especially Mandel's view (E. HANDEL (1970),
op. cit.).
4. C. ALEXANDER (1964), op. cit., edition of 1974, preface.
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functionalism of the 'Notes' as well as to the question of
independent and objective 'needs', Needs have been abandoned
and the important notion of 'diagram' , firstly mentioned in
the 'Notes', has been developed towards the prototypic 'pattern'
full of semantic pluralism and cultural context.
In EAR/3 we discussed the development of Alexander's
thinking (and I repeated that discussion in the first part of thi
study5 ) as being perhaps the most clear example of the
transformation of a purely systemic thinking to a syntagmatic
structuralist one.
Unfortunately, some of Alexander's critics did not take
this development seriously into account. So, they seem to be
either suspicious or incapable of seeing beyond the 'Pattern
Language' and the 'Oregon Experiment', Peter Smith ,for
example, wrote about Alexander's concept of participation:
"Paradoxically a writer who seems to come down
heavily on the side of the community as against
the individual is Cristopher Alexander®. .. But
if 'well-formed building' can only come about by
'collective experience' then it would seem ipso
facto that an architect on his own is functionally
incapable of designing good architecture."7
Here, Smith does not refer to the nature of a pattern
language which can be collectively internalized and interpreted
As such, a pattern language does not exclude the role of the
architect, neither means automatically that architects cannot
5. Ch. 1,2.1.
6. The term "paradoxically" refers to the fact that the States is a
country supposedly dedicated to the freedom of the individual.
7. P. SMITH, Architecture and the Human Dimension,
Godwin 1979, pp. 199-200.
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use it as an apparatus, in which they can incorporate the data
they need from the community.
The 'Oregon Experiment' being an application of the
'Pattern Language' and reflecting the philosophy of the 'Timeless
Way of Building' is a collective work and represents a twelve-
year experience in dealing with patterns. As Rabeneck wrote
recently,
"the pattern language ... is a major statement
about how to overcome what is probably the key
problem in the social act of building."®
For this study here, the 'Oregon Experiment' is an
extremely important example for the following reasons. First,it
reflects a general philosophy which has much in common with
our linguistic paradigm and, moreover, extends this philosophy
to the real practice. Second, it incorporates organically a
participatory problem-solving strategy not only as such but as
a basic component of a collective 'language'. Third, it refers
to the planning of a university, being probably the first
attempt towards an aim which would be described here as a
principal future goal of applying the linguistic paradigm.
What X am going to experiment wi-Ri here is a translation of
the pattern language, which was used in the case of Oregon,
through the concepts developed in the first part of this study.
I hope that this will be both a criticism of my paradigm as
well as a review of the method developed by Alexander's team.
8. A. RABENECK, Book review in A.D. 1/79, p. 19.
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Before doing this, however, I -\&*l if it necessary first,to explore
some important steps which appear in Alexander's thinking
and are previous to the pattern language® and second,to
outline in general the method proposed by the authors for
the 'Oregon Experiment1.
a. 'Notes on the Synthesis of Form'
I believe that the 'Notes on the Synthesis of Form',
although strongly criticized for their functionalistic attitude
towards design, constitute the basic core, from which the whole
theory of patterns has been developed. On the other hand, the
'Notes' represent a revolutionary approach to the understanding
and describing artificial space, which is closely related
to what I have called linguistic paradigm. The evolution of
Alexander's theory towards the 'pattern language' does not
represent, in fact, a change in philosophy or general principles
but mainly a turn towards an approach more meaningful than the
'synthesis' in the 'Notes'.
Alexander has never tried to introduce an autonomous
syntax of space. His 'analysis' is not an attempt to identify
eventual geometrical or abstract deep elementary space structures
but an attempt to isolate the fundamental human requirements.
His basic 'diagrams' are semantically equipped by the fact that
they express the sub-sets which the designers themselves use.
9. See C. JENCKS (1973), op. cit.^p.351.
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Alexander argued in the 1 Notes' that today the design
problem is predominantly a cultural problem. His analysis
of what happened in closed societal systems is characteristic.
"The unselfconscious process has a structure that
makes it homeostatic (self-organizing) and that it,
therefore, consistently produces well-fitting
forms, even in the face of change. In other words,
in this process each failure is corrected as soon
as it occurs, and therefore, restricts the change
to one subsystem at a time, keeping the other sub¬
systems stable by the force of tradition, which
resists to needless change. So, tradition and
immediate action provide a process of solving
particular problems at a rate which is faster than
the rate at which the culture changes."10
What happens in the selfconscious process? The designer -
- the main actor here - in order to manipulate his items, gives
them shapes and names according to functional categories,
which provide no structural correspondance between the problem
and the means to solve it. Such categories are, for instance,
acoustics, circulation, accomodation etc; even 'neighbourhood'
is considered by Alexander as an inadequate mental component
of the residential planning problem. The reason of the in¬
adequacy of such categories is that such concepts simply happen
to be part of architectural usage; they do not constitute a
fundamental relationship to any particular problem under
investigation.
That 'happen' constitutes the main core of the description
of the 'selfconscious process' in Alexander's 'Notes' .
Alexander seems to accept a philosophy which argues that there
10. C. ALEXANDER (1961+), Qp. cit., p. 38.
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is an objective relationship between problem and form; that the
fitness we are looking for is somewhere hidden and our main
task is to discover it.He does not seem to be really interested
in the social origin and explanation of this 'happen'. It is
not surprising, therefore, that Alexander tried to construct
the objective problem-solving 1 diagrams\ These 'diagrams' should
be connected with 'requirements' and 'human needs', should be
loosely related to any cultural particularity of open societal
forms and would produce their semantics by themselves. They
are so elementary, Alexander argued, that they are cleaned from
any semantic interpretation, which exists in our culture. So,
the 'diagrams' become self-adaptable like those in the unself-
conscious process.
Thus, in the 'Notes' Alexander'discovered'a semantic syntax
of the artificial environment. The problem is that he eliminated
the semantic component of such a syntax. The ideology of the
unselfconscious became the leading problem-solving ideology
of the selfconscious process and led to a merely syntactic and
abstract attitude towards the elementary deep structures of
the built space.
Therefore,it was not very strange that the method proposed
for the synthesis was mainly understood as a functionalistic
dream leading towards a kind of conscious unselfconsciousness.
But a main consequence of that artificially attained
objectivity (which, nevertheless, was originated by a correctly
identified problem) was that it influenced the whole meth.od
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presented in the 'Notes'. Alexander accepted a syntax which
was semantic only in terms of intentions and not in terms of
the structure of it. It remained a 'composition' and not a
transformational syntax from the elementary to the complex and
from the institutional deep to the environmental surface.level,
So, it was also not surprising that it was this method that
was mostly attacked by Alexander's critics and it was the
first that was abandoned by Alexander himself.
b. 'a City Is Not a Tree'
The first correction of the method of the 'Notes1,
appeared in ' A City is not a Tree' (1966) 11 . Alexander
realized there some of the over-simplifications of the synthesis
proposed in the 'Notes', especially those which were un¬
suitable for urban complexes. He wrote that he himself was
mistaken in the way all the past urban designers have been,
that is, he accepted that complex urban forms correspond to
tree—structures instead of 'semi-lattice' structures.
Yet, this was a quantitative correction only. At a time
when Jacobs':? thoughts for ' organized complexity' had prepared
the ground for new ideasAlexander introduced the concept
11. C. ALEXANDER, A City Is Not a Tree, in: G. BELL and J. TYRWHITT
(eds.), Human Identity in the Urban Environment,
Penguin 1972 (taken from Design, No 206, Febr. 1966).
12. J. JACOBS, The Death and Life of Great American Cities,
Penguin 1974 ( © 1961). Jane Jacobs refers to W. Wearer's
(1958) stages of development in the history of scientific
thought : (a) ability to deal with problems of simplicity;
(b) ability to deal with problems of disorganized complexity;
and (c) ability to deal with problems of organized complexity,
that is,problems which involve dealing simultaneously with a
sizeable number of factors which are interrelated into an
organic whole (Ibid., pp. 442 - 445).
332
of 'natural' and 'artificial' order. Natural corresponds to a
semi^lattice, artificial to a tree-structure. In the 'City',
Alexander seemed to remain very near to his belief in
objectified elementary structures,stressing that the distinction,
in terms of overlapping, between tree and semi-lattice is
enough to distinguish between artificial and natural.
Alexander and his team, even later in the 'pattern
language', were subject to the attraction of this biological
approach. Although their prototypic 'pattern language' is
highly structured, more meaningful, manipulable and more human,
the references to the biological, deterministic and, in the
end, functionalistic and 'objectified' analogy are still
powerful. Alexander's metaphor remained predominantly biological
and less operationally linguistic. Here is an example from
the 'Oregon Experiment'. What for the Carnegie Commission is
the naturally evolved but
"puritan aversion to the 'evils' of the city, the
'booster' inclinations of small towns ..."-*3
for Alexander could be a search for perfection.At least,this is
what one might conclude from the example of Cambridge:
"The University of Cambridge is a perfect example
of organic order . . .: Each college is a system of
residential courts, each college has its entrance
on the street ... But while each college repeats
the same system, each one has its own unique
character ... Cambridge is a perfect example of
organic order. At each level there is a perfect
balance and harmony of parts.
13..The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1972), op. cit., p. 1.
14. C. ALEXANDER, M. SILVERSTEIN, S. ANGEL, S. ISHIKAWA, D, ABRAMS,
The Oregon Experiment, Oxford University Press 1975, pp. 11-12.
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Perfection is explained through the dynamics of the
biological metaphor:
"Where did this order come from? Of course it was
not planned; there was no master plan. And yet,
the regularity, the order, is far too profound
to have happened purely by chance. Somehow, the
combination of tacit, culture-defined agreements,
and traditional approaches to well-known problems,
insured that even when people were working separ¬
ately, they were still ... sharing the same
principles."-^
And,to make things clearer:
"We propose to solve the problem (of 'piecemeal
growth' towards 'organic order') in a way that is
almost perfectly analogous to the way in which it
is solved in nature ... When an organism grows how
is it that the millions of different cells that are
growing at various places throughout the organism
manage to form a unified whole, with as much order
in the overall structure of the organism, as in
the small parts which make it up?... Essentially,
the problem is solved by a process of diagnosis and
local repair (authors' emphasis)
The belief in the biological metaphor, that is, in the
eternal structural Order, is perhaps the most important problem
in Alexander's thinking. This heritage of the abstracted
mathematical thinking of the 'Notes' was transformed in the
'City', it ranains clear throughout the 'Pattern language' and
the 'Oregon Experiment' and it becomes almost a dogma.
This dogma is in fact contradictory with the very idea of the
shared 'patterns' . The contradiction'is clear in some parts
of the 'Oregon Experiment' where the social character of
'diagnosis' is emphasized:
15. Ibid., p. 12.
16. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
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"The principle is diagnosis: The well being of the
whole will be protected by an annual diagnosis ...
With the diagnosis constantly in front of them,
there is a good chance that people will pay more
attention to their environment, see what it is not
working properly, and invent projects to repair the
defects. " 17
It seems to me that the participatory interpretation of
'diagnosis', which is stressed in the 'Oregon Experiment',
does not exclude cases which an a posteriori observer would
realize as non-organic Cat least within the context of organic
perfection adopted for Cambridge). The problem is that,for
Alexander Cstill from the time of ' a City is not a Tree'),
organic perfection means a particular prototypic structure and
not only a diagnosis-repair process. To conclude that the
former is a natural consequence of the latter is in my view
the main danger of the biological metaphor, Alexander concludes
it from the beginning to the end. The image of a university
in the 'Oregon Experiment' is the image of a decentralized,
human, and low density university, which reflects a
particular preference ■jor some patterns .The. pattern language is
not only a means but also an imperative which aims at specific
purposes (namely those of the unselfconscious culture, which
remain well preserved in the mind of Alexander and his
colleagues), Such prefabricated structures illustrate, of
course, environmental values, which tend to disappear and, also,
are really valuable for the architectural education of the
people. We have to admit, however, that they exclude a large
17. Ibid., pp. 159 and 161,
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number of possibilities of those which a participatory pattern
language is able to offer.
c. 'a Pattern-Language'
The notion of the 'pattern language1 took its first
concrete form after the creation of the 1 Center for Environmental
Structure' at Berkeley and the publication of works like 'Atoms
of Environmental Structure' (1966-67), 'A Pattern Language
which Generates Multi-Service Centers' (1967) and 'Major
Changes in Environmental Form Required by Social and Psycholo¬
gical Demands' (196 9)*S . All these constitute a kind of
introduction to the more clarified and more practical con¬
clusions, which appeared in the trilogy 'The Timeless Way
of Building' , 'A Pattern Language' and'The Oregon Experiment'
(1975-1979 )*?
18. C. ALEXANDER and B. POYNER, The Atoms of Environmental Structure ,
(1967) in: G. T. MOORE (ed,), Emerging Methods in
Environmental Design and Planning, M.X.T. Press 1970;
C. ALEXANDER, S. ISHIKAWA, M. SILVERSTEIN, A Pattern
Language which Generates Multi-Service Centers,Center for
Env. Structure, 1967; C. ALEXANDER, Major Changes in
Environmental Form Required by Social and Psychological Demands,
ARCH+ 2/1969, H. 7, pp. 29-35.
19. C. ALEXANDER, I. FIKSDAHL-KING, S. ISHIKAWA, M. JACOBSON,
M. SILVERSTEIN, A Pattern Language , Oxford University Press
1975; C. ALEXANDER et al., The Oregon Experiment, op. cit.
Volume I of the trilogy ( The Timeless Way of Building,
to be published in October 1979) "lays the foundation of the
series. It presents a new theory of architecture, building and
planning which has, as its core, that age-old process by
which the people of a society have always pulled the order of
their world from their own being— it forms, in essence, the
basis for a new traditional post-industrial architecture,
created by people" (C. ALEXANDER et al. , The Oregon
Experiment, op. cit., jacket back page).
The 'Atoms' was an extention of the 'Notes' concerning
not only the method but also the elementary structures of the
built forms. In the 'Atoms' a richer semantic interpretation
of these structures was realized as important;''' needs' were
replaced by 'tendencies' and the tendencies constituted the
dynamic expression of the needs; they could be tested and were
more objective.
It is. in the 'Atoms' that, also, the concept of internal
antagonisms appear for the first time in order to translate
the development of the environmental structures.
Alexander again presents a strict view writing that a good
environment is that in which conflicts between tendencies
are avoided. Although he accepts the important role of these
conflicts for a piecemeal growth of the structure (by resolving
systems of interacting forces) he does not seem to accept
that an environment:-.can be in a dynamic equilibrium of
contradictions. He does not refer to concepts like the
multiple semantic pluralism of the built space, which
originates - iri such conflicts nor was he ready to accept
Vent/turi's institutionalization of contradiction and conflict
\20
in architecture (published at almost the same time ).
However, in the 'Pattern Language which Generates
Multi-Service Centers' the concept of 'pattern' takes a more
concrete form, replacing the 'diagrams', In general, the
20. R. VENTURI (1967), op. cit.
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description of 'patterns' is the following; a pattern is an
arrangement of parts in the environment, which is needed to
solve a recurrent social, psychological or technical problem,
A pattern consists of three parts; 'if','then', 'problems'.
This means that, under certain conditions (_' if' ) , a problem
may be solved through a given environmental arrangement C'then'),
All the patterns are structured within a language, which the
designer has to internalize in order to create good forms.
The patterns and the language as a whole are to be continuously
corrected and subject to cultural changes as well. The patterns
are hierarchised within this language, which takes the form of
a semi-lattice. From each pattern different built forms may
be reached according to the particularities of a given problem
and, also, to the voluntary variations initiated by the
designer
Finally, the idea." of the 'pattern language' is
extended in the 'Major Changes in Environmental Form, Required
by Social and Psychological Demands' (1969),it is applied to
the urban scale and corresponds more coherently to future
cultural changes. In the 'Major Changes' (a personal article
as opposed to the collective form of the 'Patterns' ) plan¬
ning is the design of a culture; a pattern is defined there,
as a new cultural institution. In short, such a design is
based on the pattern language but it is also supported by the
physical and political changes which are necessary in order
to provide a setting for such a new institution. Here,
Alexander returns to the discussion about 'needs', ' require-
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merits',, and 'tendencies' using certain definitions of
fundamental human needs, namely those by Leighton, Haslow
and Erickson21. Patterns are also clarified as regards
their parts; they now consist of a brief summary of the
pattern, a brief summary of the problem and a collection of
hypotheses to test the validity of the pattern .
The pattern language was developed from 1967 to'The
Oregon Experiment' (19 75) and was also elaborated in terms of
details and simplifications, which were necessary to make it
more coherent and practical. The important development,
however, from the time in which the 'pattern language' initial¬
ly appeared, was that the team at the Center for Environmental
Structure understood and elaborated the social character of
such a language. Instead of being an apparatus for good
design by trained designers, it is now understood as a means
of educating users and of initiating their participation.
This development transformed the whole method from what Jencks
calls 'parametric design' into a "mode of action for getting
things done on a practical city scale"22. In fact, Jencks's
criticism, although positive about the application of the
pattern language to a barriada settlement of Peru ("The results
were unique and radical ... they incorporated ....
traditional requirements ,,, without being historicist or
condescending ..."22 ) could not prescribe the development
of the pattern language to a user language.
21. C. ALEXANDER (1969), Major Changes etc., op. cit. p. 31.
22. C. JENCKS (1973), op. cit., p. 357.
23. Ibid., p. 357.
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There are many questions about the 'pattern language1,
especially when we do not see it as a generative Chomskian-type
parametric design24 but as a syntagmatic approach to the
description and planning of the artificial environment. Some
of these questions have been already discussed previously
especially with reference to the 'Notes' and the 'City'. I
prefer to continue this discussion by attempting at the same
time to 'translate'1 the pattern language used for the 'Oregon
Experiment' through the concepts developed in our linguistic
paradigm. It is necessary, however, to outline first the
method adopted in the 'Experiment' by Alexander's team.
1.3.2 THE 'OREGON EXPERIMENT';AN OUTLINE AND DISCUSSION
"This book is the master plan for the University
of Oregon. It also defines a process which can,
with minor modifications, be adopted as a
master plan by any community,anywhere in the world...
If the experiment takes hold, we hope that it will
be a paradigm for projects in similar
communities all over the world."25(my emphasis)
This is, in fact, an ambitious introduction. It
contains, nevertheless, some important summaries of the whole
philosophy of the team about both the nature of a pattern
2M-. The comparison is due to Jencks (Ibid., p. 357).
25. C. ALEXANDER et al. (1975), The Oregon etc., op. cit. , p. 1.
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language as well as the identity of a uniyersity. The fact
that a book, which outlines a process, is itself the master
plan illustrates the attitude of the team towards the dynamic
and social character of a design, which is based on the
learning of a language. That this process can be supposedly
applied,with minor modifications,to every community in the
world, reflects Alexander's belief in the unity of architecture
and also in the hypothesis that a method is,in the end,
invulnerable to historical or geographical conditions. It
also reflects the belief that universities are simply kinds of
communities, which are easily comparable with every community
in the world. Finally, the style of writing itself reflects
the attitude adopted by the team towards the use of this
'master plan' ; the whole book is easy to read, over-simplrfied
and full of repetitions and emphases. It is, in fact, a
book for the user
The question of what a university is,is answered within
the 1 community' context although some limitations are accepted:
"However, we must emphasize at once that we are
dealing here with a very special kind of community.
Unlike most communities, it has a single owner
(The State of Oregon), and a single, centralised
budget. This situation is not only unusual, it
is even opposite to the ideas which are actually
needed to make the way of building which we call
the timeless way, appear in society. However, we
believe that a modified version of this way of
building is possible, even under these restric¬
tions . ..
26. Ibid., p. 3.
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And, to outline in a paradigmatic comparative manner
the nature of the university, they write:
"The process will apply, in f u 1 1, to any
other community where there is a single owner, and
a single, centralized budget. This means that it
will apply, for example, to a kibbutz, a hospital,
a corporate industrial plant, a farm, a cooperative
factory, any settlement where the concept of
private property has been abolished, and any
benevolent institution run by a government for the
welfare of its citizens."27 (my emphasis)
Such communities, however, are not the really ideal
communities,
"... where people own their houses, common land and
workshops , and where there is no centralized
budget."2S
The supposed general validity of the method is not
simply an oversimplification made for the readers *- users.
It is a general Utopian philosophy which cotvwcff he accepted cXl
rV" \^ ■ l.t has, I believe, important consequences on the
whole structure of the pattern language and I will discuss
in the end of this chapter as an overall problem in the team's
thinking.
The pattern language is not the only component of the
process developed in the Oregon Experiment' . It is merely
one of the six proposed 'principles of implementation' , which
also constitute the main chapters of the book,
"We recommend that the University of Oregon, and
any other community or institution which has a
27. Ibid., p. 4.
28. Ibid., p. 4,
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single owner, and a centralized budget, adopt these
six principles to replace its conventional master
planning and conventional budgetary procedures, to
provide the administrative resources which will
guarantee people the right to design their own
places, and to set in motion the democratic pro¬
cesses which will ensure their flexible
continuation ...
1. The principle of organic order ...
2. The principle of participation ...
3..The principle of piecemeal growth ...
4. The principle of patterns...
5. The principle of diagnosis ...
6. The principle of coordination . .. "29 (my emphasis)
'Organic order', achieved through 'piecemeal growth',
underlines Alexander's past as a lover of biological perfection
and becomes a kind of super-pattern, with which all the
components of the 'pattern language' do not seem to disagree.
Although 'diagnosis' and 'coordination' are based according
to the text also on the biological paradigm, in my view
they constitute together with 'participation' the new element
in the philosophy of patterns ; that is, the social significance
of the pattern language and its dynamic survival through
participatory processes. But it is important to have a closer
look at these 'principles of implementation',
a. organic order
The analysis of the 'organic order' principle starts
with a polemic against traditional master plans, because they
"can create a totality, but not a whole. (They)
can create totalitarian order but not organic
order."30
29. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
30. Ibid., p. 10.
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It continues with a clearly expressed admiration for the
University of Cambridge (see also Chapter 1.3.1), which is
considered as the representative example of an organically
ordered university. There are also some morphological
remarks about deviations from the ideal organic orders
"Nowadays, the process of growth and development
almost never seems to manage to create this subtle
balance between the importance of the individual
parts, and the coherence of the environment as a
whole. One or the other way dominates ... In some
cases the parts take control, and the whole is lost,
... in other cases the whole is made to take control,
and the integrity of the parts is lost ."
31. Ibid., p. 13.
32. Ibid., p. 14.
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Organic order is defined, therefore, either as a
prototypic structure of a particular kind, in which there
"is a perfect balance between the needs of the
parts, and the needs of the whole,"33
or as a process towards such a structure. This means that
"planning and construction will be guided by a
process which allows the whole to emerge gradually
from local acts ... (the process) enables the
community to draw its order, not from a fixed map
of the future, but from a communal pattern language;
the process shall be administered, on behalf of the
community, by a single planning board ... the
director of planning shall have a staff ... to
guide community action."34
b. participation
The 'participation' principle is there "to guide the
process of organic (order through piecemeal) growth in a com-
munity"36. This is clear enough. However, it is clearer
to the team that
"no matter how well architects and planners plan,
or how carefully they design, they cannot by
themselves create environments that have the
variety and the order we are after."36
(my emphasis)
Unfortunately, 'The Timeless Way of Building' is not
yet available3'7 and it is difficult, therefore, to have a
33 . Ibid., p. 14.
34. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
35. Ibid., p. 38.
36 . Ibid,, p. 38,
37. August 1979.
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theoretical background which would explain this extreme
thesis. Such an attitude excludes a broader interpretation
of participation, (for instance, an infrastructural design
for continuous participation) and minimizes the value of
participation. Such a thesis does not take into account the
problem-solving origin of participation and instead of con¬
necting it, for example, with a process leading to a gradual
OO
abolition of barriers, it relates it directly to the achievement
of ' organic order1 . This 1 order' seems to have become for
the team a very important concept indeed. It is beyond
criticism.
There is no doubt that other kinds of participation
are mentioned in the 1 Oregon Experiment' . It is the final
choice of the team, however, which does not really reflect
an eventual broader understanding of this concept.
"(participation) can meaa; any process by which
the users of an environment help to shape it. The
most modest kind of participation is the kind
where the user helps to shape a building by acting
as a client for an architect. The fullest kind of
participation is the kind where users actually
build their buildings for themselves ... we advo¬
cate an intermediate kind of participation (for
the Oregon University), in which the buildings
are designed by the users and then built by
architects and contractors ... the essence of the
design is created by the users."39
A broader understanding of participation is hidden here
behind the reasons for which the team proposed this particular
kind of design participation. The first reason is concerned
38. See part I of this study (Ch, 2.4),
39. Ibid. (The Oregon etc.), p. 40.
34 6
with the educational character of participation, the creativity
involved in it, and the process of internalization of the
built environment.
"(people) need a chance to identify with the part
of the environment ...; they want some sense of
ownership, some sense of territory ... The first
reason to encourage participation, then, is that
it allows people to become involved in their
community, because it gives them some sense of
ownership, and some degree of control
(over the environment)."40 (my emphasis)
Although this reason does not reflect the team's prefer¬
ence for design participation, the second reason clearly does:
"At the University, there are countless stories of
frustrated scientists trying to describe the nature
of a laboratory to an architect. The scientists
always seem unable to communicate their needs
to the architect ... To some degree this difficulty
can be overcome by the use of the patterns from
A Pattern Language ... But there are countless
needs and subtleties that are not defined by these
patterns . (my emphasis)
So, for another time, participation becomes an apparatus
for the ideal built form, through the parameters which define
such a form? that is, the needs. This attitude, however, is
contradictory to the previously mentioned acceptance of
participation as a means for the development of a common
language for the users. Unnecessarily, in my view, they
attempt to find refuge to a hypothetical elementary unit
(the 'need') the importance of which was previously minimized
in the discussion of the same principle ('creative control
of the environment').
40. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
41. Ibid., p. 44,
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After successfully defending participation against the
pseudo-problem that "participation will create chaos because
in design and planning people don't know what they are doing"
(the answer is that the people can learn a collective 'pattern
language') the team is in real trouble in answering the fol¬
lowing pseudo-question,
"Most students, and many faculty stay at the
university for less than five years; there is,
therefore, no reason why they should design the
places in the university since, after- five years,
the actual users will no longer be the same people
as the users who made the designs."42
It is in fact the individualistic conception of
participation that makes the above question difficult to
answer ..If participation is understood, for instance, as a
broader infrastructural procedure (that is, as a procedure,
where institutional, activity, and environmental infrastructures
guarantee a continuous interaction between the users and
the artificial environment) this question does not have any
meaning. The team, however, is again obliged to go back to
the dogma. They start from a reasonable reference to the
statistical nature of needs, which unfortunately turns to a
kind of behaviourism;
"In other words, there is no way of avoiding the
fact that university buildings will be designed by
people different from the ones who end up using it
in later years. The only question is: How differ¬
ent shall they be? It seems clear that we should
choose people who are as similar as possible in
their needs and habits as the people who will
ultimately use the building ... on the housing
market, personal and individual houses are always
worth more than mass-produced houses. When you
42. Ibid., p. 45.
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buy such a house, it fits you better, not because
you are the person who created it, but simply
because a particular person created it."43
(authors' emphasis)
Thus, the team are again contradicting the idea of
creative ownership and control and presume that personal
creation is always more valuable, obviously because it
corresponds better to their ideal organic image.
After explaining the really captivating example of
design participation in the case the School of Music (captiva¬
ting, however, in the sense that the users can produce a
project if they are helped by the architects and not as regards
what this project means or will mean in the future), the team
outline the principle of 'participation' in a summarized
form. The important point in this summary is that, in the end
this summary j_s a proposal of; an institutional infrastructure
•for design participation. Detailed regulations are included,
they are analysed later (.in 'diagnosis' and 'coordination' )
and a simulated process is presented including even application
forms:
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43. Ibid., p. 48.
44. Ibid., pp. 165 and 173.
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In fact, the last principle of 'coordination' represents
precisely the administrative framework within which the whole
design procedure can take place;
"The principle of coordination is the last of the
six principles we propose. In a way, this sixth
principle summarizes the other five principles
and gives the final details of administration
required to grow an organic environment."45
c. piecemeal growth
The idea of 'piecemeal growth' is closely related to
the idea of 'organic order', and it is also based on the
biological paradigm:
"... we shall argue that piecemeal growth, like
participation, is essential to the creation of
organic order ... Any living system
(organism or environment) must repair
itself constantly in order to maintain its balance
and coordination, its quality as a whole ... In
the case of the environment, the process of growth
and repair ... is far more complex (than in the
case of an organism). Repair not only has to
conserve a pre-ordained
o r d e r ... but must also adapt continuously to
changing uses and activities at every level of
scale." (my emphasis and comments)46
According to the team's biological paradigm, the
environmental systems, being artefacts, have all the properties
of organisms plus other properties, which to some extent
contradict the biological ones. Alexander and his team do
45. Ibid., p. 169.
46. Ibid., p. 67-68.
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not seem to stress this contradiction. In fact they seem to
believe that both families of properties can or, moreover,
must exist simultaneously to serve the 1 order1 through
biologically simulated growth. The idea becomes clearer
later when they write about two distinct and opposite kinds
of development of university buildings; the 'large lump
development' and their own 'piecemeal growth'.
"In large lump development, the environment grows
in massive chunks ..., 'finished' buildings ...
assumed to have a certain finite lifetime ...
The fundamental assumption is that it is better
to be in a new building than in an old building."47
To clarify the difference, they write:
"The basic philosophical difference between the two
approaches is this: Large lump development hinges
on a view of the environment which is static and
discontinuous; piecemeal growth hinges on a view
of the environment which is dynamic and continous
... Large Lump development is based on the idea
of replacement. Piecemeal growth is based on the
idea of repair ..."^(authors' emphasis)
There is no question, of course,that what the team describe
as 'piecemeal growth' has quite obvious advantages over what
they understand as ' large lump development' . The problem is
that they refuse to explore the institutional origin of these
two types of growth and to understand that large lump develop¬
ment (or 'urban bombs', as Jencks described it 49 )is
integrated within a given mode of production and, moreover, it is
not contradictory with other modes of production. What is
47. Ibid,, p. 75.
48. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
49. C. JENCKS (.1977), op. ci.t.
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a posteriori realized as a perfect example of piecemeal growth
is usually created by 'urban bombs' dropped in the past. The
idea of the large monumental building has always been nearer
to the architecture of universities than the street in
Canterbury they mention:
As a consequence of this, the ideology of orqanic order
and participation is not enough to initiate in institutional
terms the 'piecemeal growth' they advocate. Piecemeal growth
becomes unrealistic if it is based only upon the dogma of
the 'small human scale'. Xn such a way, large buildings are
considered only as evils and the very idea of infrastructural
design and participation can be seriously damaged.
They attempt, however, to reach a more comprehensive
explanation of piecemeal growth when they write about ' slums' :
50. Comune di Bologna (ed.), Bologna Centro Storico , op. cit.,
p . 240.
51. C. ALEXANDER et al. (1975), The Oregon etc., op. cit., p. 69,
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"Parts of cities have gradually become slums for
somewhat similar reasons. The money goes into
huge development projects, in the areas where land
is cheap; old parts of the city are left to decay
... If the present policy of large lump development
continues ... it will almost certainly make parts
of the University of Oregon a slum by 1990." 52
Here is the reason for which the team hope that 'piece¬
meal growth' can be acceptable and successful: as opposed to
the 'myth' that large buildings save cost ,
"small buildings cost no more, per net usable
square foot, than large buildings. In fact, we
have found that cost of construction generally
increases with size and heightof buildings."53
It is certain that any contractor agrees with this.
Not because this argument is itself so obvious but
because 'large lump development' is more capable of using
money for environmental symbolism. And it is clear that such
a symbolism is desirable by universities and institutions
of a similar nature.
54
52. Ibid.,p.82.
53 . Ibid., p. 84.
54. J. A. VILLAR, La Universidad de Salamanca; Arte y
Tradiciones, Universidad de Salamanca 1973, p. 46.
.Saint-Joseph Hospital,Tacoma,: Washington,by Goldberg and
Associates, A.A./183,p.l01
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In fact, the attempt of the team to persuade the
university authorities and the building industry that they
should prefer piecemeal growth is not completely convincing.
They forget problems like the internal contradiction between
the alleged autonomy and the dependence of universities on
the State and on private industries as well Cor on the
latter through the former), In the end, it is not clear at
all that universities and the contractors, who build the large
lump-style buildings, are really interested in saving money.
>
The problems of use-value, exchange value, urban land-use and,
mainly, circulation of surplus value are so broad that
they cannot be answered only through this logic which advocates
ezcz
the value of low-cost buildings.
Here is the summary of the 'piecemeal growth' principle
as presented by the team in a purely financial but also
speculative language:
"The principle of piecemeal growth: The construc¬
tion undertaken in each budgetary period will be
weighted overwhelmingly toward small projects.
55. See D, HARVEY, Social Justice and the City, Arnold 1975
( © 1973), especially Ch, 6 (Urbanism and the City) pp. 283-284:
"Class and rank differentiation and patterns of mutual respect
and support, are carefully interwined in the life of the con¬
temporary metropolis. Similarly, the physical structure of the
city reflects the peculiar combination of each with each. The
symbolic downtown centre with its emphasis on prestige and status,
the fashionable neighbourhoods, the areas of public housing,
the cosy architecture of the working class or ethnic neighbourhood
within which reciprocity can flourish, the areas of residential
and commercial blight as exchange value becomes the criterion of
use in the hands of speculators and commercial operators - these
are- all tangible representations of the various modes of
economic and social integration present in contemporary
society".
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To this end, in any given budgetary period,
equal sums shall be spent on large, medium and
small building projects, so as to guarantee the
numerical predominance of very small building
increments; when funds come from outside the
community, as they do at the University of Oregon,
the government which supplies these funds must
support this principle, by earmarking funds for
large, medium and small projects in equal pro¬
portions; in the small project category, the govern¬
ment must release its funds as lump sums, without
regard for the specific details of individual
projects."56 (my emphasis)
d. the other principles
There are three other principles which together with
'organic order', 'participation' and 'piecemeal growth'
constitute the basis for the environmental development of
Oregon University. The last two, 'diagnosis' and 'co¬
ordination' , deal with the organizational arrangements,
which are necessary for the application of the method. The
remaining principle is that of 'patterns'. This is obviously
the most interesting of all and I shall deal with it in the
general discussion of the model,later in Chapter 1.3.3.
Here I shall continue and close the analysis of 'diagnosis'
and ' coordination".
'Diagnosis' is a kind of antilogue to the theses
developed by the team about 'participation'. In 'participation'
56. C. ALEXANDER et al. (1975), The Oregon etc., op. cit.,
pp. 92-93.
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they implied that only the users can form a good environment,
because
"architects and planners ... cannot by themselves
create environments that have the variety and the
order (the team) are after."57
Additionally, the users can produce a good environment
because they participate creatively and this gives them some
"sense of ownership, and some degree of control
over the environment."5®
The users know their own needs.and they can provide a good fit
between needs and environment, as opposed to professional
planners and designers59.
In the discussion of 'diagnosis', the team discover
that, even so, the future development cannot be predicted.
Thus, they
"propose to solve the problem of global order in
the university by means of a very simple process
of diagnosis and repair."
This process is supported, of course, by 'participation' and,
predominantly, by 'piecemeal growth'. It is piecemeal growth
which will guarantee that repairs are indeed possible.
Diagnosis is to be implemented through the 'pattern
language' in the process of 'piecemeal growth';
"Once a set of patterns have been adopted by the
university, it is therefore possible to look at
the environment and mark the places where the
patterns have broken down . . . "*>-*
57. Ibid., p. 38.
58. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
59. Ibid., p. 44.
60. Ibid., p. 150.
61. Ibid., p. 151.
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The team give an example of the diagnostic map for a
pattern ('positive outdoor space'):
They admit, of course, that such maps are not enough
as a diagnostic apparatus:
"... we need a composite map, summarizing the ...
pattern-maps. Such a map contains everything we
know about the state of the environment ..."63
So, they try to give an example of a composite
diagnostic map of the northwest corner of the campus:
62. Ibid., p. 152.
63. Ibid., p. 154.
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I think that there are two important points in the way
the team present the idea of 'diagnosis'. The first point is
that they realize that composite maps do not constitute a
complete diagnosis:
"If we try to derive the composite map strictly
from the pattern-maps, we shall find that some
insights for repairing the environment are 'lost'.
These insights may range from the obvious to the
profound ... The fact is that there will always be
such insights: our feelings for the life of the
environment will always outstrip the current set
of patterns. And we must be free to add these
intuitions to the diagnostic map."65 (authors'
emphasis, my emph as i s)
What happens is this: although, as we have seen (Ch. 1.3.1),
the pattern language is generated by a structural logic, tJhe
64. Ibid., p. 154.
65. Ibid., p. 156-157.
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need for simplicity transformed this logic into a systemic one.
Patterns are structured units very similar to what I called
'prototypes' but their use in the 'Oregon Experiment1 is more
or less linear. They supposedly belong to a structured
pattern language (which would indicate the difference between
elementary and complex, deep and surface, or small-scale and
large-scale) but the way they are used in the process of
diagnosis does not guarantee that the patterns of the patterns
are taken into account. So, deep (or'profound'as the team
call them) 'insights' have to be found but the process of
exploring them is purely instinctive. I shall return to this
point later.in Chapter 1.3.3,
The second important point,in the idea of 'diagnosis',
refers to the internal structure of the prototypic patterns
and the different levels of approaching them:
"John Larner ... points out that the organic
character of these towns was not the result of some
haphazard 'instinctive sense of form-correlation'.
Instead,the towns (the medieval free city-states)
emerged from a very definite planning process. The
process was built around the existence of
'decrees' and 'laws', similar to our patterns, and
a yearly review of the town by a citizens' group,
a process similar to our diagnosis ..."67
Of course, such a procedure is well known nowadays to
any professional architect. 'Laws' and 'decrees' still exist
and dominate the image of the built space. Moreover, their
66. Quoting J. LARNER, Culture and Society in Italy 1290-1420 ,
Ch. Scribner's Sons 1971.
67. Ibid. (ALEXANDER et al.), p. 158.
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application is strictly controlled. Such regulations may
produce horrifying images like the following, either because
they have never been analysed in depth or because their deep
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The patterns and the diagnosis of their existence are,
therefore, automatically subject to the criticism of the
36o
context of the patterns. Although most of the team's patterns
are more or less acceptable , the lack of a structure of them
does not give room to an effective criticism. Instead of
implonenting a linear diagnosis enriched only by instinctive
'insights', one should expect that a diagnosis based upon the
exploration of the deep or the institutional would be more
essential. There is, clear evidence that the team are aware
of this question and some information about the grammar of
their pattern vocabulary is expected to appear in the future.
I shall discuss such an eventual grammar, however, when I
deal with the pattern? themselves, in the next chapter.
'Diagnosis' and 'coordination' are expressed in their
final summary as more or less normative rules for future action
on the built environment of Oregon University. The essence
of both (as well as of all the six principles) is summarized
as follows:
"Our point is now transparent. The precise order
that emerges as a result of the gradual coordina¬
tion of hundreds of acts of piecemeal design cannot
be known in advancer it can only arise slowly out
of a community that is sharing patterns, responding
to diagnosis and taking responsibility for its
own plans and designs. A precise plan for the
University of Oregon cannot be fixed in advance.
If it is to be an open organic play, it must grow
from the hands of the community itself."68
It is quite clear thatyin the work for the 'Oregon
Experiment', Alexander had already abandoned most of his
68. Ibid., p. 187.
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initial admiration for an eventual scientific analysis of the
artificial space and the design action on it. He
abandoned this admiration in favour of or influenced by a
participatory ideology, the background of which is evident
in terms of social beliefs, regardless of how objective the
method attempts to appear. The point is, nevertheless, that
the very idea of a 'pattern language' has still a great capa¬
city for further elaboration towards a meaningful description
of the built space and, therefore, towards the practice on it.
1.3.3 THE 'OREGON EXPERIMENT'IN GENERAL AND THE PATTERNS
IN PARTICULAR THROUGH THE LINGUISTIC PARADIGM
a. patterns,principles,organic order,and problem-origin
Although in the 'Oregon Experiment' patterns are mentioned
as simply one of the principles introduced for the planning of
the University, it is clear that they constitute the heart of
this 'Experiment'. According to the authors, a pattern is
"... any general planning principle, which states
a clear problem, that may occur repeatedly in
the environment, states the range of contexts in
which this problem will occur, and gives the
general features required by all buildings or
plans which solve this problem."6®
69. Ibid., p. 101,
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According to this definition, it is not difficult to
conclude that some principles - such as 'organic order',
'piecemeal growth', and even 'participation' - are in fact
general patterns which are excluded from the list because
of their global character and significance.
They are also excluded for another reason: no criticism
of them is permitted. While the other components of the
pattern language are subject to alteration,
"until (they) properly reflect the communal
situation (of the people) and their communal
needs . " 70
there is no question about the general validity of 'organic
order' or 'piecemeal growth'.
This is the first sign of an internal structure in the
pattern language. In this language, 'organic order',
'piecemeal growth', 'participation', 'diagnosis' and 'co¬
ordination' - or, better, 'organic order' through 'piecemeal
growth' and 'participatory diagnosis and coordination'—
constitute the deeper characteristics, which are achronic







70. Ibid., p. 103,
There is little information about the rest of this
internal structure apart from a general reference to the
'Timeless Way of Building'.
"The exact definition of 'health' (for the
community life) or 'wholeness' (for the pattern
language), and the way in which these very complex
concepts can be anchored in empirical realities,
the way that many patterns coalesce to form a
pattern language, the structure of
pattern languages ... are given in The Timeless
Way of Building. " 71 (my emphasis).
It is, however, evident that, even after such elabora¬
tions (promised to appear in the ' Timeless Way'), 1 organic
order', 'piecemeal growth', etc. will definitely keep their
position at the deepest level.
In terms of our linguistic parhdigm, the set of these
basic principles (and especially the first four, as 'coordina¬
tion' simply concludes them) constitute an ideological back¬
ground for planning. Consequently, they prescribe a system of
social evaluation of an environmental structure. The meaning
of any environmental artefact passes through these concepts,
which in return re-define(through the ideology of biological
perfection) any traditional system of social evaluation. For
instance, there is no 'aesthetics' for the team nor 'com¬
municative value', unless filtered through the system which
these fundamental principles constitute.
Yet, the set of these fundamental principles has itself
an internal structure. Although there is no clear reference
71. Ibid., p. 102,
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to this structure, there are some indications of it in the
way these principles follow each other in the text, I have
already mentioned that, in my view, the 'pattern of the patterns
of the patterns' is in fact 'organic order' and that this
signifies the biological determinism of the 'Oregon Experiment' ,
'Organic order' is there as the ultimate deep, elementary,
global, multi-level Cand particularly institutional) category,
which is established for the environmental artefacts.
It is, however, misleading to concentrate all the discus¬
sion of the Oregon paradigm on the predominance of organic order.
'Organic order' as being abstract,eternal,and universal does not
have to solve any problem, as opposed to the rest of the
language which is well originated from problems and orientated
towards planning. Since 1967, when the Center for Environmental
Structure was created, the patterns included a large number
of definitions of problems and intended to solve them. In the
end,of course,all these solutions, even through complex routes,
refer to the restoration of organic order. Nevertheless, since
'patterns' derived from Alexander's initial 'diagrams', both
their reference to the mother-principle as well as their
problem-solving structural synthesis are well explained. We
have to admit that this is a fundamental contribution of both
the 'Pattern Language' and the 'Oregon Experiment' to a better
understanding of the dialectics of simultaneously 'explain'
72
and 'propose'. The dual character of description becomes a
72. See Ch. 2.4.4 (the formal expression of the alienation-
-participation modifier) for an example of this logic.
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A problem not only exists at the deep elementary
level but it is also described in terms of a whole 'problematic'
procedure from the deep-elementary to the surface-complex .
It is expected, therefore, that the transformational rules
would also reflect this procedure in a similar manner as we











. States wh^re the effects of the
Jn;prpblem" ARE NOT PRESENT
-Roles wtna+ decrease










fcTmH, WHERE THE EFFECTS OF
-THE "PROBLEM" ARE PRESENT
X
366
The diagonal is what for Alexander is defined as
organic order or, in a transformational sense, "the set of
logical orders the state of which is a state of organic
equilibrium". The question concerns the universality, stability
and even the existence of this diagonal 73:
This means that a procedure towards the solution of a
problem may well establish different 'diagrams' from the
elementary to the complex by using areas of the repertoire
of intermediate order structures where the effect of some rules
is exaggerated. It is very inflexible, for example, to under¬
stand a procedure towards the abolition of very complex urban
barriers as a series of consecutive de-barrierized intermediate
structures. 'Sometimes complicated infrastructural policies
are necessary, so that the whole image of the 'synthesis' can
be much more elaborated than what the 'normal' diagonal
indicates.
The philosophy of organic order exaggerates, in my view,
the importance of this diagonal of biologically 'normal'
73. This discussion constitutes an important contribution of the
"Oregon Experiment" to the paradigm of the present study.
structures. Furthermore, it eliminates the importance of the
notion of problem. This philosophy cannot incorporate, for
instance, problems which appear historically but the solution
of which is well outside organic order. Ambiguity of form,
for instance, as a pattern which can solve the problem of the
inhuman purism of built forms cannot be explained through
this logic of the diagonal. In fact, such a pattern represents
a 'diagram', which in Alexander's view would be inorganic and
illogical;
To.
"diagram'' representing THE PROBLEM;
PRODUCED BV EXAGGERATED USE OF THE
Tb ROLE IN SteciFIG HISTORICAL
CONDITIDliS.
EQUILIBRIUM AXIS : "ORGANIG ORDER.".
CONTRAST WHICH REPRESENTS
CHARACTERISTICS OFTHE SySTEM OF♦ 11_ rsio i i_yr j n»- u / sit |vi vi
"diagram' representing Social evaluation^terns a
THE ABSENCE OF THE \IN WHICH A PPOBL^M IS IDENTIFIED)
PRORiEM L PPCPUCEJ)
p-y £xaggeratex> u^e
OF T+»& Ttt RULEyTUSTiFiQ)
BY A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL
EVALUATION AT A GIVEN TIME.
The above diagonal, that is the "set of structures
which are in a state of dynamic equilibrium", is only one way
of understanding organic order in transformational terms.
This way refers to the chain from the complex to the elementary
and vice-versa. The other way is to understand organic order
and the problem-solving procedure which is related to it, in
terms of the deepness chain:
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Therefore, the other version of Alexander's 'analysis'
is that we proceed from the surface-environmental to the
deep-environraental-iactivity-institutional. In such a version,
'synthesis' and'diagrams' signify the reverse route.
The 'patterns' have modified and simplified this process
stating that the analysis of the problem and the synthesis
should concentrate on the prototypic intermediate level of
patterns.
o
That is, the analysis identifies patterns which should
exist mainly by abstracting an existing environmental surface
structure. The analysis does the same by using other
routes; for example, by explaining,at a prototypic level,the
inability of existing regulations to correct the built
environment.
The 'diagram' or synthesis is a complex dynamic procedure
the rules of which, however, are pre-defined and generated by
3<S9
the philosophy of organic order and the way it is structured
through the four other principles:
So, the team provide the users and professionals both
with a set of rules which constitute the deep structure of
the whole synthesis (regardless of how such rules are applied
to particular situations) as well as with a central idea
about the vocabulary that the design will follow. This idea
is so central that it definitely belongs to what we under¬
stand as deep environmental-activity-institutional structure.
The identification of the problems does not proceed
beyond the intermediate prototypic level except in some
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very special cases, where new patterns have to be introduced
but only
"on the basis of explicitly stated observations
and experiments."74
The team, however, do not exclude the possibility
that, after a reasonable time and when the whole process is
perfectly internalized by the community, the analysis will
proceed to deeper levels:
"it is essential that the set of patterns be
continually improved. This happens naturally
when the community understands the tentative
nature of patterns, and takes an open minded,
experimental attitude toward them"75
Until now, we discussed the formulation of problems in
terms of the structural analysis and the synthesis suggested
for the solution of them. We also discussed the dominant
position that the concept of ' organic order1 keeps in such
processes. There are, however, some other aspects, in which
the exploration of the 'Oregon Experiment' through our linguistic
paradigm is especially interested. Such aspects concern the
following.
First, the patterns themselves as prototypes and moreover,
the structure of the patterns as regards university planning*
Second, the dynamics of university structures and,
mainly,the logic of understanding these dynamics,as this logic
74. Ibid. (ALEXANDER et al.), p. 141.
75. Ibid., p. 141.
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is expressed in the 'Oregon Experiment'. Our question here is
to what extent this logic is based upon the exploration of
contradictions which are included in a university structure
and which serve as potential for the transformation of it.
There are some questions,finally/ about the whole
ideological background of the pattern language as it is applied
to the Oregon Experiment. The answer to such questions deals
again with the problem of the biological paradigm but it also
refers to some aspects of the problem of participatory strategies
and of the nature of a 'modified' description in general. Un¬
fortunately, it is not possible to discuss here all these aspects
of the 'Oregon Experiment' to the extent they deserve it. So, I
shall proceed to a rather brief account of these questions and
of some eventual directions for further research (especially
concerned with the patterns).
b. the general character of patterns
The set of patterns, proposed to initiate the 'correction'
or 'repair' procedure for the Eugene Campus of the Oregon
University76, is undoubtedly the core of the team's idea
about what a University is. There is an attempt at the
76. "The University of Oregon has about 15.000 students and
3.300 faculty and staff (1973). It occupies a site on the
outskirts of Eugene, a small town with about 84-. 000 inhabitants.
The University was founded in the mid-nineteenth century. For
most of its life it has had a few thousand students; only
during the last 10 years have there been more than 10.000
students" Clbid., pp. 1-2).
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beginning of the book to minimize the particularity of a
university ("... the process will apply in full to any other
community where there is a single contralized budget...") but
the development of very specific patterns, especially designed
for a university does not justify the attempt. The pattern
language becomes, in fact, a pattern dialect for university
description and planning. Not only tjfre -Jew cf the patterns
included in the 'Pattern Language' selected for the
'Oregon Experiment' but also new very specialized ones are
invented in order to outline this dialect more clearly. This
selection is sincere, characteristic, and very convincing.
Moreover, it constitutes a worked e*awip(t of evidence, ac^odnst dffHticles
like the 'unity of architecture',
First, the team mention the need of a dialect for a
community in general;
"... We imagine that every community which hopes
to adopt a common pattern language will
find it easiest to start with the second volume of
this series: A Pattern Language. Of course
not all of its 250 patterns will apply:
many may be inappropriate, some may be wrong."77
(my emphasis).
Second, they define some way of constructing such a
dialect:
"... the 250 patterns (of the 'Pattern Language')
... are independent; that is, they make sense one
at a time; any collection of them makes sense ..."7®
Although this is an exaggeration (as we shall see, some
patterns are 1 global' and some others are very deep as op-
77 . Ibid., p. 103.
78. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
373
posed to surface ones) the patterns can be considered as in¬
dependent, especially because they are orientated towards the
solution of supposedly independent problems. So, if not all,
at least some collections of them make sense, although these
collections contain structured lexical items rather than
independent units. So,
"... it is possible to add any number of other,
newly invented patterns to such a collection, and
it will still make sense. This is, in fact, how
we propose that a community should start to
develop a pattern language for itself.
The term 'community' here, as a generator of a pattern-
dialect, has a serious epistemological importance for architecture.
The team seem to use this term in the ad hoc interpretation
of it (that is, any set of persons who live in an environment,
conceivable as a unity under a certain institutional state) as well
as in the interpretation which stresses the institutional image
of a community (the.team do this when selecting the
additional patterns of the language). For them it is the latter
which is clearer than the former, although they don't seem
to identify the essential difference between the two:
"Let us now take the University of Oregon, as an
example (although it is not just an example). When
we look through A Pattern Language, we find that
about 200 of the 250 patterns are relevant to
the university community (mixture of the two in¬
terpretations) . About 160 of these 200 deal with
building interiors, rooms, gardens, and building
construction. These 160 patterns are very
important indeed but, since they do not deal with
global problems which affect everyone, it seems
better not to adopt them formally, but instead,
to treat them as patterns which every user group
79. Ibid., p» 104.
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might use or not use, according to their own
instincts, when they design their projects
(that is they are still relevant for communities
in general). However, 37 of these 200 patterns
relevant to the university (now, the institutional
image becomes predominant) are so large in scale
that individual projects will not be able to
complete them - and they will only appear at all
if many different individual projects help to
create them, in cooperation (a different basis
for 'dialects' appear; that is, 'not very large
scale'). For this, of course, there must be
university-wide agreement about these patterns.
These 37 patterns must therefore be formally con¬
sidered by the planning board, adopted on behalf
of the university community, and then, in some
fashion, backed by incentives so that individual




















(my emphasis, my comments
SHIELDED PARKING
PATHS AND GOALS


















But the real evidence of a pre-fabricated understanding
of a university as an institution .comes immediately after
mentioning the above 37 patterns:
"This list of 37 patterns is extremely general: It
deals with problems of density, buildings, open
space, roads, and paths. It does not deal with
the specific problems that a university
confronts. And yet, of course, these special
university problems are as vital to the well
80. Ibid., p. 105.
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being of the environment as the more general
ones. It just happens that A Pattern Language
does not deal with them,precisely because they are
too special, too detailed, too local to be included
there."®-' (my emphasis).
This is not entirely true and it is important that it
is not. Some of the patterns which are proposed for univer¬
sity structures are indeed special and detailed as the team
present them. However,some others(like 'open university',
'university population' or 'university shape and diameter')
are very general as regards their scale and deepness but also
very special as regards their reference to a particular
institution. Nevertheless, the team conclude as follows:
"We (that is, the team of professionals) have,
therefore, derived 18 special patterns to solve
those more specific problems which are peculiar
to universities. Every particular community will
always need to do the same to supplement the













(my comment in parenthesis)
An important conclusion from the above 'discussion' with
the team is that the ad.ln.cc character of a community can indeed
function as a generator of a 'pattern-dialect', in which some
lexical items are emphasized or idiomatically coloured.lt would not
81. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
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be entirely correct, however, to call such constructions
'languages'. Specific 'pattern-languages' seem to correspond
better to institutional categories than to the communities
to which they are addressed. 'Home' , 'university', 'city' or
'classroom', for example can function as generators of languages
(with their own sets of lexical items) as opposed to ad. kioc
communities, the members of which can either generate dialects
of such languages or incorporate such dialects in their own
general dialect of the built space.
A pattern language for a university cannot have the
broadness of a general language of the artificial environment.
Although the Oregon team seem to advocate the opposite, it is
clear that the lexical items they use for the 'Oregon Experiment'
are either completely new or severely differentiated from their
initial form in the general pattern language. There is nothing
like 'open university' , for instance, in the understanding of
a city and, even if it is, the degree of abstraction, which
is necessary in order to obtain a common deep meaning, is so high
that this meaning becomes achronical and not particularly
useful.
I think that, as regards this question, the 'Oregon
Experiment' shows that it is necessary to understand a building-
type category (and to construct a pattern language relevant to
it) within the context of its own institutional identity.
This is clearly shown, although the team seem to have advocated
the reverse route. The ideas, which are developed in the
'Oregon Experiment', do not seem to oppose the fact that, in
the long term, the construction of a General Pattern Language
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is a process which has to be based more on the analysis of the
prototypic patterns,as they derive from institutional categories
through history,and less on prefabricated imperatives regard¬
less of how reasonable such imperatives are.It is essential,
however to discuss the patterns themselves in order,first,to present
evidence for the above arguments and,second,to explore
how a university is described in terms of such a particular
pattern language.
c. the patterns in detail
c 1 ., the nature of the patterns
The list of patterns which, according to the team, are
sufficient to describe a university structure contains 55
patterns in all. 37 of them are considered as 'general' and of
'large scale' and the rest 18 are the particular patterns,
which, are 'special to the University of Oregon'. The attempt
of the team is to form a ' single coherent list' , by integrating
the two categories. Moreover, they choose a shorter list
of 32 patterns (14+18) in order
"to show the rough scope and content of this
list (the complete one), and what the University
gains by adopting this list formally, as the
backbone of its planning process."83
It is difficult to discuss here all the patterns in
detail. The information we need about these patterns can
83. Ibid., p. 107.
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be presented through a simple taxonomy of them. This taxonomy
is based on the characteristics of a semantic syntax, as such a
syntax was developed in the first part of this study.
According to the team,
"(a pattern is) a statement of some general
planning principle ... which states a clear
problem that may occur repeatedly in the environ¬
ment, states the range of contexts in which this
problem will occur, and gives the general
features required by all buildings
or plans which solve the problem."84
(my emphasis)
According to this definition a pattern has a large
spectrum of interpretations. This spectrum appears, in fact,
in the analytical description of each one pattern of those
adopted for the 'Oregon Experiment' ,
First, a pattern represents a prototypic structure,
which is given as a solution to a problem defined at the same
prototypic level:
Because it belongs to the abstract prototypic
level, a pattern can produce a set of possible alternative
solutions at the surface levels of the physical environment
84. Ibid., pp. 101-102; see also, C. ALEXANDER et al, A Pattern
Language, op, cit.
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and the activities. It is also expected , of course, that
all these alternatives correspond to the protoirypic pattern.
This is clear in the team's definition of the pattern (."the
general features required by all buildings").
To secure, however, that this reproduction will be
successful, the team introduce a second interpretation of a
pattern, which is much nearer to the initial Alexander's
concept of 1 diagram' :
=0
The DESCRIPTION OF THE "PROBLEM"
ifueoRPORfntS THE pROCEWRE
THRCUCW vMlOf THE PR.O0LEM HAS
BEEN CRBft7E£> ■
■And scn^sts a new proalem-
-solrme, pattern not only as
f\ protot/plc blt also
a5 a process to ac4ncve it.
THIS PROCESS CONCERNS SOT*
Roles CF CjETT/bGi reou THE.
ELEMENTARY TO THE COMPLEXWELV.
/|S ROLES OF QETT'MCj FROM TH£
PROTOTYPE TO THE SURFACE#}.
PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE >s ATTRIBUTED
TO INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AMD
RtOULATlDNS WHICH SUPPORT .
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "PLAN"^.
So, a 'pattern' outlines also the process which is
necessary for implementing the prototype introduced by it.
This interpretation is indirectly implied by the team, when
they write about "the general features required by all ....
plans".
In reality, the deep characteristics of the institutional
regulations, which will support the implementation of plans,
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are summarized in some of the basic principles ('participation',
'diagnosis' and 'coordination') and are given as a set of
imperatives. On the other hand, some of the deep characteristics
of the prototypic images implied by the patterns are also
summarized in the other two basic principles (' organic order'
and 'piecemeal growth') and are also given as a set of impera¬
tives. So, the pattern-language is in fact a language which
contains lexical items ('patterns') some basic rules for its
grammar ('participation' ere.) and some highly abstracted
syntagms ('organic growth' etc.) which function as criteria
of correctness in order to evaluate the numerous syntagms
which may be produced by the 'patterns', Finally, the patterns
are, in fact, composite lexical items and not atoms. They
contain the rules of their development and the explanation of
their problem origin as well.
c2. a taxonomy of the patterns
Although the prototypic character of patterns has been
already emphasized, in reality they appear to be more complex
and diversified than the general definition of 'prototype'
would imply. Studying the thirty—two patterns approved for
the 'Oregon Experiment', we find no relation between, for
instance, 'open university' and 'real learning in cafes' as far
as scale and deepness is concerned. On the other hand, we can
discover that, because of their generality and deepness, some
of the patterns prescribe situations which appear in other
patterns at a surface level.
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There is no doubt that most of these questions
Should be c*r>sw&recL in the 1 Timeless Way of Building' .
There is also no doubt that some of them are answered in the
'Pattern Language'. For example, the total set of the pat¬
terns in the 'Pattern Language' ('a network used as a sequence'85)
is hierarchized in terms of scale. Moreover, it is hierarchized
in terms of a hypotherical design procedure (a 'sequence').
There are also some thoughts about an overall super-surface
use of the pattern language ('The poetry of the language')88.
It is essential, however, to discuss all these questions as
they occur in the language of the 'Oregon Experiment'. I shall
proceed towards a taxonomy of the Oregon patterns, according










In the above diagrams : (initially developed in Ch.I,
2.4.4)it is possible to identify some criteria for a taxonomy
of the Oregon patterns. To make this taxonomy simpler, I
shall express these criteria in the form of four linear axes,
where: 1 stands for "complexity axis' containing 'low complexity'
(LC) and 'high complexity' (HC); 2 stands for 'scale axis'
containing 'small scale' (SS), 'building scale' (BS), and
'large scale' (LS); 3 stands for 'deepness axis' containing
'surface level' (S), 'prototypic level' (P), and 'deep level'
(D); and, finally, 4 stands for 'substance or descriptive
axis' containing 'environmental description' (E), 'activity
description' (A), and 'institutional description' (I).
It is essential to note that such a taxonomy does not
give sufficient information about the university model-structure
as the Oregon team understand this structure. It is important
to re-compose the classified patterns according to the structure
of the linguistic paradigm as this structure is expressed by all
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the characteristics of the above diagraims . This is not an
easy task and I shall only attempt to give some rules and to
illustrate some examples of such a re-composition.
The classification of the Oregon patterns according to
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The above taxonomy can be directly transferred to the
basic diagrams of our linguistic paradigm, as follows
(circled are the patterns which, according to the team,are
specific for -universities):
87. Classification based on the description of the patterns
of the "Oregon Experiment", pp. 108-135.
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The method presented in the 'Oregon Experiment1 is a
method for planning. There are two aspects, however, through
which this planning method presents a descriptive image of a
university. The first aspect concerns the dominant idea of
an 1 organically grown university' as this idea is transformed
to the model-structure of the ideal university, towards which
the whole of the planning process is orientated.
The second aspect concerns the detailed description which
every pattern contains,either in terms of identifying particular
problems of universities or in terms of giving examples of
good solutions to these problems.
To what extent the previous analysis and classification
of the patterns help in structuring all the above descriptive
aspects of the language used in the Oregon Experiment, is a
question which cannot be apparently answered by the information
available through the patterns themselves and through this
simple classification. What is needed is a further elaboration
of this simplified surface structure, a structure which implies
the Oregon team's conception of the ideal university. I shall
give some examples of an elaboration of this kind; first,
however, it is necessary to make some comments on the clas¬
sification itself.
There are some crucial over-simplifications in this
classification of the patterns. First, the complexity and
deepness chains are presented as equally discontinuous as the
substance and disciplinary ones. Although/in the end,it is
possible to accept that there are distinct orders of complexity
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and clear deepness levels, their eventual number and overlappings
are far more complex than simplifications of the kind Clow -
high complexity' and 1 surface - prototype *- deep level' , which
are included in the classification. This is one reason for
which there is a certain degree of ambiguity in classifying
some patterns. Second, the patterns themselves, as developed
in the 'Oregon Experiment'®® , are not clear In structural terms
(although they are very clear as design imperatives). Take an
example, the 'fabric of departments' (no.
"over-emphasis on the indi¬
viduality of departments
helps to fragment knowledge
by keeping it in watertight
compartments. Yet each de¬
partment does require its
own indentity. .
Therefore: Give each depart¬
ment a clearly identified home
base, but spread the parts of
the department! within a radius
of 500 feet,! so tnat they
interlock with the parts of
other departments. |No one
of these parts should contain



















This lack of clarity does not constitute,, of course,
a problem which derives from the planning directives proposed
by the team. It is merely a problem which derives from our
intention to match these directives by using our paradigm.
Yet, it is not a problem included in the paradigm, since most
88. There is a further analysis of the patterns in the "Pattern
Language" which, however, does not alter such ambiguities.
89. C. ALEXANDER et al. (1975), The Oregon etc., op. cit., p. 116.
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of the elementary descriptive and planning syntagms developed
by the team are explainable through the paradigm. The dif¬
ference is a matter of complexity and, eventually, of different
catalysts.
c3. elaboration of the taxonomy I:general features
Now, what is the possible further elaboration of the
previously developed classification? Such an elaboration
tries to ideO"H/y the model-structure of a university, as
the Oregon team expresses it through the 'pattern language'.
The surface of this model-structure has been already
presented in the previous diagram,where the patterns
used in the 'Oregon Experiment' have been classified according
to the characteristic chains of our linguistic paradigm.
To make this surface structure clearer, it is necessary to
replace the numbers of the patterns by their analytical
description and the examples which support this description
3.1 two
languages
This surface structure consists of two overlapping sets
of patterns; so, it is composed by two overlapping structures,
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This raises an interesting question about the distribution
of these patterns in the whole of the surface structure
presented by the model. Such an elaboration will prove, I
think, that the argument, according to which the patterns
proposed for universities are 'specific and detailed* is not
entirely correct. It is characteristic that the fundamental
elementary, deep and institutional large-scale patterns are
all 'specific and detailed' . No. general patterns belong to
that level:
-? "oMlVEftitTV POPULATION" ([. Ev OVERALL SIZE)
> I'OPEN UNIV'ERSlTy"fI,EVDEEP INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER."}
> ''FflRftlC. OF OEPAR.TMENTS"C I.E..,THE INSTITUTIONAL,
AGTivrrv AND ENVIRONMENTAL STRUCTURE OFn
"THE UNIVERSITY IN TERMS OF ITS CCM BdnentS) 1
On the other hand, most of the highly complex
environmental and activity patterns of the medium scale
belong to the general pattern language:
"NJINE percent PARKING."
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Although, as mentioned, there are many problems in
classifying the patterns, it is rather clear that the overall
image of the university, as presented by the 'specific' patterns,
is unique and not supported by any general urban images. On the
contrary, most of the really detailed patterns are of general
value and have nothing to do with universities in particular.
If we remember the general philosophy of the team (as it
is expressed through concepts and principles like 'organic order1,
piecemeal growth' , "human scale' , etc.) this is not surprising.
Such concepts and principles have little to offer to the overall
conception of a university and are mainly translated into
prototypes of the intermediate and small scale (mostly borrowed
from the vernacular or historical tradition). In fact, the
team are not interested in large scale general patterns, since
they strongly advocate the idea that nobody can prescribe them;
such general patterns are to emerge in time through successive
local and small steps. What is certain, however, is that
instead of a general pattern language equipped with ' very
specific university patterns' , we have, in the end^a general
pattern language of the small scale, equipped with certain
specific and detailed (but only as regards their specific
institutional origin) large-scale patterns.
This remark could easily lead to an interesting discussion
concerning the unity of architecture. For instance, a question
which has to be answered in such a discussion deals with the
identity of those detailed patterns, which would be generated
by the general patterns especially designed for university
3 91
institutions. To some extent, the above question signifies
the internal difficulty of environmental thinking to bridge
the gaps between the well established disciplines■of urbanism,
architecture and small scale design (mentioned in Ch. 1,2.4.4,
c3 ) . Within the context of such a difficulty it is .not
surprising that different prototypic images are used for each
discipline. Such difficulties, however, are also connected
with the transformational rules included in each discipline.
This matter will be discussed later in this chapter.
3.2 densi- The distribution of the patterns in the particular
ty and
complete-levels which our linguistic paradigm has introduced, can
ness
be seen also from different point of view; that is, from
the point of view of density. It is normally expected that
deeper patterns are less in number than surface ones. The
reason is that a variety of alternative surface structures
may derive from only one deeper structure. The same also
happens in terms of complexity (always within a disciplinary
area); that is, a variety of complex structures may derive






The existence of such tree distributions is essential
in a pattern language in order to give to the users or to
the professionals all the possible richness of information,
which is necessary in order to understand the meaning of a
deep structure. Such a distribution is only partially
present in the ' Oregon ExperimentThis means that instead












our analysis of the patterns of the 1 Oregon Experiment'








Some attributes of this distribution are the following:
first, almost half of the patterns belong to the area, which






The philosophy behind the 'pseudo-levels' was that when
we move from the surface to the deep it is in fact impossible
to separate the substance or descriptive characteristics and
to classify them into categories like environmental, activity
or institutional. Prototypes consist of both environmental
and activity images interrelated in a coherent representation;
deep structures, on the other hand, cannot isolate the
institutional characteristics as well.
Thus, when we deal with 'deep environmental structures'
and we describe them in terms of environmental elements only,
we hide some aspects of them, which are inevitably incorporated
in the deep meaning of such structures. However, for practical
purposes and for making the vocabulary of patterns more con¬
nected with the images of the users, such a 'hiding' is
justifiable, provided that the rules which connect those
'pseudo-levels' with the real ones, are well known to the
3?4
authors of the vocabulary and also provided that there are
other real lexical items, which support in a complete manner
the idea presented by the pseudo-levels. We have to admit
that such conditions are usually satisfied in the 'Oregon
Experiment'. For instance pattern (4) ('university shape
and diameter')is classified as a low-complexity ,large-scale,
deep,activity-and-environmental pattern after the description
given in the text by the team (there are some ambiguities
about the deepness position of this pattern but the same
happens with all the patterns ) :
UNIVERSITY SHAPE & DIAMETER
"When a university is too spread
out, ["people cannot make use of f
all it offers]: on the other hand
[a~diameter for the university /-E-A




evenly distributed, within a
—{> No prototypic
neither surface level
circular zone no more than 3000 although there are
feet in diameter. Place non-
class activities such as
athletic fields, research
offices, administration within
a wider circle, no more than






identity of an auto¬
nomous self-containing
system is hidden
However, if we relate pattern (T) to patterns (l), (2), 6~2),
which belong to the D, I, LC, LS level, the central idea
becomes clear:
90. Ibid., p. 110.
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so, NO NEEDLESS KESTRICT/OMS
BUT AN ARTICULATED INTERACT/WC)
CITY-UNlv/ERSiry WHOLE \




h. <"<... ENCOURAGE THE DIS-r SOOCTON OF BOUNDARY
BETWEEN ONIVERSITy AND
TDlHN. ENCOURAGE(5), PARTS
OF THE TOWN TO GROW UP .
WITHIN THE ONIVERSlTy^E,A,l/
(AND VlCE-VEKSA) V>
\ {>«(7lRTl6ULAT£ THE WHOLE
IN TERMS OF PARTS) ^ALSO, IN




SUPPORT BY ORG) AN IZAT'°NAl_
FLEYIBIUTy IN ORDER. TO
ACHIEVE THE PROTOTYPE
It is not certain that such 'supports' exist for every
'pseudo-level' of those presented in the 'Oregon Experiment'.
Only an analytical study of the possible correlations among
the patterns can prove this.
3 densi- A second attribute of the distribution as regards the
r and
.mplifi- density of the patterns is that, at some levels some extremes
it ion of
ie chains are apparent. Namely, low complexity surface levels are
empty of patterns and the same happens with high complexity
3?6
deep levels. On the contrary, low complexity deep levels and
high complexity surface levels as well are crowded vvtih. patterns:







NOT IfJCLVDBO IM TH£ PATTER*5
BEOVUSt Tf^ey HAVE BEEN TR^WFERRED
iVhD THE QPMERAL PRIMCIFLFS
In the first part of this study, I have discussed why
this happens (see Chapter 2.5). In fact, the 'Oregon
Experiment' follows a simplified general path from the
elementary deep to the surface complex, emphasizing the
syntagmatic character of.the language it implies. These are,
of course, patterns of low complexity which belong to upper
levels, like 'university streets' ((§))',
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"... Concentrate the major functions of the
university - the offices, labs, lecture halls,
sports, student quarters - along university
streets; streets that are public and essentially
pedestrian, 20 to 30 feet wide, with all the
university activity opening off them;- always
locate new buildings to amplify and extend the
university streets.
There are also patterns of high complexity which belong
to deeper levels, like 'positive outdoor space' (21).
POSITIVE OUTDOOR SPACE
Outdoor spaces which are merely
'left-over' between buildings
will, in general, not be used.
Therefore: Always place build¬
ings, arcades, trees and walls,
so that the outdoor spaces they
form are convex in plan. But
never enclose an outdoor space
on all sides - instead connect
outdoor spaces to one another
so that it is possible to see
and walk from one to the next ii
more than one way.®^
Quite understandably, however, the general tendency
of the team is to have the deeper patterns in a general
elementary form and the surface examples in all the
complexity which is justified by their surface position.
91. Ibid., p. 114.






This remark could lead to a further elaboration of
our linguistic paradigm towards a composite representation
of the chains. To some extent, this has been attempted in
the diagrams of ChJL,2.4.4 , but, for reasons of simplification,
in the rest of the study the chains appear separated from
each other.
c4. elaboration of the taxonomy II: the university
model-structure
A further investigation of the 1 Oregon Experiment' can
only be based on the discussion of the real meaning of the
proposed patterns. To understand the deeper meaning of the
proposed university model-structure, we have to explore how
this meaning appears in the deeper elementary levels and how
it is transformed into surface,complex,environmental images
through the whole set of patterns and through the general
principles as well. The previous study of the distribution
of the patterns can give only an idea of the means which
are used for presenting this model-structure. However, this
distribution does not describe this model-structure.
Some general aspects of this ideal model-structure
are clearly integrated, I believe, within the fundamental
principles and predominantly in what has been called 1 organic
order through piecemeal growth'. I have stressed this
previously. What is new, is that some of the deep, large
scale,elementary patterns enrich this very general image.
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This enrichment is especially promoted by concepts like
'university population' (-CD), 'open university' ( (2) ) ,
1 university shape and diameter' ((4) ) and 'fabric of
departments' ( ([2) ). So, 'organic order' can be grown
through piecemeal operations but up to a limit ( (T), ®)
within a complex urban-university interacting system ((2) )
but following some basic internal principles concerned with
the parts of the universities ( (TJ) ). The team seem, therefore,
to be strongly opposed to the 'urban bombs', which establish
completely pre-designed autonomous campuses of a very large
or very small scale, and the parts of which have no particular
identity.
I think that, in the end, v\Y)y analysis of the ' Oregon
Experiment' would lead towards a similar general idea of a
university. Although we have to admit that there are only
few examples of universities which follow such principles,
this idea (mainly based on the model of the old urban
universities) seems attractive, especially if it is
achieved through the eventual participatory processes described
in the 'Oregon Experiment'. However, the important contribution
of this experiment is that this idea has not remained
only a very general model-structure of a university but it
has been extended to a very analytical list of patterns
regardless of how personal or one-sided these patterns
eventually are.
For a structural study of universities, the exploration
of the paths, through which the prototype of the old, urban,
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human and 'organic' university is translated into design
considerations like 'arcades' or 'real learning in cafes' ,
is essential. Within the limits of this study, however, this
detailed prototypic analysis can be only suggested as a field
of further research. Nevertheless, it is possible to discuss
here some eventual forms of such a research.
The exploration of 'which pattern comes from which'is
essential in order to understand the transformational rules
included in the chain from the elementary to the complex
structures and in the chain from the deep institutional to the
surface environmental structures as well. A major conclusion
expected from such an analysis refers to the completeness of
the pattern language in terms of its lexical items and in
terms of the rules, which generate each item from another.
The 'which comes from which' analysis of the patterns
can be based either on an ad hoc investigation of them or on
a comparative study, which would follow the main paths included
in our paradigm. The content of the patterns themselves,
is rich enough to show their connections in spite of their
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In general, the patterns, precisely because of their
loose and free formulation, radiate their content to most of
the levels included in our paradigm.
Thus, by decomposing the patterns we can find their
mappings at different levels and we can then study the levels
themselves in terms of their coherence. When we decompose
the patterns, we have to be careful not to cancel them. We
are not looking for combinations of phrases included in the
patterns but for mappings of them and for combinations of
these mappings, always within a structural logic. A complete
decomposition of the patterns would be disastrous for the
investigation of the pattern language as understood and proposed
by the team. The patterns are already structured prototypic
images and we have to deal with them as such.
The purpose of such a mapping is to facilitate the
understanding of the structure of the patterns as this structure
is analysed in a set of overlapping partial structures:
402.
 
Apart from the ad hoc investigation of 'which pattern
comes from which' through a process similar to the previous
one, a study of the patterns can also follow some of the basic
paths of our paradigm starting from the elementary, deep,
large/and institutional towards the complex, surface, smal^
and environmental. This would be a hypothetical tree structure
obviously equipped with a large number of new side-product
patterns, which,eventually,would not be included in the initial
list. The comparative study of the side-products and of the
original patterns would give an idea,first, of the completeness
of the pattern vocabulary of the 'Oregon Experiment' and,
second,for the structure of this vocabulary. Such a method,
however, would be highly subjective, since it has to be based
on a purely hypothetical model-structure of a university.
d. other aspects of the linguistic paradigm in the
'Oregon Experiment'
The model of the ideal university, as the Oregon team
conceived and expressed it through the patterns and their
hidden structure, is not the only conclusion from this
experiment. I have already discussed (Ch, 1.3.2) some more
general aspects of the 'Oregon Experiment' and I have presented
some questions to answer. Here, I shall summarize these
questions in two main areas and X shall discuss them in
brief.
o
The first area concerns the degree to which the Oregon
pattern language is in fact a 'modified' description of a
university; that is, a description with a clear problem-origin
and an ideological context. Although we can accept
that,in general,this language constitutes a
modified description of a university, we have
to identify the manner in which the problem-origin of the
language is translated into the basic components of it; that
is, into the patterns and the rules of structuring them.
The second area of questions, which lead to a further
investigation of the 'Oregon Experiment', deals with the general
logic which governs the transformations of university
structures. The 'Oregon Experiment' as a whole does not
provide us with a static image of a future university. The
idea of piecemeal growth towards organic order by following
self-regulated participatory processes emphasizes the dynamic
nature of universities as the Oregon team understand it. To
what extent, however, university dynamics is conceived by the
team as a process based on contradictions is another question.
This question can be only partially answered, because most
of the information needed for such an answer is apparently
included in the meaning of the patterns themselves and in their
structure.
It is rather premature to answer such questions by
taking only the 'Oregon Experiment' into account. It is
expected that the 'Timeless Way of Building' will give mere
concrete and structured material for such answers. The
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'Oregon Experiment', nevertheless, is undoubtedly a 'modified'
description of universities. That is, every pattern and
every general principle of it has a clear ideological origin.
I have repeatedly noted in this chapter that the principles as
a whole indicate this ideological origin. The problem is that
they indicate this origin at a less deeper level than one
should expect and that, in the end, the ideology promoted by
the principles is itself idealistic, achronic or indeed timeless.
Alexander and his colleagues appear in the 'Oregon Experiment'
to be apriorists despite all the discussion concerning
participation and despite the expectations for a gradual
evolvement of the university through piecemeal operations
by the users. The team believe in one specific image of a
university, namely in an 'order they are after'; they also
believe that such an order is hidden and has to be somehow
discovered; they are,finally,convinced that professionals can
do nothing about discovering this order. In short, they are
after a return to an environment organically produced by the
users as in the case of vernacular architecture. Unfortunately,
they have also to invent a vernacular societal structure to
achieve it. Unfortunately too, other aspects of participation
are not sufficiently emphasized in the 'Oregon Experiment'.
Participants are considered as an ideal 'universitas' cleared
from any antagonisms; in the end, institutional difficulties
of the centralized organization of a university are not taken
into account.
This idealism has its consequences -for the proposed
principles and patterns. Although the deep elementary
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structures to which patterns and principles correspond are
modified and orientated towards planning, they promote
'organic order' and biological perfection. Although it is not
entirely fair to claim something like this without having
analysed all the patterns and their structure in detail, it
is more or less evident that the patterns reflect the
philosophy of vernacular architecture. They reflect it,
however, in different ways, according to the ideal images
that the members of the team have in their minds. The deep
meaning of these images is different for the large scale
compared with the small building scale. And we have to admit
that it is mainly oft the biAildcng scale where the contribution
of the team is. more important, although this contribution
concerns architectural prototypes in general rather than
universities in particular.
Although the vernacular, human, participatory and
piecemeal growth image of a university or of an urban formation
is not repulsive, we have to realize that it is based upon
a particular attitude towards not only society but also the
environmental artefacts that society can produce. The
question to be answered ( I believe by the 'Timeless Way of
Building') is whether this attitude is a result of a historical
explanation of the contemporary societal conditions or an
abstract ideal, which does not occur nowadays and has to occur.
This discussion leads us to the second area of questions
concerned with the 'Oregon Experiment', Is it reasonable
4o7
to expect a contradictional understanding of university
transformations within the context of such ideal forms and of
such ideal procedures to achieve them?
In principal, the answer is positive. The internal
antagonisms in a university, however they appear (as 'normal
anomalies' or 'leading contradictions' ) can be exploited in order
to facilitate the development of the university towards the
'organic order' of the future. The question is whether or not
such a tendency is present in the pattern language of the
'Oregon Experiment'.
,\Ri
Alexander himself is not unfamiliar within an under¬
standing of structures based upon contradictions and
antagonisms. As I mentioned previously (Ch. 1.3.1,c), in
the 'Atoms of Environmental Structure" he realized the
conflicts between interacting 'tendencies' at the deep
elementary level of what he had previously identified as
'needs'. Since the logic of patterns evolved at almost the
same time, it is reasonable to imagine that patterns represent
already structured prototypic forms, where such conflicts have
been resolved. The patterns represent, to Alexander, the atoms
of a good environment and, therefore, conflicts between
tendencies are avoided in them. If we follow the arguments
developed in the 'Atoms', we can understand this attitude
quite clearly. Strictly within the same logic, we have to
expect that such conflicts have to appear in that part of
the patterns, where the identity of the problem is presented.
For,'patterns' constitute, according to this logic, eventual
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good solutions for bad situations which are described as
'problems'. Conflicts should be apparent in the 'problem'
part of the pattern and should be resolved in the 'therefore'
part of them.
In fact, this happens to some extent in the 'Oregon
Experiment'. There are, however,.some difficulties if] recoup i ei^
it. The first difficulty derives from the over-simplified
language used in the 'Oregon Experiment'®®. The second dif¬
ficulty derives from the obvious differentiation between
problems and proposals in terms of deepness, complexity or
substance. Normally, the conflict which is hidden in the
'problem' is deeper, more elementary and more institutional
than the resolution presented in the 'therefore' part of the
patterns. This is shown in the following example of pattern
CD as seen through the model of our linguistic paradigm:
PATTERN © : UNIVERSITY POPULATION
PROBLEM:
If a University is too small, it
suffers from lack of variety;if it
is too large,it no longer works as
a human organization;if it grows
too fast,it breaks down because it
doesn't have the chance to absorb
—or to adjust to change.
PROPOSAL:
Therefore:Limit the growth of any
university to a rate of 2% per year,
and limit the absolute size of any
university to 25,000 students.
93. As mentioned, most of the patterns are better analysed in the
"Pattern Language" and the Oregon files.
94. Ibid. (Oregon), p. 108.
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In this sense, eyen if an internal conflict or an
'anomaly' between different descriptive images of a university
is apparent, it is difficult to identify the way of resolving it.
Contradictions in the 'problem' part of the patterns
usually appear in the form of 'if - then' and are mapped on
extreme cases. Such contradictions belong mostly to what I
have called 'normal anomalies': "if something happens at the
environmental level, then this happens at the activity level
(first extreme); if ... then t...) (second extreme); so,
follow the middle (.design consideration based on the conflict
between activities and environment)". This is shown in the
following example of pattern (f6) seen through our model.
( (f6) ) STUDENT COMMUNITY j £
[if dormitories are too small and (too A(th t 1
communal, they become constrainina?)-1 f, "!"s ?
[if they 4re too big or too private-^then fonstrarnrng)





















Therefore: Encourage the formation of
autonomously managed cooperative housing
clusters that bring 30 or 40 units together,
around communal eating, sports, etc. Unlike
dorms, however, make the individual units
rather autonomous, with sink, toilet and hot






The example shows that the prototypic image, which is
promoted by a pattern, is conceived as a middle road between
apparent extremes and that it is not perceived in an
abstract way. The whole set of the patterns is indeed (as
previously mentioned in Ch.II,1.3.3)a set of equilibrium images,
where conflicts are supposedly avoided:
UNSTABLE AREAS, PRODOCBD B>Y
USE Of RULES; NOT PRtFWtf) QV THE
PATTERN LfiNbVf)OB.
< EQ.UiLi 6RIUM ARJEA , "NO£MPU" DRDftt STRDCrUefrJ 5
PREFERLtP B>Y IHT- PAT7HUJ /AN$046?E
As Rabeneck wrote, the pattern language is
"scrupulous in pointing out that the patterns offered
are no more than hypotheses" 95
in which varying degrees of faith are by the authors. So,
95. Ibid., p. 119.
95. A. RABENECK, Book review in A.D. 1/79, p. 19.
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if new conflicts arise in the 'ideal' situations described
by the proposals, the users will be free to add or transform
certain or all the patterns to suit their new circumstances.
They have of course to invent new ideal prototypic images to
repeat the same procedure. How they can invent them is a
question which should not be answered before the appearance of
the 'Timeless Way of Building', However, a reference to the
way, in which internal antagonisms should be realized in order
to lead to new prototypes, is something that one should
expect from the 1 Timeless Way1 ,
Although most of the 'problems' stated in the patterns
follow the previously explained logic, there are also certain
clearer references to leading contradictions. As expected,
such references are mostly included in the larger and
institutional patterns. However, some of them are also
presented in activity images, reminders of the conflicts between
'tendencies' which continue to influence Alexander's
thinking. Consider the following example (pattern (2) ) .
( @ ) OPEN UNIVERSITY
[when a university is built up as a institutional
campus, separated by a hard boundary avT^a°bNb'^ E&NFcruEd
from the town, it tends to isolate ' S
its students from the townspeople,
and in a subtle way takes on the
character of a glorified high school.|
) I , . Give the infra-
respurr^on (at various levels) structure
Therefore : ["Encourage^ the [dissolution (including the
of the boundary between university institutional)
and tow"n~K Encourage 1 parts of the ^\_m
town to grow up within the university, T°war s an en-
and parts of the university to grow vironmen a_
up within the town]97 activity result
\_ Explained as a
strategy
97. C. ALEXANDER et al. (1975), The Oregon etc., op. cit,
pp. 108-109.
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Antagonisms are also present at an activity level as
in the case of pattern 7 .
(7) LOOPED LOCAL ROADS
[^Through trafficj^destroys theptran- \ Antagonism
quility and the safety of / between
pedestrian areas]. This is especially activities
true in university districts, where (both essential)
the creation of quiet precincts is
crucial to the work.
RESOLUTION
Therefore: To bring the traffic and
the pedestrian world{Tnto the right-
balance] ^jmake the local roads that
serve the area form a system of
loops or cul-de-sacs, so that






The pattern language which is proposed for the
'Oregon Experiment', as it is restricted to some simplified
prototypic equilibrium images, excludes a large number of
eventual prototypes and strategies, in which the exploitation
of the transformational potential of contradictions would be
more effective and imaginative. However, it is not fair to
criticize this language for this fact. Where it has to be
criticized, in my view, is at the level of the very basic
patterns which the pattern language does not include/ and the
98. Ibid., pp. 112-113,
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contradictional understanding of which could lead to quite
different 'ideal1 images of a university. There is no refer¬
ence, for instance, to problems which derive frcm the contradiction
between the alleged academic autonomy and the financial
dependence of universities on the State, There is also no
reference to more specific problems, which derive from
antagonisms between teaching and research (or at least from
the antagonistic aspects of this relationship), Finally,
there is no reference to a more general antagonism of
contemporary universities, which covers and explains the
others; that is, the antagonism between the role of univer¬
sities as ideological State apparatuses reproducing the
essential personel---of a mode of production and their natural
role as centers of societal guidance, a role that universities
have been continuously playing.
Such general aspects of universities might be easily
considered as too general or too questionable to have any
effect on the activities and the environment of the univer¬
sities. It has been shown through history, however, that
there are some effects of this kind, especially related to the
relationship between universities and cities and also related
to the symbolic aspects of the university environment. What
has been undoubtedly shown, nevertheless, is that
environmental decisions concerning universities are more
ideologically influenced and historically affected than -those
implied by the tranquil, balanced, ideal and, in the end,
timeless image, which is promoted by the 'Oregon Experiment'.
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The criticism on some aspects of the 'Oregon Experiment'
16 not in4er)die<i to minimize the pioneering value of the work
carried out by Alexander and his colleagues. Many critics
agree about the value of the pattern language as a tool for
understanding and planning the artificial space and as a
'wonderful' apparatus for architectural education. Within
the context of this study, however, the pattern language and the
'Oregon Experiment' are valuable for another reason; "they
constitute the only worked example of a semantically meaningful
language of built space based on the idea of prototypic
structures and their analysis, I have advocated the same
idea throughout the present study and I think that the 'Oregon
Experiment' shows, in the end, clearly that there are some
basic advantages in accepting a logic, which is based on the






This study was an attempt to investigate • te artificial
space in general and universities in particular, through the
paradigm of structural linguistics and semantic syntax.
The paradigm which structural linguistics follows, was
modified according to the particularities of artificial
space; namely, the semantic pluralism of built environment
and the strongly operational character of explanation in
architecture.
The possibility of establishing a 'modified', problem-
originated and problem-solving orientated structural description
of built space was investigated through an example. The
example referred to the problem of alienation . The study
analysed the specific aspects of understanding this problem
with regard to artificial environment.
It also analysed the participatory strategies proposed
to face the problem of alienation. Finally, the study tried
to indicate the particular form that a 'modified' description
of space can take under the influence of the alienation-
participation bipolar.
All these constituted the first part of the study.
This part dealt with artificial space in general, but it
showed at the same time that a modified description of
artificial space, orientated to the solution of problems, has
to take into account the individual characteristics of the
building-type which is under consideration.
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In its second part, the study explored the possibility
of applying a paradigm equipped with the properties stated
above to a building category which has a clear institutional
identity: that is, the universities. The reason why
universities were preferred, as opposed to other building
categories, was that they usually combine a complete normal
city image with particularities and symbolic exaggerations,
implied by their institutional identity. .
Instead of examining universities as such, however, the
study found ifmore effective to investigate existing descriptive
and planning theories about universities. There were three
main purposes served by this kind of inquiry. First, to test
the coherence and comprehensiveness of such theories by using
the modified linguistic paradigm as a filter. Second, to test
the validity of the paradigm itself concerning its capacity
of being 1 translated' into the terms of such theories as well
as of being eventually modified by their context.
Finally, to explore the value of a structural approach to
built space in general (by comparing it to other approaches
with more or less structural characteristics) as well as to
answer through this approach and through the comparison with
others^ some of the specific questions with which universities
are faced. Such answers are expected either directly (through
the discussion in this study) or indirectly through the
eventual production of a structural descriptive theory,




This study is mainly taxonomic. That is, it is
interested in exploring where things belong rather than in
finding particular solutions of particular problems. This
happens,first,because of the large variety of concepts introduced
in architecture by the linguistic metaphor and,second, because
of the very nature of a paradigm. A paradigm is understood
basically as a 'model of models' and it would be far beyond
the limits of such a study to answer questions concerned with
both the model of models and the models themselves. The fact
that some of these models are elaborated in more detail in this
study, is due to the particular importance attributed to some
basic questions as well as to the inevitable involvement of
'meaning' in problems initially intended for a mere taxonomic
analysis.
A valuable consequence of a taxonomic study, however,
is that hidden areas of problems and, eventually, of answers
to them can be illustrated and can acquire a significance not
previously attributed to them. This is, in fact, a contribution
to the 'meaning' of such problems, which is perhaps more
operational than solving them in conventional terms. In this
sense, the taxonomy implied by the linguistic paradigm
enriched the meaning of the two major areas where it has been




3. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The assumptions, on which the present study has been
based, belong to two domains. The first domain refers to the
dynamic nature of description and the second to the semantic
component of a linguistic syntax and to the broader notion of
'meaning1 as well.
The major conclusions refer also to the above domains
as these domains are transformed for built space.
There are also conclusions concerned with the two areas where
the paradigm has been tested; that is, the problem of alienation
in artificial environment and the description and planning
of universities. Here, I shall repeat very briefly these
conclusions, following the structure of the study.
I. On the nature of description and the linguistic
paradigm.
Description, especially in the social sciences and the
sciences of the artificial in particular, is equipped with
'behinds' and 'beyonds'; that is, it has a historical origin
and is orientated towards practice.
Comprehensiveness is a fundamental attribute of description
and is understood both in terms of the descriptors used to
construct 'descriptive theories' as well as in terms of the
coherence between 'behinds', ' beyonds' and the descriptive
corpus of a theory.
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Metaphors and'scientific borrowing' are current practices
in the social sciences and architecture in particular.
Metaphors become operational when the borrowed paradigms, first
preserve their structural cohesion and second,are modified to be
adapted to the nature of problems and the ideological context
of their solution.
Structural views oppose systemic ones in terms of their
ability to combine simplicity with comprehensiveness of
explanation. They are based on the logic of transformations
from lower to higher orders of deepness and/or complexity,
as opposed to the logic of systemic views, which is based on
elements and their relationships.
Syntactic views oppose 'syntagmatic' views in terms of
the involvement of meaning in syntax. Autonomous syntaxes
accept that meaning emerges through rules of mapping, while
semantic syntaxes accept that meaning is included even at the
deepest and most elementary levels. Syntactic views are
subject to abstract and achronic interpretations as opposed
to syntagmatic views which are capable of historically
meaningful manipulations. Even syntagmatic views, however,
have to achieve an optimal level of abstraction in order to
correspond to particular conditions and to solve particular
problems. Otherwise, they are in danger of becoming achronic
and academic.
The concept of meaning in the domain of artificial
environment is broader than in language and corresponds better
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to the concepts of 'pragmatic value' and 'social evaluation'.
Inevitably, more semantic bases than that of communication
are included. The structure of the system of social evaluation
and the predominances in it characterize particular periods in
the history of artificial environment. Architectural
prototypes represent pre-structured systems, which occur at
an intermediate level of abstraction. Such prototypes reflect
the structure of the system of social evaluation of the time,
in which they are produced.
The core of the operational modifications of the
linguistic paradigm in architecture consists of the conscious
manipulation of such semantic bases in order to reflect the
system of social evaluation of the time,the ideological
intentions and the problem-solving nature of practice, as
well as the institutional characteristics and particularities
of the building category with which practice is concerned.
The necessity of such modifications as well as the
'semantic pluralism' of built space indicate the limits
of applying a pure linguistic metaphor to the domain of
artificial environment.
The operational modifications of the linguistic paradigm
concern the following: first, the identity and formal structure
of the semantic bases, which constitute the system of social
evaluation of built space. Second, the catalytic effect
on the structure of such bases, caused by a problem and an
ideologically influenced practice to solve it. Such catalytic
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effects apply equally to the deep elementary structure of
artificial environment and to the rules which transform this
structure into higher orders.
The semantic bases., which constitute a hypothetical
formal background for the modification of the linguistic
paradigm in this study, refer to the differentiation of
substance of the environmental structures and correspond to
three levels of approach: the purely environmental, concerned
with the physical image of built space, the activity and
the institutional. Combined with the deepness chain, the set
of these three levels constructs a formal basis for under¬
standing the semantic pluralism of built environment.
It is,in fact,this formal basis that represents the main
model through which the linguistic metaphor to architecture is
understood in this study.
Deepness and substance chains tend to coincide as we
move from surface to depth and from the physical to the
institutional image of built space. Deep environmental,
activity and institutional images are understood as one coherent
image, as opposed to surface images, which are distinct and
different from each other.
Alienation is an example of a problem, which is strong
enough to cause modifications of the linguistic paradigm of the
kind mentioned before. On the one hand, it influences the
structure of the formal basis of environmental semantics and,
on the other, it influences the elementary deep structure of
built- space ~ and the rules which transform this deep
structure into higher orders . Alienation is understood as a
problem according to the following interpretations: first,, as
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a cause for creating barriers between the producer of
artificial space and the product itself. Second, as a cause
for creating physical, activity and institutional barriers
in the use of artificial environment.. Third, as a cause
for eliminating the potential semantic pluralism of built
space and, therefore, for creating barriers between the user ancL
his environment. Consequently,alienation modifies
our understanding of the elementary deep structure
of artificial environment ; that is, this deep
structure becomes a barrier-structure.It also modifies
our understanding of the rules for transforming this elementary
deep structure into higher orders (these rules are of two kinds:
rules which eliminate the problem through a problem-solving
strategy and rules which increase the problem). Such rules
reflect the 1explain-propose' bipolar of a problem-solving
orientated description. Finally, alienation modifies our
understanding of the formal basis, which is used to illustrate
the semantic pluralism of artificial space. The structure
of this basis also becomes a barrier-structure; that is, the
natural routes from the surface to the deep and from the
environmental to the institutional are either eliminated or
disorientated.
Participation has been considered as a disalienation
process. User participation in design only,however constitutes a
narrow interpretation of this. The taxonomic elaboration of
the modified linguistic paradigm illustrates a broader
interpretation of participation as a disalienation process.
Such an interpretation extends participation to infrastructural
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strategies, which are used for a gradual abolition of alienation.
Such strategies include cases like controlled development of
participation to avoid eventual dangers of co-optation or to
enrich an eventual partial understanding of built space.
Alienatory effects and participatory disalienation strategies
refer both to users and professionals. The barriers between
disciplines like urbanism and architecture, for instance,
indicate the nature of such problems as regards professional
expertise.
The dynamics of artificial space, finally, refers
both to mental transformational processes which are used to
understand and describe built space as well as to real
transformations of it, which take place diachronically.
An eventual understanding of such transformations through a
logic which accepts that contradictions constitute the core
of the transformational potential refers to both of the above
processes. As regards mental processes, contradictions and
antagonisms are introduced in our paradigm as an overall logic
by the modified transformational rules of 'increase problem -
eliminate problem', which are expressed in the form of com¬
mutative square. As regards real processes, contradictions
and antagonisms appear either between images of different
substance (in this case they are called 'normal anomalies')
or within an image. The most essential of the latter, mainly
those of institutional character, are called 'leading contra¬
dictions' . Both 'normal anomalies' and 'leading contradictions'
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reflect the potential for transformation of an environmental
structure, either through design action (as in the case of
'normal anomalies') or through overall changes, mainly-
promoted by transformations of the institutional framework
of built space.
II. On universities
Universities constitute a category of built forms which
have many similarities with urban forms of the same scale on the
one hand, and certain particular characteristics on the other.
This dual identity of universities outlines the value of
studying them through the linguistic paradigm. Universities
represent built space in general, but they also exaggerate
and emphasize the physical, activity and institutional features
of urban forms. Their environment is symbolically
overloaded, their activity patterns are clearer and more
scheduled and their institutional character is distinct and
plays a certain role in societal guidance.
The historical studies of universities usually emphasize
the institutional properties and transformations of them.
The history of the first period of the student university at
medieval Bologna, as written by H. Rashdall and J.K. Hyde,
indicates the role of internal antagonisms during the first
crucial transformation of this type of university towards
dependence on the State. It also indicates the nature of the
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institutionalization process that the built environment of
these universities followed, and the role of this institutiona¬
lization in the transformation of the student universities.
The activity models of university planning are typical
examples of 'decisionistic1 models, and are based on the
logic of alternatives and on the clear distinction between
the environmental, activity and institutional image of
universities. The activity models serve as an apparatus to
test environmental and institutional alternative policies
and are not structurally • connected with the image of a
university at those two levels. These models promote a
1 mapping' logic and are not interested in constructing
comprehensive model-structures for universities. Moreover,
they are based on questionable assumptions about the activities
themselves, since they can hardly integrate non-scheduled
activities. Yet, within the decisionist logic of the activity
models, there is enough room for a more comprehensive under¬
standing of universities as the study for 'the University in
an Urban Environment" has shown.
The 'Oregon Experiment' by Ch. Alexander and his
colleagues at the Center for Environmental Structure at
Berkeley is a unique example of applying a structural language
of artificial space to university planning. This language
has much in common with our linguistic paradigm. It is problem-
originated and planning-orientated, it corresponds to the logic
of semantic rather than to the logic of autonomous syntax, it is
comprehensive containing all the substance, deepness and
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complexity levels, and makes extensive use of pre-structured
prototypes ('patterns'). However, the paradigm behind the
'Oregon Experiment' is still deterministic, since it accepts
a kind of biological order as an ultimate target of planning,
and since it does not make use of alternative strategies for
design other than those which contain structures which are in
a state of equilibrium.
The 'Oregon Experiment' seen through the modified
linguistic paradigm also illustrates some more general features
of this paradigm. First, it illustrates the fact that
particular environments, which correspond to particular
institutions, may generate dialects for describing and planning
these environments. Second, it illustrates the fact that such
environments and institutions may produce both particular
structures of a system of social evaluation and also model-
structures through which they may be investigated. The Oregon
team's model-structure of a university is rather different than
that which a contradictional understanding of universities
would imply. However, the 'Oregon Experiment' shows the way
for further research on describing and planning universities
through the logic of the linguistic metaphor. Moreover, it
discovers,through this logic, many hidden environmental qualities,
which are lost in conventional design.
A linguistic analysis of architectural space by no means
exists within the context of an eventual 'normal science'
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of architectural description. The growing interest in this
field of research does not alter the experimental and highly
speculative character of such an analysis. In fact, many
approaches declared as syntactic or syntagmatic have much in
common with others, which although not 'officially' accepted
as such, follow a similar logic, or at least, are subject
to such an analysis.
There is a lot to be done in the direction of developing
a paradigm for built space and 'scientific borrowing' is
an inevitable step in such a process. Within the context
of the linguistic metaphor, what has not yet been sufficiently
worked out is the prototypic analysis of artificial
environment. Highly structured architectural prototypes have
still much to offer to our understanding of built space,
"either through the study of themselves or through the study
of the theories, which have been built in order to interpret
these prototypes.
This thesis was an attempt to propose a way of
explaining the architectural phenomena and,therefore, of
acting on them. To what extent studies of this nature satisfy
or try to satisfy a real existing demand in our understanding
of : artificial environment is a question that the
study itself cannot answer except" in highly ideological terms.
Although it is obvious that I advocate such attempts, it is
up to the reader to decide whether our empiric knowledge
of our environment on the one side and the arguments
developed in this study on the other justify such a task.
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